UNCLASSIFIED Department of State Release of Documents on Argentina and the Latin American Region, 1977-1980 SUMMARY This collection of documents was selected for two ehapters, on Argentina and the Latin Ameriean region, to be published in a forthcoming Foreign Relations of the United States volume on South Ameriea, 1977-1980. These 119 documents, totaling 574 pages, are made available to the public today by the U.S. Department of State at the request of the Government of Argentina and in support of the President’s commitment to deelassify U.S. Government documents pertaining to human rights abuses committed during Argentina’s 1976-1983 military dictatorship. In autumn 2017, these two chapters, including additional annotation to the documents released today, will be formally published on the Offiee of the Historian’s public website, history.state.gov. The full volume, ineluding the remaining nine ehapters in the Foreign Relations volume on South America, 1977-1980, will be published in early 2018. This volume will be one of 32 Foreign Relations volumes documenting the foreign poliey of the Jimmy Carter presidential administration. The Foreign Relations series, published since 1861 by the Department of State, presents the official documentary historieal reeord of major foreign poliey deeisions and signifieant diplomatie aetivity of the U.S. Government. The Foreign Relations series is required by law to be a thorough, aceurate, and reliable reeord of U.S. foreign policy and serves as one of the longest-running examples of the U.S. commitment to openness and transparency. Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted doeuments from all relevant U.S. Government repositories. For this volume and these chapters, historians searched for the documents that were most important in the proeess of developing and implementing U.S. foreign policy in the following ageneies and repositories: the Department of State, the National Archives and Records Administration (including documents held at College Park, Maryland, and the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia), the National Security Council, the Library of Congress, the Central Intelligenee Agency, and the Department of Defense. These doeuments include minutes of discussions between the president and foreign leaders, memoranda about deliberations inside the National Seeurity Couneil and the Department of State, cables from U.S. embassies abroad, and intelligenee analyses. Doeument selection for the Foreign Relations series is guided by the prineiples of historieal objeetivity and aceuracy. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED The documents released today show high-level U.S. concern over human rights violations in the Southern Cone at that time and policy debates within the Carter administration over what exactly to do about those violations. In these years, U.S. policy toward Argentina sought to promote human rights, moderate the internal dynamics of the ruling junta, and encourage the reestablishment of electoral democracy and an orderly end to the military government that had taken power in March 1976. At the same time, U.S. officials tried to calm disputes between Argentina and its neighbors, limit the spread of nuclear weapons, encourage the stabilization and growth of the Argentine economy, and, in 1980, ensure Argentine cooperation in the grain embargo that the United States had placed on the Soviet Union. Many of the documents are relevant to the Argentine Government’s request regarding information about human rights abuses. However, not all the documents relate specifically to this request; some were selected for inclusion in the Foreign Relations series because of their importance to other aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward the entire Latin American region. These documents provide context into the entirety of the relationship between the U.S. and Argentina from 1977-1980. Much of U.S. policy toward Argentina from 1977-1980 grew out of President Carter’s new global emphasis on human rights. In addition, it was driven by a Congressionally-mandated halt on U.S. arms sales to Argentina, which was enacted in August 1977 and went into effect on October 1, 1978. U.S. officials grappled with internal disagreements over what tactics should be used to implement the human rights policy. The disagreements inside the Carter administration were not over whether or how to support the Argentine Government, but rather over how to influence its behavior. The declassification review of the documents in this collection was coordinated by The Office of the Historian under regulations established in Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information.” Each document underwent a careful word-by-word review with special emphasis on releasing as much information as possible, consistent with the protection of United States national security. The interagency declassification review resulted in minor excisions in 16 documents and an excision of a paragraph or more in one document. The public release of these documents builds on two previous releases in August and December 2016. Due to the breadth of the search undertaken in U.S. Government documents for information on Argentina’s 1976-1983 dictatorship, there is some overlap between documents released earlier and those released today. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED South America; Latin America Region, 1977-1980 South American Regional Compilation Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume XXIV South American Region UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 1 . Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC- 1 7 Washington, January 26, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 2, PRM/NSC 1-24 [1], Secret. UNCLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20606 UmS^IED January 26 , 1977 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC - 17 TO; The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense ALSO; The Secretary of the Treasury • The Attorney General The United States Representative to the United Nations The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Labor The Secretary of Commerce The Chairman, Coxuicil of Economic Advisers The Administrator , Agency for International Development The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency The Director, United States Information Agency The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence The Special Trade Representative SUBJECT: Review of U.S . Policy Toward Latin America (U) The President has directed that the PRM/NSC-1 on Panama lead into a broad review of our overall policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. The PRC, chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for preparation of this review , which should clearly state areas of inter-agency agreement and disagreement. The study should analyze the major issues of concern to the U .S . and Latin America and examine whether the current assumptions underlying U.S. policy toward the region as well as the policies UN^raFIED by NARA on fhe recommendafion of fhe NSC. themselves are appropriate to an effective handling of these issues . The review should concentrate initially on six areas and then proceed to 9 . discussion ctf an overall policy . The stodjr shbuld be completed by March 1. The six areas for initial analysis include: 1. Interests . What economic, political, and military changes have occurr^ oVer fire jikst decade in &e ihtemational environment, in the U.S. and in die countries of Latin America and the Caribbean? How have these changes affected die ways in which U.S. policies can advance or protect U.S . interests in the region or influence the internal or external poHcies of the region's governments? What are U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean today, and how have diey evolved over the past decade? What is the broad psychological climate within the hemisphere into which U.S. policies and action will be prelected over the next decade? 2 . Economic Issues . The economic issues of concern to Latin America, including trade, commodities, debt, international financial institutions, foreign direct investment, science and tech-* nology, and develc^ment assistance make up the agenda of the North- South dialogue. Therefore, in developing options for U.S. policies on these issues , the review should include a discussion of (a) how it would impact on U.S. and Latin/Caribbean interests, and (b) how it might be implemented, including pUssible heed for new legislation or a tnodificatlon of existing legislation . These options should take explicit account of the differentiation of Latin America and the Caribbean as between middle range powers and less-developed countries. Discussion of strategies for each option should address its relationship to the broader North-South dialogue and should identify which institution(s) — if any — might be the most appropriate and effective for dealing with the issue. The review should also include an analysis and possible options for U.S. policy toward Latin American and Caribbean efforts at regional economic integration, including the Central American lJM®IFIED 3 Common Market, Caribbean Commvinity, Andean Pact, LAFTA, and also the Latin American Economic System (SELA) . 3 . Human Rights . What options are available for U .S . foreign policy to reflect a higher and more effective level of concern for fundamentad human rights in all nations? Options should be developed for U.S. policy in: (a) bilateral relationships (taking into consideration distinctions between degrees of human rights violations and types of governments); (b) multilateral organizations , including intergoveriimmital organizations like the OAS , the Inter- American Development Bank, the Inter- American Htunan Rights Commission, the United Nations Human Rights Commission; non-govemmental organizations like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists; and third parties like Western European governments and the Vatican; and (c) signing and ratifica- tion of various conventions , including the Aimerican Convention on Human Rights . A discussion should also be included of ways to strengthen the internal capacity of the U.S. Government to assess reports and to make determinations on "consistent patterns of gross violations of htiman rights" . It should also include a review of present U.S. policy with regard to temporary asyliun in U.S . Embassies, and emigration to the U.S. of refiigees from political repression. 4. Special Countar Problems . With regard to each, what are U.S. interests, and in the light of those interests what should U.S. objectives be? What options and strategies are available to the U.S. to attain those objectives? a. Cuba (can be dealt with s^arately and more quickly) b . Brazil c. Mexico d. Central America 5. Caribbean . This section should consider: (a) a discussion of the economic and political problems of the independent and non-self- goveming islands of the Caribbean; (b) a review of U.S. security, economic, humanitarian, and political interests in the region, and strategies for advancing or protecting those interests; and (c) the desirability and feasibility of assisting the development of the region M MaASS IPIFD 4 in a way which will not collide with the aspirations for national inde- pendence of the new ind^endent coiintries of the region. 6. Institutional and Other Issues . Issues for review include, but need not be limited to: a. Inter- American Syst^ : U.S. purposes with respect to the Organization of American States, the Rio Treaty , and other regional organizations like the Inter- American Defuse Board. b . U.S. Policies on Territorial Disputes : (1) Bolivia-Chile-Peru (2) Peru-Ecuador (3) El Salvador-Honduras (4) Belize (5) Guy ana-Surinam- Venezuela (6) Venezuela-Colombia Arms Sales, military training and U.S. military representation . d. Nuclear Proliferation and safeguards . e. Narcotics . Immigration . This review should identify at the conclusion &e basic options for an overall U.S. -Latin American policy in light of the options identified for the major issues considered above./ Zbigniew Brzezinski imSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 2 . Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter Washington, March 5, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 39, Peru, 1977. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right- hand comer of the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED \\i\\U)H:\sin \\ V ‘r ' ^-''4 <1 753 Rc- penaaa lapanadlp aara bdag datafaad aa toaigai af ertaw agdaal toa The dawanw hae pparawd ai a aaeiel wknfaeeaw a ea d b fa aalyt ^fanrkai BefeRBBMWOB k nay Pangaay aftaa aMHnia died fa adlliaip fall. Since kan ndfaad kl pnetoan aad adapted paSlfaal prfaaawa Maaary tPM, tone ban baai atdy aa- loan aabito watkadi af diM»a|jkb tka aaiidaillilid I aadaaal lepnrta af taitata pi Hlfa i l alleged •Vncnifai af tow iialc.*eWl> I m nlgi l in tod petol to too flgwtoo ed aa aad toa trnlianal af : aa nkabfe ^nai aa toe laadkbtollfaahlepfadnn rarpalittaalpifaaaarifakniB.Ia rtipimkinilp far toa ifagal deMatfaae . Oct aba r IPPS, Ai a anty latiraitliail rapartad Ikal laaia 2,flM paHtfaal The pawnaeat aawiti toal tone pea- p i faaa tn aara i ir a it id dadag l»7> aad pb kan akher Bed Ike aagaay ar gene I9M aad'toal becaaea POP aad no af Mdcapaiaid. Iaaaamanai.faftfauiaay toeai nan atm aader detaadea. US an- baanainltelo^w^^iwwaaieal banyefBefala fa ki a ilii lirifa n th a t b ath by apaaaeifag da^ af aSe^ tofadag dwaa eatoaaica in rrnfanatid; di^ penau. aefcaatafadge. k aae nr . toat they da act Ike ad baa gra^ af toa UN Kaaiaa tew tty firoi ooi tefco . OooitoBfloo bw liwoi o B j pfl it Tke aiip ra r iw a i fa the bnnaa ifatai fe a dwnnliig the ‘kalkakad paaard! af •lUMCtootoflraflldBttoiitepoBiou’tei tot CUkoo toteffiflcoeo ttowtonfle otol lovwitototoc field trifli l Tbero baw «ffWPC8fl3f beni goKfc io> •Useei flte )pe». Ob flw ma bwid, ite ■ Mhorflsrtoa of Ite jtotg tes tBol boeo vetoxed, ■ad igi etikagf foirlcH ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 UNCLASSIFIED 4. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 60, PRC 008 — Latin America — 3/23/77. Secret. Borg forwarded to Brzezinski under a March 12 covering memorandum and noted that Vance requested that copies of the study be distributed to members of the PRC for use at the PRC meeting scheduled for March 15, which was postponed to March 24. See Document 7. UNCLASSIFIED CEGRE ^ PRESIDENTIAL REVIE\^ MEMORANDUM NSC- 17 REVIEW OP UNITED STATES POLICY / TOWARD LATIN AMERICA SECRE T CDS DECLASSIFIED NARA on the ge NSC under provisions of E.0. 12958/ UNCLASSIFIED [Omitted here is the table of contents.] UNCLASSIFIED SECRET PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORAI^DUM/NSC-17 UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA: OVERVIEW I. Introduction We have prepared the response to PRM/NSC-17 in two parts. The first is this overview. It integrates major policy problems into two conceptual and eight specific issues. The second is a set of papers that examines particular policy areas in more detail, presents pros and cons on individual options, and reflects work undertaken prior to preparation of this overview. In the overview we have sought to be didactic by posing somewhat stark options that show the occasional conflicts among U.S. interests and between U.S. interests and those of other hemispheric nations. We have formulated these issues in ways to elicit guidance from the PRC on general policy directions . Finally, the outcome of separate Presidential Review Memoranda on human rights, non-proliferation, and North-South questions will have a major impact on U.S. policy toward the hemisphere. Because of their global nature, these issues are touched upon in the overview, but are not drawn out as distinct issues. DECLASSIRED ON uln/cw by M( ip tfip gf the SECRET uiiuiii p.'Ovi^ions of E.O. 12958 XGds-3 II SECRET - - 1 - . The Setting The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are more diverse, prosperous, confident, independent and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third World. They also have an alarming population growth, the dizziest rate of urbanization and the most highly developed systems of military government. As popula- tion and economic pressures have increased, the governments of this hemisphere have increasingly moved from the one-man caudillo to institutionalized, largely military regimes. Democracy, never strongly rooted, is weaker today than at euiy time since the Second World War. Its immediate future is not bright. Trade and resource flows are the central concerns of the nations of this hemisphere in their dealings with us. Escalating import bills and heavy debt burdens seriously cramp development prospects — creating strong pressures for better terms of trade and credit from us. They also want us to respect their sovereignty, independent interests, and dignity. What we want from them is less focused — and often intrinsically negative. We Weuit them not to aggravate East-West tensions; not to deny us access to their energy reserves and other raw materials; np-t to develop nuclear capabilities. In sum, we want sufficiently stable and healthy economic and political growth not to weaken our security, create new global problems, or offend our values. We weint. moderation on North-South issues and support in world councils on matters of importance to us. At our most hopeful we want democratic systems to be revived in this hemisphere. It is self-evident, however, that the U.S. is neither capable nor ready to undertake the resource transfers on a scale that could eliminate the disparities between us. It is just as self-evident that mounting frustrations over GEeR E T HECLASSIFIED on by K > 0-1 the recommendation of the Nbc under provisions of E.O. 12958 OEGRE ? “ 2 '= trade and financial issues are likely to undermine the international support we have traditionally received from Latin America, increase the flow of the unemployed over our borders, and damage our economic, political and security interests. Latin America and the Caribbean bring home most dramatically the importance of North-South issues. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own society or create such an implicit obligation to help. The Alliance for Progress made important contributions — "but its programs proved unsustainable both here and in Latin America. Moreover, because it was conceived largely in response to fears of Soviet penetration and assumed greater U.S. influence than in fact existed, the Alliance had strong overtones of intervention. Our relations since the Alliance have led to a steady reduction of official contacts. For a decade, we have appeared increasingly out of step with the processes of change in either Latin America or the Caribbean, even on matters directly affecting our own interests. Our criticism of repressive governments has now placed us more clearly on the side of change, but we have little leverage on how that change comes about. Our pressures for human rights and non-proliferation have raised new fears about U.S. intervention and paternalism. SECRET SECRg T- -3- III. ISSUES FOR DECISION A. Conceptual Issues : The first two issues are conceptual — designed to elicit overall guidance for considering the directions under the specific issues presented subsequently, 1. The Special Relationship : Discussion of the “special relationship" has focused in recent years on economic issues. But shared traditions, historical links, and common institutions are also involved. Four concepts are frequently combined under the heading "special relationship" : — preferential economic treatment for Latin America (as a whole or to indivi- dual countries such as Mexico) ; — an inter-American system of political, cultural and security links based on the OAS and the Rio Treaty. — our historical hegemony and its freight of paternalism; and — the accompanying rhetoric about shared values. We find it increasingly difficult to deliver on the first, useful to retain the second, and undesirable to prolong the third. And whether or not we "share values," there is little doubt that we expect more from Latin America and they from us. To reject the special relationship in toto because of its traditional paternalistic overtones and its irrelevance to most economic issues risks discharging a potential asset in the North-South dialogue and in maintaining hemispheric security. Issue for Decision . How do we reconcile the "special relationship" with our global commitments and the desired independence of the nations of the Hemisphere? S ECRE T -- ■ flECRE ? - 4 - Direction A ; Seek to end the "special relationship" in its various manifestations. Make clear there will be no hemispheric preferences in the trade area, downplay the OAS and Rio Treaty, and play a passive role in other hemispheric institutions. Move toward eventual withdrawal. Stress bilateral relations and global institutions, pointing out that Latin America's development gives it a relative advantage over other LDC's. Deal with subregional disputes or conflicts through global institutions (UN) or bilaterally. Drop the the’ rhetoric of shared values and historic ties. Direction B ; Differentiate by using bilateral, regional , and global institutions as necessary. Concentrate on the global for the North-South issues. Strengthen bilateral ties with major hemispheric nations. But remain active in those hemispheric institutions that can further our mutual interests — particularly the OAS, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and those institutions that promote cultural and technical cooperation. Use the OAS and Rio Treaty for dealing with regional conflicts. 2. A North-South or East-West Approach? Our reaction to political change in Latin TUnerica is critical. Our major interventions of the post-war period — Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, and Chile — have probably had more impact on our relations than all our resource- tremsfers and business activities combined. They were motivated by a strong East-West bias. In recent years, we have been thinking more in North-South terms. We are more tolerant of Guyana's Burnham declaring himself Marxist- Leninist, and of Peru's military purchases from the Soviet Union.. But should we consider significant help to Manley's Jamaica to divert him from "communism" and Cuba or primarily to assist an important neighbor who is trying to bring about IS B CR ET SEeRE ^ social change and developmeht simultaneously? The following directions are not mutually exclusive. Ihe emergence of North- Soxith issues does not eiijainate East-West concerns. We can accept pluralism in 1977 than wfcOuId in 1962 — but we could not be happy with a Communist Brazil, »texico or Pancuna. CJan we abicle additional Soviet military sales, op increased Soviet influence in some coihitries? a choice? Issue for Decision . How dp we react to Soviet or Cuban inVolvament in political change or regional conflict in this hemisphere? * Direction A - East-west Focus ^ Devise programs and- policies — short of military inierventibh-^-deSigned to head off Significauit Soviet influence or indigenous eommimist control over governments in the area. Should armed conflicts arise in this hemisphere involving Soviet or Cuban participation, support the other side. Place our economic resources where Soviet or Cuban efforts threaten. Bend our arms sales policies to head off new Soviet inroads in this area. Direction B - North-South Focus : Our primary concern now is tension between the rich north and the poor south. Encourage independence — political, economic and psychological. Do not discourage diversification of contacts, even with communist countries. Place no ideological conditions on economic assistance. If another communist lOr radical socialist government emerges, or if I a conflict situation arises, avoid actions that S EGRE g- 3ECRET - - 6 - would polarize it into an East-West problem. Do not deviate from policy lines on arms transfers to head off Soviet sales in the area. Specific Issues ; The new Administration has already set a new course for hemispheric relations. It has confirmed the need for a new treaty with Panama as the best means of protecting our interest in an open, efficient and secure canal. The State Visit of Mexico's President set in motion a reexamination of relations with the Latin American country with the most pervasive impact on our own society. Separate consideration is being given to the reestablishment of contacts with Cuba — a process with important implica- tions for our relations with Latin America, and with the entire Third World. This overview now raises eight additional specific issues for decision. These issues do not pretend to be all-encompassing. They highlight major problem areas. They also address those problems where the Administration may have the greatest flexibility to give a fresh and more constructive tone to inter- American affairs. 1, Intervention : Our concerns over human rights, the nature of our relations with military regimes, our past policies toward Cuba, the revelations of CIA activities, and some activities of multi-national corporations affect the way we view ourselves and have significant implications for how others view us. The common thread linking these concerns is U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Covert intervention in Chile in 1970-73 led the United States to become identified with the military dictatorship that replaced Allende, and associated us to some extent with SECRET - SBCR E T -T7Z— its subsequent abuses of human rights, U.S, actions designed to control Latin American behavior have ranged from economic sanctions to direct military intervention. They have ' cumulatively cast a pall over our motives and aroused suspicions that may take years to overcome . Some of our programs and activities are still viewed as interventionist: — Our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain close liaison with local security forces in most countries, collaborating to combat crime and drug traffic, counter communist activities and develop national security information, — Our efforts bn behalf of imprisoned American citizens has led us to urge on governments new laws, changed prison regulations, and new judicial procedures, — Our concern for human rights has led us to take actions that have been criticized as interventionist by some of the major nations in the hemisphere, — Can one really exclude the possibility that we may have to intervene in Panama should negotiations break down and violence break out? -- And what of the activities of Cuban exiles and other rightists who operate out of and in the U.S. against foreign nationals and foreign governments? Exile terrorism is frequently believed to be controlled, or at least condoned, by the U.S. Government. SECRET SECR E T - - 8 - . Issue for Decision ; Given- our past history and current interests and programs, how do we deal with the continuing charge that we are interventionist in Latin America? Direction A - Limited Intervention - A Part of Interdependence! Reaffirm publicly and forcefully our commitment to non-intervention in the OAS Charter; announce a policy of broader contacts with all legal political forces, including visas to communists; explain that cooperation with others in combatting drugs, crime, and terrorism requires activities by U.S. agencies abroad; and explain that our promotion of human rights and protection of U.S. citizens is justified under international law. But stress our actions will not extend to interference into internal political processes. Direction B - Dramatically Reduce Interventionist Activities ; Announce a firm commitment to non- intervention combined with a decision to make a major cutback of U.S. activities in the hemisphere. Announce the end of all covert action and make an unequivocal commitment opposing the unilateral use of force in the hemisphere. State firmly that U.S. concerns for human rights will be stressed primarily through recognized multilateral institutions. 2. Relations with Military Regimes ; Fifteen governments in Latin America are now run directly or indirectly by military officers. We are uncomfortable with this level of military involvement in politics, all the more so since some of the regimes involved are consistent violators of hximan rights. Our posture toward military regimes is complicated by the fact that; — Military rule has deep roots in Latin America and is legitimized to some extent in most constitutions; — The fragmentation of political parties and the relative weakness of civilian institutions sometimes provides no viable alternative to military rule; S ECRE T CECRE? - ^ — Military rule, traditionally directed largely at repressing popular disturbances, is now in some cases combined with efforts to expand the technocratic and even political roles of civilians in government . The military regimes resulting from these patterns vary greatly, . ref lectincr the different conditions in each country. Although these national distinctions and institutional differences are signifi- cant, strong generalized U-.S. opposition to military rule could unite South American military regimes into a bloc directed against us. Our decreased military presence cind our dramatically reduced role as arms supplier has already diminished our capacity to influence — or even relate to — the leading military elites. Moreover, generalized U.S, opposition to military regimes combined with U.S. rhetorical and political support for civilian opposition elements could promote heightened internal tensions and political instability combined with charges of U.S. intervention in internal affairs. Issue for Decision ; Given our objectives on human rights and a clear preference for democracy, how should we relate to military governments in the Western Hemisphere? Direction A: Work with all Military Regimes . Develop new programs for military relations as incentives to support democratizing trends and greater civilian participation. Use military training programs, sales and joint maneuvers as tools of influence. Direction B: Diverse Treatment . Adopt a deliberate and evident strategy distinguishing among civilian regimes, non-repress ive military regimes, and the most repressive military regimes. Maintain warm relations with the first, normal relations with the second, and cool but correct relations x rEr - 3 - inadvertently send conflictiiig signals during a press conference to Latin America, to tlie bureaucracy, and to tlie U.S, public. Fourth, it would be more desirable for him to make the speech in the United States now rather than save it for a possible trip to the Latin American democracies later in the year, not only because of timing, but more im.poi-tantly , because Presidential trips tend to bring out the worst kind of rhetoric about our "historic ties" and "shared values," and tlius, it would be more difficult to expect an address setting for such a new approach. What would he say? An outline of the speech can follow the agenda of the meeting. I . Overall Approach — General Policy Directions Important changes within Latin America, within the U.S . , and in inter- national politics and economics have dramatically transformed U.S. relations with Latin America, but our psychology and the assumptions underlying current U.S . policy have not adapted to these changes. In Latin America , relatively rapid economic development and increasingly institutionalized governments have made them more resistant to foreign influence, pai-ticularly North American, At the same time, the economic cheinges have incrceised the hetero- geneity of the region, making the notion of "Latin America" as an homogenous region more unrecdistic than ever before. Internationally , Latin Americans have been at the forefront intellectually, politically, and economically of a determined movement by the developing world to alter the terms of exchange between the industralized and developing worlds . -- In the United States , several developments, including the passing of the Vietnam trauma and the reduced insecurity due to detente, served to divert American interest from the problems of the developing world. At the same time, Americans still maintained the "special relationship" mentality, demanding more from Latin America in human rights, restraint on arms transfers, and on other issues, while also promising (though not delivering) more resources to the region. CXJNnDENTIAL €;QN^IDE^^TIAL -4- The guiding principles of a new approach — rather than a new policy — to tlie region should include; 1. North-Soxith . Rather than trying to divide Latin America from the rest of the developing world, we should encourage Latin American leaders to take the general issues which concern them to a North-South forum and to take a for^vai'd (leadership) position on these issues. Rationale : Several Latin American leaders have been in tlie forefront of this movement, and we should recognize their efforts, by adopting a global as opposed to a regional approach. Regionalism in all its manifestations - the OAS , the Inter- American Defense Board — has declined in importance over the last two years, and the trend not only seems irreversible, it makes sense; There is less reason to use regional institutions wlien the issues can only be effectively addressed globally. 2* Global Policy: A Single Standard for the Developing World . U.S. policy on trade, finance, investment, science and technology, aid, human rights, arms transfers and nuclear proliferation should be formulated according to global criteria. In the formulation of these policies we could consult bilaterally with selected governments, or regionally if the forum is an effective one, but the policy we adopt should be a general and a global one. Rationale; If we are interested in furthering Latin American economic development, then we should adopt a general policy which will confer special trade and financial benefits on Latin America by the nature of the region's relatively advanced economic ^ position. In the long-term, a special and direct American effort will not bring any more benefits to the region than a general policy, and it is likely to have significant negative political consequences since direct resource transfers inevitably get tied to special American political concerns (i.e. , human rights, or treatment of U.S. investors, or anti-Communism) , leading to unintended paternalism. 3. Mature bilateralism will be enhanced by a global approach , but particularly from the decline of a regional institution which encourages artificial unity on the wrong issues posed in the least constructive way. C ONFIDENTIAL -5- 4 . Diversification of Political and Economic Relationships . In response to the central political need of all Latin American countries to reduce their dependence on the United States or any single source, the U.S . should encourage the present trend toward increasingly diverisified relations between Latin America, Europe, Japan, and even Eastern Europe. At the same time, the U.S. should exhibit a gi~eater tolerance for regimes of viddely different political philosopliies , distinguishing only on the basis of their respect for fundamental human rights . 5. Non-Intervention . The U.S . should pledge its full respect for the sovereignty of each Latin American nation and should commit itself not to undertake unilateral military intervention or covert intervention in their internal affairs , Rationale ; This simple statement will go far in a region that has experienced the vast majority of U.S .-military exercises abroad. The question to which this answer is addressed is not only how do we view and respond to political change in Latin America, but also to what extent and in what ways can we influence it. U.S policy to Cuba from 1959 to 1961 offers a classic illustration of the way power and its use have been transformed. Currently, our ability to influence events in Latin America appears greatest not when the power equation is most weighted to our advantage, but when we are cognizant and sensitive to the principal norms of the developing world sover^^nty and social justice. Bearing this in mind, a reflexive action by the U.S . to counter Soviet efforts to gain influence either through arms sales or increased trade is more likely to have the opposite effect. Andy Yoxing's argument that we are more likely to influence events in Africa if we pay attention to Africa's obsession racism ^ them to our own v/ith respect to the East-West conflict has direct relevance to Latin America, where the North-South economic issues are their principal preoccupation. II. Economic Issues ’ Relevant Criteria for Formulating U.S, Economic Policies . The U.S . should adopt economic policies which relate to two or three levels of development of the Third World, rather than to an heterogeneous CONFIDCl^lTIAL COI'cTIDEHTIAL - 6 - regional grouping. This means concessional assistance for the poorest countries, and increased trade prospects and improved and coordinated dfebt management for the middle-^income developing countries, which are most of the Latin American countries . Trade, not aid . 2. Thus, external financing to the region should increasingly be made through the international financial institutions , and less and less through bilateral assistance . ? bhis represents both a political desire to begin a post-aid relationship , where we do not respond to problems as donors and recipients, and an economic urge to get the most out of our money, since U.S . contidbutions I to tlie IFIs are multiplied more than ten-fold because of other country J pledges. 3. On foreign direct investment (FDI) , we should recognize the sovereign rights of host countries to set the terms of investment. Similarly, the United States Government should adopt a more independent stance premised on an independent definition of the national interest in investment disputes , Rationale; We should begin to steer an independent, neutral path bebveen labor, which wants to discourage U.S. FDI, and U.S. corporations, which seek U.S. help. On investment disputes, which have been the source of considerable tension in inter- American relations, the U.S. should also seek to identify a position which is representative of the national as opposed to a specific interest. 4. The U.S . should work with the governments of Latin America to seek ways to increase access of the products of Latin America and other developing regions to tlie markets of the industraHzed world on a non- discriminatory basis . Rationale: The Lome Agreement between the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries has a discriminatory impact on Latin American exports. Furthermore, vertical and regional preferential arrangements (between industrialized and developing countries) run counter to the U.S. objectives of an open global economy . CONFIDENTIAL -7- 4 HI . Human Rights 1. Single Standard . The U.S. should not adopt a different standard for human rights violations in this hemisphere than for anywhere else . 2. IFIs. Human rights considerations should enter into all U.S . decisions with regard to the developing world, but the U.S . should not adopt any automatic or fixed formulas . This means that we should try to obtain some flexibility of the Harkin amendment (to the Inter- American Development Bank Act) , while resisting its extension to other ITTs . 3. Multilaterlize Our Efforts . To the extent possible , the U.S. should try to multilateralize its concerns and its..,efforts on human rights by working through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights . IV . Relations with Military Regimes Excluding the use of punitive sanctions, the U.S . should nevertheless adapt its relations with individual governments to the character of the j;egime, maintaining warm relations with civilian and democratic govern- ments, normal relations with non-repressive military regimes, and cool but correct relations with repressive governments . The U .S . should put particuleu- stress on non-military aspects of cooperation with military governments . V. Arms Transfers Agciin, the policy should be a global one, but one which actively promotes restraint in any appropriate fora or framework (bilateral, sub-regional, regional, or global) . We should also avoid competitive sales with the Soviets or with other suppliers . VI . Organization of American' States The OAS should be reorganized so that it only carries out those functions for which it has a comparative advantage. These functions are peacekeeping and human rights. Its economic and technical assistance functions could be done more effectively by the IDB , <30NgiDCNTIAL - 8 - Rationale : Despite recurrent efforts to strengthen the OAS, it continues to decline, largely because the most important business in the hemisphere is not hemispheric. Secretary General Orfila has said this to me in a conversation two weeks ago. He also said that he needed the help of the U.S . to reduce the OAS bureaucracy from its current 1,500 to a staff of about 300 which could have responsibility for peacekeeping and human rights . He would also like to do away with the Permanent Council, and believes that if he obtained the complete support of the U.S . he would succeed. It remains to be seen whether he would succeed, but we should certainly help him do that . One indication of the irrelevance of the OAS in addressing economic issues is the lack of any enthusiasm (or even support) for the Secretary General's proposal for an OAS Special General Assembly on Economic Cooperation and Development. They still have not yet set a date or a site for this meeting, and it is not clear whether they ever will Vn . Educational and Cultural Exchanges The Department of State, in cooperation with other agencies, should reexamine basic objectives and programs in educational and cultural exchanges in consultation with U.S . institutions and with selected Latin American governments, and suggest a specific proposal to the NSC for improving U.S . policy in this area. Vin . Country and Sub -Regional Issues Mexico, Cuba and Panama have all been dealt with in other contexts . The two critical areas demanding some kind of U.S. Government attention are Brazil and the Caribbean. With regard to Brazil, the critical question is whether the U.S. should maintain the Memorandum of Understanding in the light of quite critical comments of this arrangement made by President Carter during the campaign. Given the extreme sensitivity of our current relationship, it would not be advisable to mal1 credit an (State should coordinate with DOD ^ ACDA.) To support regional and subregional integration efforts . To increase the number and kind of people-to-people programs, bilaterally and through the OAS , to increase professional . cultural and scientific exchanges . ^ Zbigniew Brzezinski UNCLASSIFIED 11 . Report Prepared in the Department of State No. 785 Washington, April 28, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 29, Mrs Carter, Latin America and the Caribbean, 5/30-6/13/77: 3/24/77-6/16/77. Confidential. Drafted by Hyman and Estep. Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 5 covering memorandum from Pastor, who recommended that the report be sent to Mrs. Carter in preparation for her trip to the region. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. (Ibid.) An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicates that Inderfurth “apparently” forwarded the report to the First Lady. (Ibid.) UNCIASSIFIED CONPIDDNTIAL PROBLEMS ON THE SOUTH AMERICAN WEST COAST BUREflO Of lOTflLIGEnCf (100 BfSfOBCH Overview The developments that have led to the present degree of tension among the West Coast countries of South America extend back over a century. Peru's current efforts to establish itself as the dominant West Coast power have alarmed its neighbors and have provided a South ‘ American foothold for the USSR, which has become Peru's major supplier of arms since 1973. - i x ; Analysis of the available evidence leads to 1 the following conclusions: — Peru has and will maintain for some time arms superiority, but it will be unable, i. in our judgment, to effect a definitive shift in the balance of power on the West , Coast because (a) it lacks the economic and human resources, and . (b) there is no : i real, imminent, external threat. : i —Peru's arms program will nevertheless spur ; I a costly and divisive arms race with its ; 1 neighbors and could eventually lead to armed conflict. — US influence and leverage in this situa- tion is reduced — sharply in comparison with the past. Nevertheless, countries which feel themselves threatened (Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador) look for protection first to the United States and second to the Organization of American States (OAS) . ! > .« t ; j CONFIDENT lAL/ GDS ■ Report No- 785 j April 28, 1977 i ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED • ' . by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017, C ONFIDENTIAL - ii The roots of any solution over the mid- to long-term lie in South America itself: -through the efforts (including self- restraint) by the states most directly concerned (i.e., Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia) ; -through the efforts of leading South American states (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela); and -with US support (if not leadership) . ****** CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED [Omitted here is the body of the paper.] UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 12 . Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency Washington, May 9, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 65, Terrorism, 5/77-1/78. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. No drafting information appears on the paper. In the top right-hand comer of the first page. Pastor wrote: “File Terrorism.” UNCLASSIFIED 9 May 1977 5 SUBJECT: Counterterrorism in the Southern Cone The security forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have for some time engaged in a formalized exchange of information on leftist terrorists. Moreover, these governments jointly carry out operations against subversives on each other's soil. This effort, dubbed "Operation Condor**, is not publicly known. One aspecc of the program involving Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina envisages illegal operations outside Latin America against exiled terrorists, particularly in Europe. Because the existence of Condor is known to foreign security services, such activities have so far been frustrated. The extent of cooperation In Condor is unusual in Latin America, even though the exchange of intelligence information. by governments facing a common problem is a routine practice throughout the world. j The mil itary-contro lied governments of the Southern Cone all consider themselves targets of international fiirxisro. Having endured real and perceived threats From leftist terrorists, these governments believe that the very foundations of their societies are threatened. ,In nwst cases, government leaders seek to be selective in the pursuit and apprehension of suspected subversives, but control over security forces generally is not tight enough to prevent innocents from being harmed or mistreated. Cultural and historical developments in the region go a long way toward explaining, if not justifying, the often harsh methods. In Hispanic law, for. instance, a suspect is presumed guilty until proven innocent. In addition, most Latin American constitutions have pr-ovisions for states of selge or other emergency clauses which greatly increase the governments* powers of arrest, detention, and censorship. \ There is a long history of bilateral efforts to control subversion in the Southern Cone countries. The regional approach eventually formalized in Condor, however, apparently was endorsed in early 1974 when security officials from all of the member countries, except Brazil, agreed to establish liaison channels and to facilitate the movement of security officers on government business from one country to the other. ♦ • Among the initial aims of Condor was the exchange of information on the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), an organization believed to consist of representatives of terrorist groups from Bolivia, Uruguay, ADP Declassification Review declassified by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Chile, Argentina, and Paraguay, The JCRj^m^^^Bcoordinaten activities and provides propaganda and logistical support for its members. The Junta has representatives in Europe, and they are believed to have been involve^] in the assassinations in Paris of the Bolivian ambassador to France last itay and an Uruguayan military attache in 1974. The attache had been involved in the successful campaign to suppress Uruguay's terrorist Tupamaros, a meoiber group of JCR. i Condor's overall campaign against subversion reportedly was inten- sified last summer when members gathered in Santiago to organize more detailed, long-range plans. Decisions Included: ; I * — The development of a basic computerized data bank In Santiago. All members will contribute information on known or suspected terrorists. i Brazil agreed to provide gear for "CondorteT" the group's communications network. Uruguay consented to join Chile and operations against JCR activities! in Europe. '>26 3,3(b)( 1 ) The basic mission of Condor teams to be sent overseas reportedly was "to liquidate" top-level terrorist leaders. Non- terrorists also were reportedly candidates for assassination; Uruguayan opposition politician Wilson Ferreira, if he should travel to Europe, and some leaders of Amnesty Internation were mentioned as targets. Ferreira may have been removed from the list, however, because he ts -considered to have good contacts among US congressmen. A training course was held In Buenos Aires for the team heading overseas. More recently Condon leaders were con- sidering the dispatch of a team to London — disguised as businessmen — to monitor "suspicious activity" in Europe. Another proposal under study included the collection of material on the membership, location, and political activities of human rights groups in order to identify and expose their socialist and Marxist connections. Similar data reportedly are to be collected on church and third-world groups. Evidence, although not conclusive, indicates that cooperation among security forces in the Southern Cone extends beyond legal methods. Last Hay, for example, armed men ransacked the offices of the Argentine Catholic Commission on Immigration and stole records containing information on thousands of refugees and immigrants. The Argentine police did not investigate the crime — a signal that Latin refugees, principally from Chile and Uruguay were no longei welcome. A month later, 24 Chilean and Uruguay refugees, many of whom were the subjects of commission files, were kidnapped and tortured. After their release, some of the refugees insisted 2 EO 13-526 3.5(c) — ISSIIH :■ ... ♦ IFO 13526 3.5(c) their 1nterrog.jtors were security officers from Chile and Uruguay. A number oF Uruguayans v/ere held in Buenos Aires last summer for two weeks and then flown to Montevideo in an Uruguayan plane. Uruguayan military officers offered to spare them their lives if they would agree to allow themselves to be 'captured*' by authorities — as if they v/ere an armed group attempting to invade the country. Moreover, tv/o prominent political exiles In Argentina were killed under mysterious circumstances. Condor also is engaged in non-violent activities, including psychological warfare and a propaganda campaign. These programs heavily use the media to publicize crimes and atrocities committed by terrorists. By appealing to national pride and the national conscience, these programs aim to secure* the support of the citizeni^ in the hope they will report anything out of the ordinary in their neighborhoods. Propaganda campaigns are constructed so that one member country publishes information useful to another — without revealing that the beneficiary was in fact the source. For example, Bolivia and Argentina reportedly are planning to launch a campaign against the Catholic Church and other religious groups that allegedly support leftist movements. Bolivia will collect information on the groups and then send it to Argentina for publication. The Condor communications system uses both voice and teletype. Member countries co.mmunicate via radio and each is required to maintain an open channel. No commercial equipment is used, but each country can monitor the conversations of another over the Condor net. Sensitive data, not of concern_jte_alI_ menibtrSj_a re forwarded via diplomatic pouch. that Condor suffers from some organizationa inefficiency, but this factor has not inhibited its overall effectlyg ness. C ondor has, tightened security mpaciiresj ecurity has been strengthened at Condor's operations center in Buenos Aires, and compartmentation has been, increased. In addition, once a Condor member has declin^ to participate in an operation, he is excluded from all further details of that pa rticu * active members, such as Paraguay and Bolivia — may not 6e aware ot many operations. Outside the Condor umbrella, bilateral cooperation betiveen other security organizations in the region also is strong. For example, intelligence organizations in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile work together closely. Each security organization assigns advisers to the other countrier primarily to identify subversives in exile. UNCLASSIFIED 13. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamofi) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, May 11, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Lister on April 27 and cleared in draft by Todman and Schneider. (National Archives, RG 59, Warren Christopher Papers, Lot 8 ID 1 13, Box 17, Human Rights-Latin America) Forwarded to Brzezinski under a May 16 covering memorandum by Pastor, who recommended that Brzezinski send the memorandum to Carter and the First Lady. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 55, Human Rights, 1-5/77) See Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. II, Human Rights, Document 42. UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDBNTIftL- May 11, 1977 MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI TBE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Human Rights Policy Intact: Latin America The Carter Administration's human rights policy is hetving a significant impact in Latin America. A good many Latin American governments have reacted negatively, but some of these have nonetheless taken steps to improve their performance. There have been nvunerous indications of approval in important sectors of Latin American public opinion. Of cotirse these general- izations should be treated with caution. The United States Government's new higher priority for human rights, as reflected in Administration speeches and statements, diplomatic representations, military aid cuts, actions taken on IFI loans, and Congressional hearings, has caused the governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Guatemala, and El Salvador to reject, in whole or in part, security assistance predicated on human rights considerations (actually the Brazilian Govern- ment attributed its reaction to the issuance of our Brazil Human Rights Report, a decision made prior to the Carter Administration) . Leaders in these and other governments have expressed resentment and concern, as well as some bewilderment, at the United States Govern- ment's human rights stand. Many in Latin American ruling circles regard our actions and words as inter- vention in their domestic affairs and a self-defeating abandonment of old allies who are' fighting a common enemy, international Communism. This reaction has been reflected in pro-government press comment, at least some of which has been -^directly inspired by local regimes. ^ CONFIDENTIAL GPS , ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 eONFIDEMTfAL On the other hand, some officials of these govern- ments have privately expressed approval of the Carter human rights policy.- And a significant minority of Latin American governments, including those of Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Colombia, have openly voiced their support. Impact on the actual human rights performance of L atin American governmen ts has also been mixed, with a few regimes taking more progressive and repressive measures at the same time. In some cases our human rights can^aign seems to have strengthened the hand of hardliners (e.g. , in Brazil, Uruguay and probably in Argentina) , at least temporarily. The Geisel Govern- ment has used alleged Yankee intervention in Brazil's domestic affairs, specifically the Government of Brazil's nuclear energy and human rights performance, to rally domestic support for its policies. Geisel has subsequently weakened the legal opposition MDB through amendment of the Constitution by Executive Decree. However, there is no question but that a good many Latin American governments have become increasingly concerned about their human rights image. Some un- doubtedly have been influenced, consciously and/or unconsciously, to release prisoners (e.g., Chile, Paraguay and Haiti) , to caution security officers against excesses (e.g., Brazil and Nicaragua), to refrain from repressive actions which otherwise might have been taken, etc. Some of these positive results were already londerway even before the Carter Admin- istration, partly as a result of Congressional stimulus. The net incremental changes are difficult to identify and impossible to quantify. No government is likely to admit that it is piirsuing a more civilized and humane policy towards its own citizens because of outside advice or pressure. But there are indications that some governments hope for public or tangible recognition of positive steps taken. These might well be encouraged in the direction of still further progress. It is much more difficult to calculate the pact ion o f 'Latin American public opinio n. Unquestionably mucn or it nas oeen positive, axtnough often muted in fear CONFIDEHTIAI r ; A T “T*’’ -r T-*: — xiTT' f '■ • COin?’lDEN gIftir - 3 - of reprisal. There has been considerable favorable, independent press comment. Sme Brazilian papers, even while supporting the official reaction to foreign government preparation of a Brazil Human Rights Report, criticized htanan rights violations and called for a domestic investigation. M any democratic OTspositi on parties -gmnp s have hailed our human rights stand, including the Christian Democrats in Chile, the PRD in the Dominican Republic, some factions of the MDB in Brazil, and the opposition coalition in £1 Salvador. Catholic church representatives have commented very favorably. And there have been warm words of praise and encouragement from influential intellectuals, journalists, sociologists, etc. Once again, this positive reaction has not been imiform. Various supporters (e.g., some Latin American government of- ficials as well as leaders of the Buenos Aires Jewish community) have quietly cautioned aga inst pushing s o hard publicly as to make xfipressive ' regimes feel they areT^lfigrSornered, thus leading them to take even harsher measures. It is, of course, far too early to make any definitive judgments as to the net impact of our cur- rent human rights policy. Many Latin leaders are still trying to sort out where they stand in the face of what they regard as an onslaught on their legitimacy. Some see, or pretend to see, the most recent public human rights statements by United States Government officials as a backing away, at least to some extent, from our previously voiced high priority for human rights. Latin Americans both in and out of government are watching carefully to see whether and how effectively we intend to continue our present human rights com- mitment. In this connection, there is attached the revealing March 27 comment of Robert Cox, the coura- geous British editor of th^ Aires Herald. Mr. Cox prepil become ”more and more effeC|1^ Sng] ct^ Lish 1 'Presi ' if anguage Buenos dent Carter will 3 sticks to his guns. — , 1 _ . ' j Pet 1 <1 ,er 1 farndl f Executive Secretary Attachment ; ‘f As stated. COMriDDMTITUS - UNCLASSIFIED 14. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter Washington, May 19, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 18, Evening Reports (State), 5/77. Secret. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum. Vance was in Geneva to meet with Gromyko. UNCLASSIFIED r DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON May 19, 1977 SECRET - MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT PROM: Warren Christopher, Acting [Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.] Todman Trip to Latin .^erica . Assistant Secretary Todman returned this week from a quick swing through Latin America. In Colombia , President Lopez Michelsen pressed for the helicopters which we promised him in 1975 under our narcotics assistance program, but which we are hesitant to deliver because of reported narcotics-related corruption in the Colombian Government. Lopez generally supports our human rights policy but warned that we should not try to be the "world's moral policeman." He urges that we internationalize the GBCREf CDS ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 \ SECRB ?- - 2 - effort (which of course we are trying to do) . Colombian officials pressed their view that we should give special preferences to Latin American goods to offset the preferences the European Community extends to former European colonies. Venezuela r President Perez, looking forward to his forthcCTning state visit, is anxious to cooperate with us in all areas and to take a strong ^tand on human rights. The Venezuelans stressed that the single most important issue in our bilateral relations is the removal of Venezuela (and Ecuador) from the list of OPEC countries excluded from o\ir system of generalized trade preferences. Todman talked with President Videla of Argentine who was also visiting Venezuela. Videla said that te understood our human rights position and did not ar ' ' with its importance, but that Argentina just coulcl no : meet the highest standards until it wins the war against terrorism. Videla asked for our understanding of Argentina's difficulties. Foreign Minister Silveira stressed that Brazil attaches great importance to the Memorandum oT Understanding signed with the United States in 1976. He was obviously concerned that ambiguity on its future would not only hinder bilateral problem-solving, but could lead to a further deterioration in U.S. -Brazil relations. Cy will be meeting with Silveira next week during the CIEC meeting and will try to put Tiis doubts to rest on this score. Although not discussed extensively with Todman, the nuclear issue remains of primary concern to the Brazilians. Bolivian President Banzer and other Government officials promised to speed up adjudication of the cases of Americans held on narcotics charges. BasGd on our pledge of assistance, the Bolivian Governiner , is now fully committed to a program of crop substitution for the cocaine- source coca now produced there. SECRET - [Omitted here are portions unrelated to Latin America.] J UNCLASSIFIED 15. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, May 28, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81 . Confidential. Sent for action. On the first page of the memorandum, Aaron wrote, “ZB — See my comments. DA.” Dodson also initialed the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED 3324 7,4 SUBJECT: Follow-up on the President's Pan American Day Speech: Peacekeeping In the Pan American Day Speech , when the President said that the United States will siqjport the efforts and initiatives of the Secretary General of the OAS in his "active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solutions to several longstanding disputes in this hemisphere," he was signalling a departure from past policy . Since U.S . intervention in the Dominican Republic, U.S . policy has been to keep our distance from any territorial problems in the hemisphere because it was felt that our involvement woiild be the "kiss of death" for any initiative, regardless how desirable. Thus, die U .S . did not even comment favorably when the Andean countries signed the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974 calling for mutual arms limitation in the region . This non-profile policy may have been appropriate, for the decade after the Dominican Repub He, but times have changed. There are now many leaders in the hemisphere — and I would count Secretary General Orfila as a potential leader — who are either looking for U.S . support or leadership in this area. The President signalled the possilnlity of such a new postiure in the Pan American Day speech not only in his reference to the OAS peacekeeping efforts , but also in his positive comment about the Ayacucho Declaration. "1 spent most of this morning working on a new United States policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms around the world. Again, you in Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American nations to limit the acqmsition of offensive arms in their region is a striking example . If the eight nations can implement their pledge . their own people will not be the only ones to benefit . They will have set a standard for others , throughout the world , to follow . " nONFIDENT t A tr ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 CONnDENTIAL 2 ( There are three relatively serioiis territorial disputes and several others less serious problems in the hemisphere. The three deserve o\ir attention: 1. Belize - Guatemala . Belize is a colony of Great Britain which would have achieved independence had it not been for the fact that Guatemala, which has claims to BdUze, has threatened to invade if it becomes independent . TMs is the most urgent issue because it has divided Latin America, whidi supports Guatemala, in varying degrees, and the Caribbean, which support Belize. Panama has recendy shifted to the side of Belize, and Guatem«da broke diplomatic relations. The British have asked us to help, and Secretary Vance asked ARA for options, which I believe they provided, albeit reluctantly (Luers said he thought it wo\ild be a mistake for us to get involved.) 2 . 3. El Salvador and Honduras still do not have diplomatic relations^ • , A little support for Orfila's efforts might help there. Andean Tensions. In the memorandum asking for follow-up on the President's speech, optio ns on peacekeeping efforts were requested, but we never receive d anyTr ARA^ split on dds issue. Bob WUte, Deputy Chief of the U.S . Mission to the OAS , believes that we shovild take a more active role in this area, and Secretary Vance's request for options on Belize is one indication that he may be in agreement with this new posture . Obviously , I th ink an active — not necessarily as a leader, but at the le ast, as an intere sted party searching for d>e most effective way to get inv olved — role is enti rely consistent with the main theme in the P resident's speectTyT mentioned this to Bob White, and he immediatSy^ orgaiilzed"a meeting in ARA on May 25, and in my opinion, it wais the most prodvi ctive meeting I have ever gone to in ARAVi The people he brought in knew each of the disputes and had some good ideas on what the U.S . cotild do. Luers attended the meeting only for the first ten minutes, and I suspect he was the one who slipped t hat ridiculotis n ote to the Secretary which vou mentioned on Friday^ The irony is that I would bet that the Secretary wotild support a more active role by the United States in this area . CONFIDENTIAL ( CONFIDENTIAI r 3 Anyway , I siispect that the only way that we will get any movement on this issue is either by a formal request or perhs^s a phone call to Secretary Vance. I would recommend a formal request for two reasons: (1) in order to give us the opportunity to show something to the President on this subject — letting him choose the options on the questions of future involvement; and (2) so that we can monitor the interagency process to ensure that it is not sandbagged in ARA. RECOMMENDATION UNCLASSIFIED 16. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency RP 77-10129 Washington, June 1977 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 136, RP77-10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Confidential. {drafting information not declassified]. UNCLASSIFIED Co n f i den t ial Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Confideiiti fri' RP 77-10129 June 1977 Copy 149 CON Fi P E NT I At - Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence June 1977 Key Judgments Human rights have been violated— sometimes flagrantly— by the authoritarian military regimes that have come to power in the southern cone of Latin America. Repression, characterized by torture and other inhumane practices, has been directed for the most part at leftists, but others have been victimized as well, largely by governments reacting to real and Imagined threats to stability. As a result, human rights guarantees have been subordinated to the priority concerns of imposing order on sometimes fractious societies and concentrating on economic development and growth. Our basic judgments about this pattern are that: • Authoritarian military or quasi-military governments will remain in power for the foreseeable future and will continue to accord low priority to the human rights question. • Improvements in human rights practices will depend more on the military’s assessment of local security and insurgency conditions than on outside pressures • Where basic reform is instituted, the process will be slow at best and may be measured only in terms of cosmetics rather than substance. Moreover, the continued existence of security apparatuses geared to repression increases the chances of retrogression. • Where the terrorist threat has subsided, there has been a gradual easing of the worst kinds of offenses, but this trend is by no means irreversible. • External criticism of human rights abuses in the southern cone may lead to limited improvements; reprisals by Washington will be viewed as infringements on national sovereignty, and are more likely to provoke continued defiance than serve as catalysts for improving the human rights situation in any fundamental way. CO N r i DEMTIAL CO N r t DE W T t At Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America The judgment of what rights all people are entitled to enjoy is a subjective one. and it varies from culture to culture. Hunutn rights for the purposes of this paper are de- fined as protection of persons from arbi- trary arrest and imprisonment, torture, and murder. Although this paper addresses the relationship between authoritarianism and human rights, a broad definition of human rights that includes the right to a democratic form of government and to certain social and economic benefits goes beyond the scope of this discussion. In trying to define human rights there are limitations in venturing generalizations about a geographic region. In the case of the five South American countries— the south- ern cone— discussed in this study, however, there are some common trends that can be discerned and various conclusions that can be drawn about recen t developmen ts. The Roots of the Problem Human rights problems are not new in Latin America. Throughout the history of the region, even so-called “democratic” governments have sometimes engaged in repression and systematic violations of basic individual rights. The noto- riety of these acts— especially among the authori- tarian governments— has become more pro- nounced in recent years because of improved worldwide communications and greater inter- national emphasis on human rights problems. South American military regimes today are re- acting in similar fashion to real or imagined threats to order and stability and have adopted a doctrine that is stridently anticommunist, but largely antidemocratic as well. The resort to tor- ture and other inhumane practices to suppress perceived threats to stability has been a part of this pattern. Constitutional rule has been extinguished or drastically altered; political freedoms have been shelved; and political parties have been banned or tightly circumscribed. Where elections are still held, they are usually rigidly controlled with little doubt as to their outcome. The protection normally afforded by the judi- cial process has been abrogated by the imposition of states of siege in some countries, thereby giv- ing the military broad discretionary powers to suspend many rights and guarantees. Govern- ments have used these emergency powers to crack down on suspected subversives. Although the target has been leftist extremists and other opponents, innocent persons have also felt the impact of arbitrary actions. The preeminent role of the military in count- ering subversion in Latin America and a long- standing tolerance of highly centralized govern- ments have reinforced the trend away from dem- ocratic practices. Once in power, the military has assumed sweeping measures to guarantee security and combat leftist influence. COHr i DCNT I At 1 CONfl D eN T IAl There are a number of sociopolitical factors that have facilitated this process. The first is that little value is placed on the rights of the individ- ual. In the Latin American context, fundamental rights are not viewed as sacrosanct. The state is the arbiter of what rights are inalienable and de- termines how justice will be administered. The vast majority of the people, by and large, is not bothered by what happens to the fringe elements of society. In addition, although a separation of powers exists in theory, in practice the Latin American executive has usually functioned in an autocratic manner. Judicial and legislative or- gans, where they exist, do not have the independ- ence that marks North American and some West European models. Moreover, in their desire for security and the preservation of their society, Latin Americans have often acquiesced in strong military rule and endured constraints on their in- dividual freedoms. Those who have had their rights abused tend to come from all walks of life, and their political views or activism seem to be the primary criteria that make them subjects of government repres- sion. In many cases, young people from middlc- or upper-class families who have participated in extremist movements or sympathized with leftist causes have been jailed or tortured by security services to obtain information about their associ- ates and subversive organizations. Among the military officers who now direct the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, there is a firm conviction that former civilian politicians had failed to halt a drift to- ward political polarization and violence in their societies. The armed forces have equated this fail- ure with the inability of the democratic system to cope with the complex problems of Latin Amer- ica’s “less developed” status. Their authoritar- ianism has been improvised as a result and does not follow the classic pattern of military dictator- ship. Tlie old archetype of the military strong- man as defender of the oligarchy and of elite interests has been supplanted by a new image of the military as catalysts of national development and progress as well as defenders of national secu- rity. An important aspect of the trend toward mili- tary dominance in the area is the impact of the drive for modernization on the thinking of the current generation of armed forces leaders. The economic difficulties generated by political dislo- cations have impressed them with the need to channel their countries along a path of sustained development and growth. While most of these countries have been plagued at one time or an- other by runaway inflation, a lack of investment capital, or economic stagnation, their societies have been strained by the demands of a rapidly expanding urban p>opuIation and middle class. After taking power, the military has sought to guide the process of economic transformation by imposing tough and sometimes unpopular poli- cies. A concentration on assuring political stabil- ity at any cost to guarantee a continuity of poli- cies within a coherent modernization strategy has frequently meant that concern for basic human rights has had a very low priority. The Southern Cone Where the terrorist threat has subsided— in Bra- zil, Chile, and Uruguay— we believe there has been a gradual easing of the most offensive kinds of violations, including torture, illegal detention, and political kidnapings. Firm confirmation of this sort of information is hard to come bv. but EO 13526 inde- the impression held byE pendent international organizations tliat monitor the human rights situation in Latin America is that fewer violations in tliese countries have been recorded so far this year than a year ago. In gen- eral, there is no discernible pattern in the number of human rights violations in the southern cone, but as long as the repressive machinery remains in place the chances of a resurgence cannot be ruled out. Repression by the military regime in Brazil has been mitigated, in part, during the past year or so by President Geisel’s removal of officials respon- sible for illegal arre sts and tort ure. Military and police organizationsl3|n9S^ have orders from high-level officials to prohibit torture and other forms of mistreatment. Detainees in security cases have experienced improved conditions, but CONriDC N TIAL 2 South America VENEZUELA BOLIVIA WNOURAS A .1 '.( ' ARGENTINA FALKLAND ISLANDS ? flSL^ MALVINASI ^ (Adniini«t»r»d by U.(C« clslNi«d by Ai96fiGna) 1000 Kitoimtom South Geo/gta 526 5(c) FO AzNTMftttal EBNTlAB — ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: t5f THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON e^U^Sfi/e October Z8 6621 . ^ Si.' ■"/ ' ' THE PRESIDENT ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI Follow-Up Letters to Your Bilaterals With Latin American Leaders The memoranda of your eighteen conversations with Latin American leaders during the Canal Treaty signing have just been completed. For a number of your bilaterals. State and NSC felt it would be very useful for you to follow up your conversations with letters which con- firm the commitments made during the meeting and xuider score areas where we have a continuing interest. In certain cases — for example, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — our intelligence indicates that their Presidents may have gained an inaccurate impression of your concern about human rights. Apparently Pinochet, Stroessner, and Mendez felt that you were in agreement with them that their countries were victims of politically-motivated and inaccurate pro- paganda, and that the human rights policy which is being implemented in your name does not really reflect your views. No doubt this may be a result of wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, our Ambassadors in the field. State, and NSC believe it would be useful for you to re- state clearly your contiuumg commitment in this area. Since the drafting of these letters had begun, you have received letters from the Presidents of Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and we have included " references in your letters. The letter from President Videla was de- livered directly to the White House on October 18, and it refers to the ^ Deutsch case which you raised with him. ' There are a nximber of specific commitments made or repeated in the ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Issues Or Points Which Are Noted In The Letters 1. While not deciding to invite representatives from human rights organizations, Videla did say that he was not troubled by such visits. Your letter repeats that point. 2 . Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations particu- larly hvuman rights groups ^ at the United Nations. ' 3. Videla said that he hoped the problem of people being detained by the emergency laws would be resolved by the end of the year. Your mentioning this point will add an additional incentive for him to do it. 4. With regard to Videla‘'s statement that Argentina would ratify Tlatelolco when the political timing was opportune, which he hoped would be by the end of the year, there may have been some misinterpretation. The Argentines are reported to believe that he only said that he would "consider” the possibility of ratification at the proper time. Nonetheless, we believe that it would be helpful to re-state our interpretation of his statement so as to insure his awareness of our continuing concern on that issue. Bolivia 1. Your letter reiterates the continued interest of the U. S. in the peaceful settlement of the problems related to Bolivia’s desire to achieve access to the sea. 2. It states U. S. continued support for integration in Latin America by congratulating him on the new Andean Pact agreement on the automotive industry. 3. Most importantly, it reminds Banzer that he promised you to give priority attention to seeking the release of those American prisoners whose circumstances warrant special treatment. We have already given the Bolivians the list of names. CONriDENTlAir Chile 1. The letter states that "friendly and close relations" between the U. S. and Chile can only occur if there is increased evidence of improvements in the human rights situation in Chile. Z. On the question whether Chile would permit two UN human rights observers to visit, the Chileans are currently negotiating with the United Nations, and both parties may have some problems in agreeing to the pro- cedures which Chile requires for their visit. We believe that Pinochet promised to permit two UN observers to visit provided they do so "without publicity" and meet with Pinochet before returning to the UN. The Chileans (would like to) believe that they agreed to such a visit only "under certain circumstances, " which might include comparable visits by the UN to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Similarly, Pinochet worked out an agreement with the UN on providing a report on the people who "disappeared, '* but his report is not considered satisfactory. Your note of continued interest in both matters should help. 3. Finally, you note Pinochet's pledge to bring “Tlatololco into effect if Argentina ratifies the treaty. Paragxiay 1. Stroessner's pledge to receive the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights if they desire such a visit is noted, and you add that U. S. officials would also like to meet with Paraguayan officials "should that be helpful. " On the loans from the Inter -American Bank and A, I. D, , you re-state decisions which were made by the Christopher Committee 'to approve a number of loans for the needy in recognition of Paraguay's decision to permit a visit of the lACHR, but others are withheld until the visit, in fact, occurs. Peru 1. You repeat your interest in the Bolivian corridor issue, the Ecuador ean-Amaz on issue, the limiting of arms purchases, and your hope for the continued success of Andean integration. Morales needs to COrfFIDENTIA -fr hear of your interest in the first three, and will be glad to hear of the fourth. I 2. You reiterate U. S. interest in Peru's economic difficulties, and mention your hope that we can help Peru in obtaining food assistance. This is currently under review, but our expectation is that we will be able to give $5-10 million of food assistance. 1. You state the difficulty because of human rights considerations of having close relations with Uruguay. 2. Mendez's assurance of removing the "special security authority" and establishing an information commission, which will hopefully cooperate with our embassy, are good decisions which necessitate the comment in the letter. 3. You repeat your hope that Uruguay will invite a human rights commission. * ♦ # # ^5 These letters were coordinated and drafted by State and NSC, and cleared by Jim Fallows. RECOMMENDATION That you sign the letters to the Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. UNCLASSIFIED 25. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, January 30, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 11, President, Latin America and Africa, 3/28/78-4/3/78: 10/7/77-1/31/78. Confidential. Sent for action. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “RP, give me a revised memo to Jim Schl (copy to Vance) urging once more the Ven. talks. If he doesn’t react (and pt. out that I wrote earlier) I will go to the P. ZB.” Inderfurth also initialed the first page of the memorandum. In a January 24 memorandum to Pastor and Richardson, Brzezinski wrote, “With reference to the forthcoming trip, I think it is extremely important that we now develop plans for specific and concrete actions which could be associated with the trip: agreements to be signed, initiatives to announce, joint statements, etc. Please develop an initial scenario and consult with me within a week.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Subject Files, Box 63, President’s Visit to Brazil and Venezuela [3/78], 1-5/78) UNCLASSIFIED i ‘‘006 Redo MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL January 30, 1978 ACTION FROM: SUBJECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ROBERT PASTOR *The President's Trip Countries Selected MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI ^ FROM: ROBERT PASTOR SUBJECT: ^^The President's Trip ^ Countries Selected ^ ^ V Obviously, the first questions that need to be addressed in drawing up sceneurios ^ , for the President's trip are: (1) Which countries will he visit? and (2) How much time will he spend in each country? ^ First of all, let me repeat the point that I think a stop in Trinidad and Tobago \ is very important 4 (Ul '• 1/1 ' — to show that we are not lumping the Caribbean into Latin America as we have done in the past, — to try to gain the cooperation of a very important leader in the Caribbean which has resources as a donor, and — to show a balance in our approaich to the Caribbean between Manley on the one side and Williams of Trinidad on the other . I understand that Secretary Vance agrees on the importance of putting a stop in Trinidad on the trip . Of importance, but secondary compared to a stop in Trinidad, would be a second stop in Brazil to Sao Paulo, the center of Brazil's business and intel- lectual life and a city which symbolizes the ferment and political dynamism of Brazil in a most interesting period of transition. In addition, you may want to resist two temptations as you consider the schedule. First, there may be an attempt to make a "Latin America only trip" and do Africa in the summer . I think this would be a mistake. Right now, we are trying to encourage Latin American leaders to get involved in ADP Declassification Review DECU\SSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 I:O^TFmB^TTIA^= ( international politics, particTilarly African politics ^ A trip only to Latin America might tempt us into the rhetoric of the "special relationship" while a trip that includes Africa will give him the opportunity* to make points about global interdependence, die North-South dialogue, and "constructive" links between Africa and Latin America. I understand that some consideration is being given to doing the Africa portion after the Summit in the summer. I think that is Ihe time for him to do his travel- ling in the U.S. , campaigning for Congressmen, rather than abroad. A second temptation might be to begin the trip in Panama to fulfill the President's pledge of exchanging the instrximents of ratification there . I think such a trip is an easy and discreet one-day or weekend trip which should occur after ratifi- cation by the Senate . I think it would be a mistake to make the rest of the trip contingent on the quidk and easy resoluti.on of the Canal Treaties . 1 know that the Congressional people believe that we will finish the treaties in February, but I continue to believe that it will take March and perhaps part of April as well. I think the trip to Panama should be kept separate. With luck, he ceui do it in a day before the global trip . Otherwise , afterwards^ VgNEZUlLA Events t As originsdly planned, the first major speech on North-South economic issues * by the President should be made before the Venezuelan Congress . After meeting witit Perez, ^e President also needs to meet separately with the two leading Presidential can<£dates — Pinerua Ordaz of Perez' party, Accion Democratica; Herrerra Campins of COPEI . Finally, the President should meet briefly with the Venezuelan press., only one of two entirely free press corps in South America. When I was travelling with Secretary Vance in November, Pete Vaky took me to t 2 isk on the issue of a press conference. He said the question we face in Caracas and Brasilia is not whether to have a press conference, but how it will be handled. Either the press will stirround the President when he arrives or after meetings — as they did with Secretary Vance — or it is organized in a way so as to achieve maximum impact — i.e. , questions on ^the major issues, translation, orderliness, quiet, and a listening audience when the President answers. I continue to I believe that a press conference in Brazil is essenti«d and critical, whereas one in Caracas is just important. I would recommend both, however. COJIFIDENTIAi r COOTIDENT iAfc- ( I 3 Issues and Decisions There are two broad categories of issues for the Perez-Carter discussions: seeking cooperation from Perez on a variety of international issues and exploring inodes for cooperating on research and development in alternative energy sources . Consultations on Globid Issues. As a result of &e President's meeting with Perez in June and again in September, we have tasked onr Embassy in Caracas to consult with Venezuela on Tlatelolco and non-proliferation, human rights, Belize, Bolivian corridor. Southern Africa, and the Caribbean. In each of these sureas, we need to clearly define our objectives between now and the trip and then decide how Venezuela can best contribute to those objectives. If you approve , I will organize a meeting with State and Treasury people to do that, and will send you a memo on it. Approve Disapprove Energy Cooperation. In June, the President suggested to Perez that we have Ministerial talks on energy. Since then, Schlesinger has shown little or no interest in meeting with the Venezuelans in spite of the fact that working- level groups have defined a full agenda . Provided that someone can persuade Schlesinger to meet with Venezuelan Minister of Mines Hernandez, there will be much that the two Presidents can talk about in this area. Though Schlesinger has postponed the meeting three times , Hernandez has come back again and asked for a meeting between February 20 andManch 5 (see Tab A) . That's already quite late if we want to use it as a preparatory meeting for the President's trip. But unless you or fiie President persuade Schlesinger to meet with Hernandez, I don't think it will ever come off, and we will have lost an important opportunity . I have orepared a memo for you to send to the President (Tab I) , but you may prefer to use it as background and just talk directly with Schlesinger. RECOMMENDATION: In the light of Schlesinger 's failure to respond to your memo to him of January 10 (Tab B) , I would recommend that you send the memo to the President first (Tab I) . Approve Disapprove or alternatively, phone Schlesinger directly. Approve Disapprove CONFIDEt f F fitt: CONFIDEN'HAfc ' 4 ( In addition , there are two other areas we may want to explore with the Venezuelans: Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC) . An idea which has attracted a good deal of interest at the UN is to build scientific research centers in middle-income developing countries, like Venezuela and Brazil, to develop intermediate or ’’appropriate" technology for LDCs. In addition to helping develop technology which is more labor-intensive and thus better-suited to their needs , this program woiild help to create horizontal linkages among developing coiuitries , permitting them to relate to one another directly raflier than through industrialized countries. We could explore ways to develop such a program in Venezuela (and in Brazil) . Themes; A Common Responsibility to Help the Poor. One theme, which was in fiie President's Pan Americein Day speech, but has not yet been elaborated, is that "all of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries . " The stop in Caracas, the capital of one of the "new rich," seems to be an appropriate place to restate the commitment, which OPEC must share with the industrialized countries , to help the poor countries and the poorest people. If you approve, I will develop this concept a little more fully in the speech . BRAZIL Scenario The single most important event in Brasilia which the President could do is a press conference. Both Mrs . Carter and Secretary Vance have had receptions for a broad cross-section of Brazilians , including people who have criticized the government. The significance of these receptions was lost on the Brazilian people. On the other hand, Mrs. Carter's press conference was the event which made her stop in Brasilia so successful . In addition to meeting with Geisel, the President should also meet briefly with General Figueiredo, Geisel's appointed successor, and also with Magalhaes Pinto, the first civilian of the post-1964 period to seek the Presidency. 1 think the meeting with Figueiredo would be important since he is likely to be the President from March 1979-1985. The meeting with Magalhaes will be of enormous symbolic importance, underlining our interest in continued liber- alization wifiiout being unduly provocative . The President may also want to give a short speech on the role of law in the Brazilian Congress ; CONFIDENTIAL - I •,V -yuAt, y Approve Disapprove 5 I would also recommend a short stop in Sao Paulo to meet with Cardinal Arns and with representatives of business, labor, professionals, and academe. Given the traditional independence of "Paulistas" , you may want to consider scheduling a small seminar of people like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Helio Jaguaribe to discuss Brazil's future. Even if the President didn't participate, I believe you and Secretary Vance could really profit and would definitely enjoy such a discussion. Issues I am ctirrently working with S/P in State on a proposal for US-Brazilian coopera- tion in non-nuclear energy research and developmentj and we shovild have a draft by the end of the week . This is one area we may be able to make some progress . State is currently trying to decide whether to issue a hxunan rights report for Brazil because of OPIC. Given Brazil's open and strong distaste with these reports — leading to their renunciation of the US-Brazilian military agreement, I believe it would be a disaster to release such a report and woxild probably expose our investments to possible arbitrary action. I understand that Christopher is considering the decision at this time, and phone him on this . Cub a's^ presence in Africa is another subject for discussion. I am taskingH an update on Brazil's policy toward Africa as a wav to probe for the best approach to them . sK/* Sap'S. Wc Wr^» -U CaU * UNCLASSIFIED 26. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Todman) New York, February 14, 1978 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights. No classification marking. Todman spoke before members of the Center for Inter-American Relations. UNCLASSIFIED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS ADDRESS BY TERENCE A. TODMAN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS CENTER FOR INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS NEW YORK February 14, 1978 I am pleased and honored to be here at the Center for Inter-American Relations, which plays such a unique and respected role in the life of this hemisphere. As analysts and in many cases participants in the policy process, you know that ^^decis ions are not made in a vacuum. In fact, the policy process at its best is based upon the creative interaction of public officials, outside intellectuals, businessmen, and other community ♦members. Your contributions are invaluable; I greatly appreciate this opportunity to share my own thoughts with you . This evening, I would like to discuss how I see the evolution of our relations v/ith the peoples and govern- ments of Latin America. My purpose, frankly, is to gain your support for what President Carter last April referred to as our need to "awake our institutions to a changing world". : of Basic Relationships Since World War II, a succession of Administrations jKave ^ acTtnowledged the importance of Latin America to the United States, and sought policies that would adequately reflect that importance* The results,, however, have often been frustrating. Friends of the United States in Latin America, and serious students of U.S. -Latin American relations here, remain skeptical that American policy truly reflects either the region's importance or the many and varied interrelationships between our country hnd Latin America. President Carter came to office convinced that, if our behavior toward Latin America and the Caribbean reflects the values and priorities of the American people,, it V70uld then be possible to look to a new era of coopera- tion in this hemisphere. This Administration has not yet - 2 - dispelled the skepticism of the past. Indeed, because the prevailing frustrations are frequently rooted in our societies themselves , they cannot be resolved by . governments alone. Clearly, however, the traditional environment of hemispheric relations has already changed fundamentally in recent years. Traditional security concerns have yielded to new human rights and trade issues. At the same time, what was once unchallenged U.S. dominance has evolved into a growing interdependence. Latin American nations have grown in population, economic weight and political power. The trade among us provides a major market for U.S. exports and supplies us with key imports. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean bring leadership and voting strength to international forums. I t In sum, the other countries of the hemisphere affect us increasingly — and they knov/ it. Having seen simi- lar changes occur in Africa and Asia, I know that the new self-confidence of Third VJorld leaders will require readjustments on our part. But I also believe it creates an opportunity for more mature and healthy rela- tionships . These shifts in global priorities and power have also brought foreign policy issues into the everyday lives of ordinary citizens, affecting their pocketbooks and their consciences. Increasingly, people are by 'foreign events, not ‘ Buit: as workers and consumers — as coffee drinkers and car drivers. These shifts are healthy for our relations with Latin America. The importance of Latin America to the United States has begun to make sense to the average American. And I believe this growing public conscious- ness offers the best hope in decades for developing a consistent framework for addressing issues that really matter. The new awareness challenges us to move beyond a preoccupation with government activities alone, and to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has both public support and community involvement. What do we consider to be the nature of such a policy? First, it must speak to Americans where they live. -3- -.uv Events in Latin America and the Caribbean directly affect American communities. -The strong ties between our peoples are growing. Black and Hispanic citizens in our communities are often linked by families and friendships to the Caribbean and Latin America. The Western Hemisphere, in fact, is unique in that the drama of its recent history has been played out not in the movement of armies or diplomats, but in the mass movements of ordinary people. Each year millions of U.S. citizens visit Mexico and the Caribbean nations, coming back with lasting impressions and leaving a pro- found imprint on the societies they visit. American communities in turn feel the influx of several million immigrants, most of whom come from Mexico and the . Caribbean . , The importance of good hemispheric relations is also brought home by our growing energy needs. Latin ^erica supplies 17% of our imported oil. Our dependence on our neighbors for energy, including natural gas, is * likely to increase. Even narcotics have become a major aspect of foreign affairs; the street value of narcotics -from Latin America in the U.S. is said to be over $4 billion a year; their traffic darkens millions of lives and erodes thousands of communities . . speak to Americans wfa^re they work . In the last ten years, our exports to Latin America have more than tripled, from $5 billion to al- most $18 billion annually. We now sell more machinery, consumer goods and chemical products to Latin America than to the rest of the Third World combined — as much, in fact, as to the entire Eurppean Common Market j and more than to Japan. In addition to petroleum, Latin America, .in turn, supplies us with copper, bauxite, other key minerals and a growing number of consumer products. U.S. private investment in the area is $23 billion. What these statistics mean is that the overall growth of the U.S. economy and of employment in the U.S. is, and I believe will increasingly be, influenced by similar growth in Latin America, and by our relations with its countries. Requirements foj; Progress Moving - to a more community-based policy toward Latin America will require a major reorientation of national thinking. It cannot be accomplished over- night. For too long the United States has assumed Latin America could be dealt with as a single, monolithic region* Too often, we have viewed internal social and political struggles through a lens that distorted Latin American realities and recast them in terms of our own East-West concerns. Too often, we have viewed Latin American efforts to reform their economies with suspicion. At our best moments, we have acted as- champions of Latin American development. At our worst moments, our resort to militaty intervention has given credence to Latin American fears that their territorial integrity had less than our full respect. * Only rarely have we recognized Latin America for what it is: a grouping of nations with individual and distinct goals, aspirations and importance to the world community — and to us. During the Administration's first year, we have come far, I believe,, in recognizing the individuality . ,gf^hg- ^ Iii an effort to ^^^^pW^®ow^®^®hHtriWTbetter~and to increase coramuni cation, I have visited every nation in the region and met with a broad cross section of leaders and citizens. Mrs. Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Secretary Blumenthal, Ambassador Young and other key Administration leaders have carried the dialogue to many parts of the hemisphere; We have approached each country with a readiness to listen and to cooper- ate whenever we can. / The most dramatic example of this direct approach was the individual meetings President Garter held with the- hemispheric leaders who . came to Washington last September to witness the signing of the Panama Canal Treaties. With each, he took the occasion to listen to their views and to convey in turn a strong sense both of our concerns and of our desire for cooperation. I am convinced that, as a result of these many direct contacts, hemisphere, leaders share a high degree of understanding of each other's concerns. The major -5- chailenge facing them -r and all of us here tonight — is to translate that understanding into practical activi- ties that improve the lives and prospects of ordinary citizens. The new Panama Canal Treaties are an important beginning. They secure the future of the Canal. They offer the opportunity to put behind us the kind of one-sided and archaic relationship which the 1903 treaty epitomized to the whole hemisphere. U.S. ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties, which 1 am confident, will take place in the very near future, will establish more than any words our willing- ness to deal with others as our sovereign equals, what- ever their size or relative power. Ratification will thus confirm a cardinal principle of the Carter Administration's foreign policy; that the United States recognizes and is determined to re- * spect the national sovereignty and independence of every state . But non-interveniton alone is hardly a positive basis upon which to build effective foreign relation- ships. It is the first stage in a far more complex process. Having accepted the individuality and sover- eignty of Latin American countries, we must follow through wi 4^ of that recog - fildtions" : During the past year, we have set in place a number of building blocks in addition to the new part- nership with Panama,. We have strengthened our working relationships with Mexico, Venezuela and many other countries. Recognizing the importance and needs of the individual island states of the Caribbean, we have par- ticipated in the creation of a hew multilateral group to address the economic problems of the area and to foster cooperation within the entire Caribbean Basin. We have accepted that governments will not go away just because we may not like them. Only govern- ments can represent a nation's sovereignty in the inter- national arena; only the people of a country have the right to determine the nature of their government. Out- side powers have no choice but to deal with existing governments — whether they approve of them or not. - 6 - With this in n^ind, this Administration has tried to place our policy toward Cuba in a more rational context. Our problems with Cuba remain/ but we have exchanged inflexible hostility for a pragmatic v/illing- hess to negotiate issues which have some prospect. of solution. This does not reduce our problems with many of the Castro Government's policies, especially in Africa. But, by talking, we have a reasonable frame- work for dealing with our differences. ultimately, the challenge is to develop a foreign policy that responds essentially to human, not just governmental, concerns. The basic dilemma is as straight forward to state as it is complex to resolve: how to encourage respect "for the dignity and freedom of the individual, the development of democratic institutions, and the fulfillment of basic human needs without inter - f ering in a nation's intern ^,] af , an ^_ while ma in- t ^hina the constructi ve working relations necessar y to advance all biir BiS S Promoting human rights is a fundamental tenet and a cornerstone of this Administration's foreign policy. It is central to our relations with all nations. I know that this deep personal conviction of my own, is profoundly held by the President and the Secretary of State. . Moreover, because this commitment reflects uni- versally recogn4.2.e4,..V:4lU^^^^^^^^^ binds us .rather than sep- ■ of this planet. It On the conscience of all governments to live up to their sacred obligations. It gives all people hope for a better future knowing that we stand behind their aspirations to share in the fullness of life. That is why w e h ave mad e c^ar to_ all countr ies that the n ature of~~our relati ons with them wiir"depend :::gn^i^eir_pragfeicas,.,inli&e7.hww ihTtTtJtng*- so we are not i nterferi ng in . their^-in£€rHal affa irs , b ut J9 elE6t‘miSIng- our own behavior in respo nse t o what we se e. And it explains v/hy President Carter's emphasis Qn human rights _has struck such a responsive chord throughout this liemisphere and the world. Our efforts, of course, have done more than spark people's hopes. They have provoked lively debates both here and abroad. For us, the ^central issue i s not the di rection of. our ment. That is unwavering.- Rathe r ; i t i s. .. h.QH..^..au,3:^.bifeP Our experiences over the past year have shown clearly th at we must be careful in the actions w p. s elect if we^re truly to hel p and not hinder th e cause pt" promoting human rigHEs anci "alleviating s uFferin^^ ' " — We must avoid speaking out before learning all the facts, or without calculating the likely reaction and responses to our initia- tives, — We must avoid expecting oJ:he r aov-ernment,«f to a chieve overnight fundamental ch anges .,in,Jbbeir s ocieti es and practices in "response to our bidding and without regard to historical cir- cumstances. — We must a void assuming that wp> can dpja. 1 without consider- ing the conseguences"" for' ot^ier aspects of our relationships. — We must avoid belie ving that O nly the o pposi ti on s^.sJ5^--idie_Jtriith.,..,then^HorerBm but-,±JieL.:±:raith., ^abQ Utj^ in their countr y . — We must a void presuming to know so much more that v/e can prescribe actions for them without bearing any responsibility for the consequences. — We must avoid punishing the poor and already victimized by denying them assistance to show our dissatisfaction with their governments. — We must avoid pointing to some and not to others . Select ive morali ty is a contradiction in terms. — We must avoid condemning an entire government for every negative act by one of its officials. -- We must avoid holding entire cou D. t , r . r . RA- up- to public ridicule and embarrassjBen±.^«.J;£^iSEllng on"" ^eir * naTio^nar^BI^qnTtv and pride. ' ~ — Finally, we must avoid being so concerned with declaring the rightness of our course that we lose sight of our true objective — to alleviate individual suffering. Ta ctical mistake s such a s these do hot promote hu man right s. 'S'a'crTfic' commun'ica'troh and possibT7'’'jLii’i'i'u- ence* and resurrect old issues of sovereignty and inter- vention. And they can be avoided through good will, common sense, compassion and 'careful diplomacy. - 8 - While taking care to avoid such mistakes, we will not by any means retreat into. silence or indifference . We must proceed on the conviction that I consider to be the only basis for hope and optimism in our hemi- spheric relations: that it ^ possible to advance the rights and meet the basic heeds of individual human beings while, at the same time, respecting the sover- eignty of their governments. We know we are not infallible. We know that we have faults to correct in our own society. But we will continue to attempt in every way to associate our- selves with the promotion of basic individual rights, the enhancement of political freedom^ and the allevia- tion of those conditions of suffering that keep entire social groups at the margin of existence: — v/e will weigh . all of* our relationships to t ensure that they contribute, not to the restriction or denial , but to the promotion of human rights; — we v/ill use every possible means of public and private persuasion to bring an end to abuses of the person wherever they occur; — we will work to increase support for inter- nationally recognized human rights standards ¥ili ’ work with us ; — we will work with the Organization of American States and its Inter-American Human Rights Commission to strengthen regional cooperation to identify abuses and seek their remedy; and — we will endeavor to promote the kinds of economic, social and political development required to enjoy all the rights recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This last goal, promoting development, poses a special challenge to our active support for human rights Under present foreign assistance guidelines, for example poor people in a generally impoverished country can be helped; equally poor people in a better off country can- not. If this pattern continues, by 1980 U.S. bilateral assistance will be unavailable to most of the countries of Latin America, -9- Vital human rights are at stake- Aggregate GNP figures fail to reflect the poverty of high infant mortality, disease > illiteracy and inferior housing. More than 100 million Latin Americans are forced to subsist on less than $200 per year. Assistance policies that cut off help to the poor because some of their fellow citizens live too, well, like those that deny, help to the poor because their governments are repressive, create an ironic paradox: if we decide to confine our assistance only to those developing nations that are at once desperately poor and models of enlightened democracy, we risk crippling our ability to contribute to socio-economic development in Latin America. In the developing world/ the predicament of the "middle-income" country is often very much. like that Of the middle-income American taxpayer. And Latin ‘ America is increasingly the region in the middle: too "rich" to receive aid, not strong enough to play a decisive role in shaping events. Without, some degree of outside support in times of financial dif f iculties ,. even the relatively advanced developing countries of Latin America will be hindered in carrying out reforms to narrow the gap between rich and poor and meet the needs of all their people. In. the long run, of course, the development issue is not properly one of assistance as it has been tradi- tionally defined. At least in this hemisphere, both sides in the North-South dialogue agree that develop- ment Both we and the liltWi^^ffilriMiis l[e^3 expanding markets for exports, stable prices, and a voice in international economic decisions. We have made realistic proposals to help stabilize commodity prices. We have encouraged greater Utilization of thie Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries. . It is true that increased domestic demands for import protection have increased concern abroad that hew trade restrictions may limit future growth. However few petitions for import relief under the Trade Act have resulted , in actions adversely affecting Latin American products. Moreover, to regain momentum toward increased - 10 - trade/ we are vigorously supporting the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The Tropical Products Agreement with Mexico/ worked out in the context of the MTN this past year, is a model of mutual benefit. In the last analysis, our ability to pursue a credible course on the whole range of developmental and economic issues will depend, not on the intentions of any one Administration, but on the commitment and priorities of the American people. The growing impact of foreign policy on local communities often means in the short term that domestic and foreign policy objectives will be perceived to be more sharply in conflict. Increasing public understanding of the full impli- cations of issues such as these is one area where all of you in this room can be particularly helpful i ■ I This need to increase public understanding of how foreign policy affects local communities brings me to the last point I want to discuss with you tonight. It is the importance of making governmental relation- ships a coherent part of a much wider spectrum of cooperative private relations among our societies . During the past year, we have, of course, continued to deal with many of the traditional problems of inter- American relations. For example, to preserve the peace, we have increased our support for the dispute settlement efforts of States in Central ' trouble-spots. And we helve made nuclear non-proliferation and conventional arms restraint key elements of our hemispheric policy. Our decision last spring to reverse past policies and support the Nuclear Free Zone in Latin America and the Caribbean gives us new credibility in seeking peaceful nuclear cooperation with other hemispheric nations. It is nonetheless increasingly apparent that the nev7 issues. — such as the flow of narcotics — ^ are ones in which many more citizens have a direct interest than in the past. To reduce . the narcotics, traffic that destroys so many young American lives, we have in recent years sought the cooperatioii# of many Latin American governments. To ease the human costs of foreign imprison- ment, we have implemented a prisoner exchange program with Mexico, and are developing similar programs elsewhere. - 11 - To resolve differences over migration, v;e are working with Mexico to relieve unemployment pressures on both sides of the border. As these few examples demonstrate, our society and those of Latin America now interact in too many ways for government to monoplize the message. This trend is increasing. It is foolish to deny it and Unnecessary to fear it. ' The new challenges are ones that an open, multi- dimensional society like the United States is best equipped to meet. And they are challenges I am con- vinced most Latin Americans are prepared to meet with us. Already we are seeing many U.S. companies and multinational enterprises respond to changing realities in Latin American societies, sometimes faster than either governments or intellectuals. Most American businesses abroad now maintain healthy and constructive * relationships with their host countries, contributing to the development of the entrepreneurial skills and productive, activities essential to our mutual well- being . It has not been generally noticed, but in provid- ing for a generation of partnership based on increasing Panamanian participation in the management of the Canal , the new Panama Canal Treaties reflect a practice that is already widely followed in the inter-American busi- ness community, where joint ventures and local managers are increasingly common. The times call for similar creative and responsible problem-solving at all levels of our communities. They call for intellectual dialogue to strengthen common institutions and to encourage broad-based leadership in all our societies. Drawing fully on the hemisphere's basic wealth — its people — is a major challenge to bur press and our universities, and to institutions — like this Center — ^ which already understand that writers like Borges of Argentina, Fuentes of Mexico and Vargas Llosa of Peru are also giants of our own culture. As our own society changes, government too must awaken. Government can move far beyond present efforts in facilitating academic, technical and cultural ex- changes, including in them minorities and other groups - 12 - not previously tapped for such programs. It can build on the many contacts that take place in the v/orld of business. It can* in sum, help bring the many persons dedicated to improving.hemispheric relations together with the even greater numbers dedicated to resolving local community problems. It is time they met. I am encouraged to know that 'you will be an • active partner in that effort. Thank you very much. UNCLASSIFIED 27. Editorial Note Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman’s February 14, 1978, speech (see Document 26) engendered reaction and commentary from inside the Department of State, from governments abroad, and from the press. In a February 17 memorandum for the files. Director of Policy Planning for Public and Congressional Affairs Luigi Einaudi wrote that the speech was followed by a question-and- answer (Q&A) session, which the memorandum for the files reconstructed. Questioners asked Todman about Nicaragua, Brazil, Argentina, Belize, the Beagle Channel, Panama, Cuba, and Chile. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Human Rights) Einaudi’s reconstruction of the Q&A session was transmitted to all American Republic diplomatic posts as telegram 44242, February 21 . (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078-0295) The Embassies in Managua, Montevideo, Asuncion, and Buenos Aires reported on local press and government reaction to the speech. The Embassy in Managua reported on February 15 that the “Somoza family newspaper Novedades'’ published a “banner headline ‘Sandinistas Provoke Violence, Todman Says,” and quoted the translation of Todman’s answer to a question on Nicaragua as printed in the newspaper. The Embassy requested that the Department send “text of Todman comment (which, article indicates, was in response to question) and any clarification which we may use here ASAP.” (Telegram 786 from Managua, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070-0397) The Department responded on February 16 that the quotes attributed to Todman “are incomplete and garbled, evidently intentionally. Todman did not enter into detail about who did what or how.” In addition, the Department advised, “Embassy should avoid being drawn into polemics.” (Telegram 41418 to Managua, February 16; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780072-0462) On February 15, the Embassy in Montevideo reported; “All Montevideo media gave prominent, heavy play to Assistant Secretary Todman’s speech at the Center of Inter- American Relations, stressing his advocacy of ‘a more moderate, balanced, and realistic’ U.S. campaign on human rights.” The Embassy also noted, “Not surprisingly, the pro-government media has picked up and emphasized these and other aspects of the Todman statement which serve to prove the GOU’s arguments on human rights and have been similarly selective in their use of human rights comments Todman made to the press following the formal address.” (Telegram 533 from Montevideo, February 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070- 0236) The Embassy in Asimcion reported on February 17: “The speech of Assistant Secretary Todman to the Center for Inter-American Relations has had a great impact here. A morning headline UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED reads ‘Todman severely criticizes human rights policy of Carter.’ The government is jubilant.” Ambassador Robert E. White reported, “All government officials with whom we have spoken are unanimous in their praise of the Todman speech.” In addition, he stated, “Those in Paraguay who have supported our position on human rights have expressed themselves in the strongest terms. An internationally known scientist said the speech was a ‘tragic event.’ An opposition leader who faces a prison term on a trumped up charge came to the Embassy and told us that ‘if this is the new policy of the United States, there is no hope.’” White concluded, “If the Department has any guidance which would assist me in lessening the disastrous effects of the interpretations being placed on this speech, I could make instant use of them.” (Telegram 679 from Asuncion, February 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076- 0674) On February 24, the Embassy in Buenos Aires reported: “Assistant Secretary Todman’ s Latin America policy speech received wide coverage and editorial comment in the local press, with initial emphasis placed on ten points cautioning US response on human rights. Subsequent distribution and publication of full text largely cleared up misconceptions that speech meant other than firm commitment to existing human rights policy. Human rights groups were distressed that speech could be and was used to suggest US backing away on human rights.” (Telegram 1406 from Buenos Aires, February 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780088-0064) In telegram 45684 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 22, the Department advised: “In some areas press is distorting speech as change in criticism of President Carter’s human rights policy. Distortion has occurred where listing of types of action we should avoid has been misinterpreted as criticism of the conduct of the policy. There has been no — repeat — ^no change in human rights policy,” and “there is no basis for construing speech as criticism of the human rights policy.” The Department instructed, “Where press, official or private opinion has picked up line that there is change in human rights policy or criticism of such policy you should move forcefully to counter it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780082-0791) On March 2, The Christian Science Monitor reported that the speech “has sparked controversy in the State Department over how the administration should pursue President Carter’s human-rights policy,” that “a number of State Department officials have criticized the speech,” “arguing that it put too much emphasis on restraint and amounted to a brake on implementation of the rights policy,” and that it “may have sent the wrong ‘signal’ to some Latin American countries.” (Daniel Southerland, “Rights Policy Speech Highlights State Department Split,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 1978, p. 3) UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 28. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, February 26, 1978 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780046-0321. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Feinberg on February 24. A stamped notation indicates that Vance saw the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED D^FAftTMEriT OF STAF^ BRIEI^frOa MEMORANDUM «B-0321 MSHOIUUiDDM • c FESm To: The Sec^^ary From: S/P - Anthony L a1^ Country Priorities in Latin America S0l>0or force and Mexican oil could support 30% of our import needs by 1985. Mexico is unhappy with the Adwinistration's pro- posal on limiting illegal iramigration, and our refusal to agree to pay $2,60 per thousand cubic feet for their natural gas. Agreement on smaller issues — tropical products, prisoner exchange — cannot compensate for the deterioration in relations caused by these two central issues. We are, however, talking to the Mexicans about re- ducing the iaimigraint flow by increasing rural develojxaent credit which goes to the root of the problem and serves the human rights of unemployed Mexicans: but we may need to go further. The Mexicans would like to see us reinstate a nHsdified bracero program. The Mexicans also seek assurances that the OS market will be open to an . increasing quantity of Mexican manufactured goods. The bargaining process on natural gas pricing may come to a friendly compromise: but if it does not, our energy relationship that holds great promise for substantially reducing our dependency on OPEC will have gotten off to a sour start. Should that occur, we ought to reconsider our "hands off" approach toward Mexican energy development, and, perhaps, design a program for bilateral cooperation on energy. Lopez Portillo's first year has generally been suc- cessful largely because of the economy's fulfillment of IMF- recommended performance criteria but at the cost of a decline in industrial employment when 700,000 young Mexi- cans are entering the job market each year. Mexico's 65 million population will double in 20 years at current growth rates. The Mexican economy will have to sustain an impressive period of growth to avoid rising unemployment which could generate social and political tensions of great consequence to the U.S. Our long-term interest in Mexico's economic success may dictate a more forthcoming attitude on certain issues including trade, aid and energy, than our im- mediate economic interests would seem to warrant. Brazil The US will want to give Brazil top priority next year, as Geisel's successor defines himself on human rights, in- ternational economic issues and non-proliferation. The President will arrive in Brazil just when the official ARENA party will be chosing its candidate for the presidency. Geisel's choice, and therefore the almost certain winner. General Figueiredo, is a relative unknown. Nevertheless, he is under increasing pressure from the candidacy of Hagalhaes Pinto, a civilian businessman, to ccwflimit himself to preserving and continuing the liberalizing reforms begun by Geisel, But hardline military elements continue to see threats frOTi ^internal stdjversion, " and some fear losing their high-level jobs in government-run enterprises. Should they "capture" Figueiredo, or re- place him by force with one of their own, repression could begin anew and the liberalization process be set back. We should try to encourage the moderates in the military to see the reassertion of democratic traditions as aiding Brazil's rise to greatness, and entry into the "club" of industrial nations. A democratic Brazil could be a counterweight to the hardline Southern Cone regimes, at a time when our own leverage in the region appears to be on the decline. The Brazilians are ambivalent about their status, demanding the concessions granted LDCs, while seeking the attention worthy of a nascent global power. Brazil finds itself bumping up against rules designed to regulate relations among developed countries — despite being, in many respects, underdeveloped. Brazilian aspirations for "grandeza" center on rapid economic growth, which is linked to export expansion. The success of the MTN, es- pecially in liberalizing trade in labor-intensive manu- factures, is vitally important for Brazil. But if Brazil is to become a global power, it must accept the accompany- ing responsibilities; in the context of the GATT, this translates into a willingness to offer reciprocal tariff reductions, and to discuss such trade-distorting practices as export subsidies. We are currently drawing up a plan for possible non-nuclear energy cooperation that would apply to LDCs generally, but which the President might announce in Brazil, The proposal is being conceived with Brazil first in mind, to refute the charge that our non-proliferation strategy is actually aimed at crippling Brazil's industrialization by depriving it of energy- Progress on non-proliferation itself, however, will probably have to wait until the rigid Geisel leaves office in early 1979. - 5 - Argentina Your presentation of the list of 7500 "disappeared" helped jolt the Argentine military into releasing series of lists of names of prisoners, and movestent on the Deutsch case (although not on Tiraerraan) is anticipated. But a pattern of gross violations, including disappearances and torture, continue. Absent significant improvement in the humctn rights situation, congressional restrictions will prohibit sales of military equipment and training beginning next October 1. In the interim, we will want to leverage available military transfers (with non-lethal, non-internal security applications) to maxirami advantage. The issue is tdiether the Argentine military will more likely respond to blunt, categorical sanctions, or to the gradual release of appropriate items in response to tangible human rights improvements. We are also examining how best to orchestrate our entire range of possible in- struments of influence. The dependence of the liberal economic model of Martinez de Hoz upon foreign capital mauces it highly unlikely that the Argentine government would retaliate against US business interests. Of greater concern is the failure of the Argentines to follow through on their repeated indications that they will sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Their decision will ultimately hinge on their perceptions of their own national security and the threat posed by the Brazilian nulcear program. However, our nuclear interests in Argentina are the most powerful reasons for maintaining a working relationship with the Argentine government. The Argentine political scene is showing the first signs of rebirth since the March, 1976 coup. The ap- parently ineffectual Videla is being openly challenged by junta member Massera, who is seeking to appeal to dOTtiestic and international opinion by calling for human rights improvements and more equitable social policies. The traditional political parties are beginning to re- group and pressure for more political "space." Many of these voices are uneibashedly pro-American — clear indica- tion that our principled stance on human rights may have a handsome political payoff in the future. i> SIXrRi:T><^LlMPtl?- - 6 - Jassaica Jasiaica is increasingly important to the OS for several reasons. Manley's attempts to pursue a basic human needs development strategy within a democratic framework places Jeimaica, almost uniquely, among LDCs, exactly in tune with two central thrusts of our foreign policy. Jamaica will also be important to our Carib- bean initiative. But Jetmaica's preference for iirmediate balance-of-payments relief conflicts with our longer- term development assistance approach, and could inter- ject a Sh^trply discordant note into the Caribbean Group before it can get off the ground. And since Jamaica is the chairman of the G-77 this year, maintaining a working relationship with the Jamaicans will be central to our efforts to move the North- South dialogue in a more con- structive direction. We greatly improved our relations with the Manley government during 1977, but Manley is not convinced that we are pieinning to do enough for him to resolve his fun- damental problems. Undoubtedly, his expectations are un- realistic and he has not been sufficiently willing to confront hard trade-offs at home. Nevertheless, we will need to convince Manley — the leader in the Caribbean, after Castro, with the greatest regional and international image — that the West can provide his struggling island with sufficient opportunities. We need to keep the broad range of our relationships with Jamaica under review, to see where and how, these opportunities can be enhanced. Nicaragua Because of our long association with the Somoza regime, the political changes underway pose a considerable challenge to the U.S.: a harsh outbreak of anti-Americanism is possible — unless the US can demonstrate to Nicaraguans our absolute neutrality. Our human rights policy has begun to improve our image, but Congressional approval of FMS credits, the physical presence of American military advisers to Somoza.' s armed forces, and our ongoing AID mission (for basic huqian needs, a distinction difficult for Nicaraguans to grasp) has made the US position vis-a-vis the Somoza re- gime less clear than it is, say, in the case of Pinochet in Chile. i,>^'^;^VA<''\''‘:''^*'N'“ViH"-'--T^‘‘‘“ SECRBT/LIMPIS - 7 - In a recent policy review, we decided that we would try to avoid being seen to be propping up SooKJza by re- maining as aloof as. possible from internal political maneuver ings. At the same time, the apposition must comprehend that no deus ex machina (i.e, , the U.S.> will find solutions for them. Our underlying assumption is that Nicaraguans can only build a viable and lasting democracy if they undertake and complete the task them- selves. Continuing entreaties for support from the various political groupings will test our resolve to stick to our private and public policy of non- interventionism. Chi le Our energetic human rights stance has gone a long way to undoing, in a remarkably short period of time, US identification with the Pinochet regime. During the last year, Pinochet may have gone as far as he felt was consistent with his regime's security, in reducing the worst forms of human rights abuses. Disppearances and torture are much less frequent now. Whether Pinochet will lift the state of seige and remove other decrees that impinge on the rule of law may be determined in the course of this year. Pinochet's banishment of twelve lead- ing Christian Democrats indicates that he will not yet tolerate opposition political activity. The dilemma we face is how to continue subtly to press the GOC to improve its human rights practices with- out jeopardizing the major points we've gained in domestic 2md international opinion by separating ourselves from the Pinochet regime. If the human rights situation actually de- teriorates, as Pinochet's speeches following the plebesite suggested, we will have to find ways to show our displeasure without eliciting further repressive measures that would jeopardize dissenters within Chile. Should the recent decisions by Exxon Minerals and Goodyear to invest in Chile be echoed by other US firms, a new domestic constituency favoring more sympathetic treatment for Chile would develop. Highly visible US - 8 - investasents may generate a second difficulty: Chileans will wonder at the apparently divergent concerns of private and official OS citizens. Conclusion Unfortunately, these priority countries will not be easy to deal with in the coming year. Indeed, they beccHne priorities because of the challenges they pose. In each case, the central issues involve gl(rf>al concerns: Mexico, energy; Brazil and Argentina, human rights and non-proliferation; Jaunaica, balance-of-payments financing and other North-South issues; Nicaragua and Chile, human rights. This indicates that our general foreign policy priorities are right. Our ability to implement them in these concrete country cases will determine their ultimate success or failure. One of your next meetings with bureau staffs might be with ARA. The problems raised in this memo would provide for a lively discussion. Drafted: S/P : RFeinber^Vrym X20822: 2/24/78 UNCLASSIFIED 29. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, May 8, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, 1977-1980, Box 38, PRM-17 [2]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Erb, Mathews, and Denend. Inderfurth and Hunter initialed the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “Good memo base PRC discussion. ZB.” UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL May 8, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI FROM: SUBJECT; ROBERT PASTOR Beyond Panama: Caribbean? A PRC on Latin America/ The most difficult and Important Issue in Inter-American relations — the Canal Treaty — is now behind us. Your question wbettier a PRC meeting on Latin America /Caribbean (LAC) would be a useful way to take stock of where we've come and chart a course for the next year(s) is timely. The President's trip to Panama provides us me perfect opportunity to set in motion the next steps. In our policy. In this memo, I propose to summarize what we have achieved in the last 16 months, analyze where we have failed, and suggest those areas where we should begin to work. In the final part, I will make some recommenda- tions on the next steps we should take. I. The First Sixteen Months; What Was Achieved I think we can take great pride In the accomplishments of the Carter Administration In Its policies to Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, It wouldn't hurt to get the President out talking about It since there are few regions where we have done more or been as success- ful. At Tab A Is a brief summary which I prepared describing these accomplishments . II. Our Failures I There Is no question that the major area of failure for the Carter Admlnls- I tratlon Is In the economic area, and It threatens to undermine our success I primarily because it Is this area which is of highest priority to LAC. * Though some might argue that our most serious problem Is lack of progress In the North-South dialogue, I would disagree. We have been criticized most vigorously not for what we have failed to do, but for what we have ^ done. Specifically, the decisions which hurt Include; the doubling of the duty on sugar; ^;he support of legislation to dispose of 50,000 tons of tin; the failure by Congress to appropriate funds for the International Development Banks as pledged by the USG; the failure to significantly Increase the proportion of meat quotas for the Latin American meat producers (as opposed to Australia and New Zealand); and the decision to countervail DtI0LA0 Sff (E & /R ELEASEP by NARA on the recommendation ofw under provisions of E.0. 12958 - 2 - agalnst export subsidies by Brazil. These decisions do not seem terribly Important to us, but each has provoked a bitter response In Latin America, and they have a cumulative effect. Previous administrations have, at times, analyzed similar decisions and established coordinating and monitoring devices to prevent such adverse decisions, but these mechanisms have proven Ineffective and naive. The problem Is that, at times, other Interests — either domestic or diplomatic — do prevail and sometimes should prevail. Perhaps, all we can reach for is a deeper understanding and sensitivity to the likely impact of such decisions on LAC by people like yourself, Stu Elzenstat, Secretary Vance, Bob Strauss, etc. Perhaps the mechanism warrants another examination. In the other North-South economic Issues — the Common Fund, development bank replenishment, trade policy, etc. — progress has been slow and our position exceedingly cautious. III. Opportunities Lost or Not Yet Taken Let me suggest four areas where we should focus our attention: (1) Consultations on Global Issues In my opinion, the one achievement in the first 16 months with the greatest potential importance Is the decision to view Latin America In a global as opposed to a regional context. But "globalism" — as a strategic approach to eliciting support and advice from the hemisphere's leaders In addressing global problems — has scarcely been explored, though there have recently been a few excursions Into this new area. My memo on gaining Latin American support In the NAM as a way to pressure Cuba Is one such excursion. Anotner example Is the amount of time and effort the President spent with Perez and Gelsel on Issues like Africa and the Middle East. The strategy of extensive consultations on a wide range of Issues Is based on the premise that we will Increasingly need Latin America's support for a wide assortment of Issues — not just North- South Issues, but also East-West, African, non-proliferation, etc. To obtain support for positions we consider important, however, we need to be prepared to be forthcoming on Issues which they deem important. One could distinguish between the Input and the output parts of consultation: — Input. We need to not only touch base, but to solicit reactions and be genuinely prepared to alter our position If a reasonable case Is made. — Output. Once our decision is made, we should be sensitive to Informing the governments, to solicit their reaction, and if possible, their support. - 3 - Organlzatlonal Problems. State should be asked to prepare a paper explaining how it would organize Itself internally to undertake a large number of consultations with a great many goveriunents on a great many Issues not always the responsibility of the area. ARA is not only unable to deal with this approach, but there seems little interest in exploring it. Of course, the strategy is as important as the organization, and I would recommend that the PRC discuss both within the context of the other Issues considered below. In addition, a thorough review of the North-South economic issues of bilateral and multilateral concern to Latin America is an essential element in our overall review. (2) A Fast-Disbursing Balance of Payment Support Fund In the past 16 months, we have had to stand defenseless, unable to respond to a problem which keeps repeating and threatening to get worse. As a result of the leap in petroleum and food prices in 1973 and 1974 and a decline in concessional assistance to the LAC, the region is falling under a more and more severe debt burden. Peru, Jamaica, Bolivia, and Guyana are the worst cases now, but most of the countries in the region suffer from varying degrees of the problem. We have found ourselves totally unable to respond since our aid Instruments have been phased down and out. The problem becomes a doubly troublesome one when the governments are democratic or are trying to become donocratlc. Then, inevitably, people question the sincerity of our human rights policy — ^why we fail to follow our words with dollars. There are several options available to us including: an expansion of security supporting assistance to the region; creation of a new fund for democratization, financed by aid re-flows (which currently exceed aid loans to the region); or an expansion of Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund. (3) Arms Sales and Restraint We have a two-edged problem in this area as well. On the one hand, we will not have any military relations with Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala and Chile as of October 1978. In effect, we will have a total arms embargo with these countries, which is really unpre- cedented in relations between allies. Obviously, DOD is having fits about this prospect, and they have a point. Of course, any change in military relations with these countries would require new legis- lation, and that is not likely to be easy. We need to simultaneously approach this problem from a different direction: we need to seek support for an arms restraint agreement in the region. We have held discussions with the Venezuelans, and they are extremely enthusiastic. Perez asked us for detailed papers. - 4 - and we have forwarded th^ to him. He, In turn, has asked that we undertake simultaneous discussions with arms suppliers. In another two weeks, we'll be In a position to evaluate the chances of moving towards a genuine arms restraint program for the region which would be as unique as the Treaty of Tlatelolco is for nuclear weapons. (4) Caribbean Since the December meeting at the World Bank establishing the Caribbean Group, the Bank has been preparing papers for the May 26 Donors Meeting and the June 20 meeting of the Group. The Bank's analysis of the economic problems of the region and its recommenda- tions for ways to raise the level of structural and human development are excellent, and the DSG will have to make some hard decisions between now and then. In particular, the Bank has drawn up two proposals: (a) A Caribbean Development Facility for channelling $125 million annually for three years to the region to serve as local counter- part costs for projects financed by the Development Banks. With rigorous stabilization programs, most countries have had to sharply curtail their Investment programs, and this facility would enable them to continue these programs. (b) A Caribbean Technical Assistance Fund (about $12 million/per year) to develop regional project proposals. In addition, it is necessary to develop a strategy of consultation with other governments to Insure that our goals in the Caribbean are shared and the proposals can be implemented. IV, Next Steps I have focused on four issues not because I believe they are exhaustive, but because I think they represent areas worth pursuing at this time. In particular, each of these areas contain initiatives for the U.S. to take in tandem with the other leaders — particularly the democratic ones — in the hemisphere. Torrljos has invited the Presidents of Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Jamaica to Panama for the ratification ceremony, and President Carter will have a 1-2 hour meeting with these Presidents there. That seems like a perfect opportunity to discuss these Issues and try to obtain a common view. If I had to circle a theme for the correct approach to Latin America in the next 16 months, it is that Latin American nations are important actors in the world. We need to demonstrate our respect and responsiveness to gain their cooperation in dealing with the global problems which face all of us. - 5 - The President should reiterate this theme in his speech In Panama. (The main thrust of the speech should he to place the Canal Treaties In the context of his other foreign policy accomplishments In the hemisphere. I will prepare a suggested outline for you this week.) But Instead of just having the President state this theme and our position and goals on the four Issues outlined above> It would be appropriate and extremely effective If we could translate our positions into a Declaration of Panama, which could be Issued by the five democratic leaders at the ratification ceremony. That would embody In a document the theme of a multilateral, cooperative approach. For too long, the President of the U.S. has been asked to state his policy to Latin America. When President Carter stated his approach last year and explained why It no longer made sense for the U.S. to have a policy, few understood what he was saying. The way to get the message of multilateralism and globalism across Is to Issue a multilateral statement. And there Is no more legitimate vehicle than the five Democratic Presidents Invited to Panama. This Idea also dove- tails with Hamilton's desire to turn the Panama ceremony to our advantage, underscoring the new era which the Treaties will bring. The PRC should consider policy options for each of the four Issues described above. To permit us sufficient time to consult with the Five to gain their support for our positions and to negotiate a "Declaration of Panama", a PRC meeting should be held by t he third week In May. We may also want to consider at the PRC meeting whether the US6 should support Panama's request that the O.A.S. move Its headquarters to the area near the Canal. I think the Idea Is ripe, but 1 know there are many In State who prefer the status quo. Therefore, a position paper would be In order . RECOMMENDATION: If you approve, I will draft a PRM which follows the outline of this memo, consult with ARA, and forward 1 .% to you for signature as soon as possible. ^ APPROVE DISAPPROVE cc: Guy Erb Jessica Mathews Les Denend UNCLASSIFIED 30. Memorandum of Conversation Panama City, June 16, 1978, 7:30-9:30 p.m. 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President, 6-7/78. Confidential. The meeting was held in the El Panama Hotel. UNCLASSIFIED THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON * M H BffMI: GONF IDBNTIALy X G Qg MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION SUBJECT: SuRmary of First Multilateral Meeting in Panama PARTICIPANTS: President Jimmy Carter Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the U,N. Dr, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State William Jorden, U.S. Ambassador to Panama Jody Powell, Press Secretary Robert A. Pastor, NSC staff Member (note taker) President Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela Simon Consalvi Bottaro, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Venezuela President Alfonso Lopez Michel sen, Colombia Virgil io Barco, Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. President Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rica Rafael Angel Calderon Fournier, Minister of Foreign Relations for Costa Rica Prime Minister Michael Manley, Jamaica P. J. Patterson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Tourism for Jamaica Omar Torrijos, Chief of Government, Panama Nicolas Gonzalez Revilla, Minister of Foreign Relations for Panama Other members of other governments' delegation attended but are not identified. DATE , TIME AND PLACE: June 16, 1978; 7:30 - 9:30 p.m. El Panama Hotel, Panama City, Panama CONFIDBNTIAL/XGDS ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED CO N F I DElim by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 - 2 - • cancmrinL Torrijos opened the meeting by noting that it was a timely and propitious occasion to exchange ideas frankly. There are problems which cannot be postponed, in discussions among the six countries' leaders, we should hope to find a design which will eventually lead to a solution to these problems. Human Rights Carazo said that all present had governments which aspired to a full application of the concept of human rights. Carazo referred to the Sem Jose Pact (the American Convention on Human Rights) which was signed on November 22, 1969 and would, when it enters into force, establish a supreme court on hxunan rights matters. At his inauguration, he proposed to the whole hemis- phere the need to con^lete ratification of the Convention and establish this body. He expressed concern that only eight nations have ratified the convention, with three more needed to bring it into effect. He suggested that there are three countries represented by their leaders around the table who had not rati- fied it. Finally, he proposed his country as the site of the future court. Perez jokingly suggested that we look to the countries to the north of Costa Rica for future ratification of the Convention. Carter said that we have signed the Convention, but not veb ratified it. Myiley said that Jamaica had signed and was preparing legisla- tion that would secure its ratification. Carter said that he would be delivering the opening address to the Organization of Americem States General Assembly, and he planned to ask other nations to expedite ratificatioii. 'He promised to do the same but doubted that the US would ratify this year. Perez suggested that we draw up a list of all those countries that have signed and ratified, as well as those that haven't. Torrijos said Panama had already ratified it, but had not yet deposited the instrument of ratification. Carter suggested that Torrijos help him to persuade U.S. Sena- tors to ratify it since Torrijos knows the Senators better than Carter does. Carter also noted that Chile had invited the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to visit their country. • fYunrinniii ufrujiiML Perez said that we would celebrate the 30th Anniversary of , the Universal Declaration of Hxmian Rights this December. He suggested that December would be an ideal time for a ceremony to bring the American Convention into force, and the ideal place would be Costa Rica. He suggested again that we would do well to start the human rights activities on the northern border of Costa Rica. Perez then suggested that instead of issuing a formal declaration by chiefs of State at the end of the two multilateral meetings, a press statement which sum- marized those points on which agreement was reached, could be issued. As the first point, he suggested that we should urge that all countries in the hemisphere ratify the Convention on Human Rights, that it should be on the 30th Anniversary of the universal declaration on humeui rights, and that San Jose should be the site of the next inter-American Court on Human Rights. Carazo volunteered to prepare a draft for consideration. Non-Proliferation Carter suggested that another item to be considered in this press statement would be the completion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco on non-proliferation. Argentina had proMsed to ratify the Treaty and should be pressed to do so. He said that making Latin America a nuclear free^zone would be a perfect example for others, in other regions and in other areas. He bad referred to it in his conversations with Indian Prime Minis- ter DesaTy*” Perez suggested that one of the problems in bringing Tlatelolco into effect is that Brazil is afraid of Argentina. He then suggested that each of the Heads of State around the table address themselves separately and privately to President videla and urge him to sign (sic) Tlatelolco, Carter asked Prime Minister Hanley whether he could induce the Cubans to sign the Treaties. Manley said that he was unsure. Perez said that he had read a statement that Castro had said Cuba did not feel obligated to sign, but if others did, they might . Michelsen changed the subject and said they were talking e^sout very sensitive matters and it was very Important that certain things be kept secret. He argued that the right of information is a human right, just as not to -give information is also a right. Confidential matters should not be publicly disseminated. CO N FB B fflil • -eeNRGBffHt We should all be extremely careful that this doesn't hapfien. He was very concerned about leaks that came from the U.S. Lopez said that he was particularly disturbed that the political campaign in his country was affected by the divulgation of con- fidential matters. He said that this case was not the only one and Colombia was not alone in this regard. Perez jokingly interjected, "Don't look at me." Michelsen said that diplomatic documents should not be within the reach of the press. This is extremely destructive of good inter-American relations. He offered this as a "last testament", since he will be leaving office shortly. Lopez said he thought that the Soviet Union could induce Cuba to sign Tlatelolco. Lopez said that he would be in Cuba on July 26, the anniversary of Cuba's revolution, and that he would be happy to bring this issue to the attention of Castro at that time. President Carter said that he didn't know the origin of the doctuhents to which Lopez Michelsen referred. He explained that the press in the u.S. had absolute freedom, and we cannot have as much secrecy as we would like. He expressed his deepest apologies to President Lopez and also to President Perez for any embarrassment that the press may have caused them. He also thanked President Lopez for offering to convey the concerns of the others on Tlatelolco to Castro. President Carter said that we now have communication with the Cuban government, and he will repeat the request for ratifica- tion of Tlatelolco through these channels. This Is a very important message. Arms Restraint and the Southern Cone President Carter said another important issue is the sale atid acquisition of conventional weapons. He explained the U.S. policy to try to reduce the total sales of arms. He complimented President Perez for his work and his initiatives in this area. President Perez said that what Lopez Michelsen said is of great importance because we live constantly fearful of manipulation by the news. There are strange hands in the U.S. that go into the file cabinets and leak the secret information they find there. He said 'that, for example, someone from the State Department once came down to speak to him as well as to President Lopez, and to ask them not to hold a meeting that they were going to hold with Cuba. When the incident leaked to the press, Perez and Lopez had to hasten the meeting. This kind of leak is bad because it affects our relations with one another, makes one cautious about what is said, and also greatly affects our actions, often making us do things we would prefer not to do. CONT I DCNT l A b -5- • cantimnAi He said that he was not hurt, but anguished. Referring to conventional weapons sales, he said that it affected the economy of countries concerned. The problem of weapons sales has more to do oftentimes with the seller than with the buyer. He said he was astonished to hear President Giscard's representative had asked in a major speech at the United Nations for the countries of the world to shift their funds from arms to economic development, and then one week later he read in the paper that France had sold $10 billion to Saudi Arabia. It is not possible to wage this battle against arms sales alone. If we can get the right attitude from salesmen, that would be extremely helpful. He spoke of a respected Venezuelan industrialist, who had been visited in Puerto Rico by U.S. arms salesmen, asking him to be the arms representative in Venezuela. The Venezuelan was told that he would be given a 5 percent com- mission, 3 percent for himself, and 2 percent to use as he wished. Perez summed it up by saying that the LDC's are being manipulated in this business. A way must be found to put an end to the permanent stimulation of weapons sales, because whatever poor countries do, they will fail unless the sellers agree not to sell. Perez said that at the OAS meeting, the members of the Ayacucho group will sign an agreement on arms control, and then try to expand this agreement to include all the countries of Latin America. But the efforts of the U.S. are needed with arms producers for if there is no agreement among the producers, then there is little that the buyers can do. President Carter said that we have not only taken actions on our own, but also have talked with the USSR. The French have not been willing to participate up till now, as they are waiting to see how we do in our discussions with the Russians. But he is determined to hold down the sale of arms internationally. He explained the process by which arms are sold abroad, and said that permission must be obtained from the State Department first and that he is personally approving all sales. It is a slow process. He had hoped that the Special Session on Disarmament- would be able to find a program that would work. To President Perez, Carter said that he would certainly follow up on his advice. However, he believes that the initiative should come from Latin America, because we do not want to appear as if we are preaching to the Latin Americans on this issue. General Torrijos referred to two causes of this predicament. The apparent cause is that nations arm for expansionist or for defensive purposes. Why are they doing it? How much of their budget is being spent on defense matters? How much is being used to serve the people? We must also look for the OTENTttt - 6 - • CONFIO E NTML - real causes behind arms races. Certain armed forces magnify the problem in order to justify themselves. If the cause of war disappears, then the military government cannot justify its purchases to Its own people or to the world. Could we Impose certain kinds of sanctions or deny loans as an incentive to get milit2iry governments to stop their purchases of weapons? The real effect of arms sales is to negate development. Torrijos then commented on the fact that Panama is often the bridge through which many outside groups can travel. He has talked with leaders of such groups, and they complained about the excessive military burden of their governments. President Lopez Michelsen said that it is very difficult to condann the countries who deal with weapons because the arms business is part of their own* defense system; arms exports are used as a way of subsidizing domestic defense. This won't be solved at this meeting. In inter'American relations, this is not a problem for the countries represented at this meeting. The problem is south of the equator, and that is because of the War of the Pacific, and of differences with regard to Bolivia's desire for access to the sea. Lopez suggested that they discuss ways to "cure the infection" by mediating specifically with regard to Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Bolivia. We should call for patient action, because that would eliminate all the problems. President Perez said that he was in total agreement. The crisis in the Southern Cone is becoming more serious. He said that the problem of Bolivia is at the center of the problem of weapons purchases in the region. Peru has just bought some Soviet air- planes, and he had read of .the severe criticism in the United States because they used U.S. airports for refueling. He said that Venezuela had encouraged Peru to stop purchasing weapons, and he had said the same to Chile as well. He said tliat we should offer not mediation, but cooperation. He proposed that representatives of the six governments around the table send confidential communications to the three nations — Bolivia, Peru, and Chile — telling them that we would be willing to offer co- operation to settle their dispute. In the case of the Ayacucho countries, all the parties accepted the fact that the problem existed, and that would be an advantage. Perez suggested that all of the Presidents attempt the same approach with regard to Belize, so that independence would not have to be delayed. The problem, as he saw it, was to help Guatemala and Belize find a solution which would permit Belizean independence, while at the same time allowing some room for Guatemala to save face and accept independence. Perez was concerned that a solution to the Belizean problem was neces- sary to avoid severe repercussions in the Caribbean. CONFIDE N T S: -7- President Carazo spoke as the leader of a country with ho arms purchases. He was anguished to learn that since World War II, conventional weapons have caused more than a hundred wars. The purchase of weapons was disastrous on a country's economic development program. At the heart, he believed It was a problem of attitudes and of military governments. In other words, the demand factor. He was disturbed that Illicit trade In arms had been found in Costa Rica. He proposed that regional agencies be established to wage an intense campaign to stop the purchasing of weapons. The only way not to do something, Carazo said, is not to do it at all. Don't buy any weapons. Thirty years ago, Costa Rica took this decision, and he would hope that other countries would do likewise. President Carter referred to the problem of illicit payments which President Perez had noted. The United Nations is presently discussing this Issue, and the U.S. would like sup- port for negotiations for a new treaty. Carter thought Costa Rica had good luck In not purchasing weapons. This Is an excellent example for other countries and regions and he congratulated Costa Rica. However, the U.S. has different responsibilities in the world. Yet the big objective of the United States Is to prevent the spread of all weapons. Prime Minister Manley noted that this was an enormous and complex problem, tliat Jamaica has tried to use its Influence to dissuade buyers and sellers. He said moderation In arms purchases should be rewarded by the transfer of more economic resources. If there could be a significant shift of resources to development, then countries would see the real Importance and benefits of slowing arms purchases. President Carter said we would do all we could to support the ^ribbean Group, which has 30 nations and 15 international institutions and will be meeting in Washington next week. We should do all we can to help it. To the extent that there is restraint on arms purchases, we would try to be helpful in the economic area. He noted that President Perez and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada had tried to be helpful. He hoped we could get the Federal Republic of Germany to do likewise . He felt that progress was being made in this area. President Perez suggested that this would another good subject for the press statement. He suggested that the leaders say that armamentlsm was of great concern to all the countries. An' Important effort was .being made by the Ayacucho countries, and it was hoped that this effort could be broadened to Include all of Latin America. He said that although not for the com- munique, the leaders should extend their cooperation not mediation to Peru, Bolivia, and chile and to Belize and Guatemala. The idea of contributing to finding a point of agreement between Guatemala and Belize is an important one. If we offer our cooperation/ we can find a solution. He thought something could be offered to Guatemala, which would not humiliate Belize. - 8 - Caribbean Perez referred to President Carter's mention of the Caribbean Group. He confessed that he was indignant to learn in the press that the West was planning to establish a Pan-African force and a $2 billion Pan-African fund, while at the same time it was impossible to get money for the Caribbean Group. He warned that small nations in the Caribbean would fill the vacuum with political or economic mafias. He noted that Vesco was thinking of settling in Grenada. This could happen if we don't assume a responsibility to work for a Caribbean plan and to contribute oiir resources to it. He said that President Carter has taken this issue up with enthusiasm, and has been trying to gain support from other countries, but few have helped. If there are not enough funds contributed to this group, then it might be better not to have it at all. Perez said that he had offered $30 million to this new fund, provided that it be 10 percent of the total value of the fund. He sug- gested that there be $300 million per year over five years — a total of $1.5 billion. This would change the present condi- tions in the Caribbean. The only important thing is that the plem should point to the economic integration of the region . The problems are very serious, and all of us need to contribute. However, he was not optimistic. Carter said that the press has erroneously reported that the United States was considering a Pan-African force. It was not true. All that the United States did was to transport soldiers, food and equipment to Zaire and .he.ln stabilize the situation in Shaba. We have not asked for a Pan-African force, and we would not participate in one which did more than just this effort. in arms control, the United States has a firm policy, we do not introduce new types of weapons or permit an escalation of weapons sales. We sell a smaller percentage every year, and we hope others will join In our effort. We are now in fifth place in anoB sales to the region. It is very important also that Tlatelolco be concluded. We think, furthermore, that the example should be expanded and extended to other areas. Carazo said less investment in anas permits more investment for development . However, once a country advances, then the terms for securing loans and other assistance becomes harder than for those who invested in arms and did not advance. So a country is punished for focussing on development instead of on arms. / Miohelsen complimented Carazo for his approach to the problem. He added, however, that conflicts often come from asnas sales rather than purchases. Colombia supports the Caribbean Develop- ment Bank, but the problem is not of aid, but of market and price for commodities. What the Caribbean needs is the market for the sugar. Coffee producers have a similar problem. When the economic situation is not dealt with, we will not have a problem of arms purchases by governments; the problem will be CO N TIDDfnA Ir • -fiafffimt one of smuggling in weapons to the peasants as a result o£ growing political instability. Take the case of coffee. If there is a frost in Brazil it will create an unprecedented rise in the price of coffee; if there is no frosty then there will be a severe drop in the prices. The price shoul<^ not be allowed to depend on whether or not there is frost. Because of such violent swings in commodity prices r the situation in Latin America could become as bad as that of Africa. You don't have to be a Marxist to recognize the relationship between economic instability and weapons purchases. He had asked President Carter in September that we not wait until the economic situation grows so badly that a catastrophe occurs^ Let's try to agree now to establish a fair price. The coffee agreement is temporarily suspended, but we should not wait. If the U.S. would implement the coffee legislation, and apply quotas and stcibilize prices at a timely date, he was sure that if the group met again in one more year they would spend much less time discussing weapcns sjid eccncmic assistance. These agreements would restore this kind of stability. The situation in these countries, in Lopez's words, "is not correctable by just warm washcloths.” Perez said Lopez Michelsen had mentioned a most serious point. He referred again to the press statement, and suggested that another item to be included in it should be the Caribbean Group meeting which would be held on the 19th in Washington. We should state our full support for the Caribbean Group. He added two additional items which he believed should be in that press statement. First, the Coffee Agreement which was one of the few good things which began with the Alliance for Progress, has remained, emd should not die. If the Senate does not ratify the Coffee Agreement soon, the whole agreement will die because over 50 percent of the coffee exports go to the United States. Perez said that the press statement should express our great concern over this Coffee Agreement. A second problem, of course, is the International Sugar Agreement emd the ' extremely low price of sugar, and the signs of protectionism in the U.S. We should mention our concern about this as well. Carter responded by saying that he would not be disturbed for the group to express its concezm eibout the stabilization of market prices. He noted, however, that the U.S. is a large producer of sugar and U.S. producers had to be protected. He repeated his concern 2 d>out the in^rtance of the multilateral trade negotiations as an effective vehicle for reforming world trade; and noted that many of the countries represented aroiind the table are not members of GATT. nfurtnnmi l uiriJdlllllr - 10 - sV • • CO NF ffi l TM. Responding to the more specific points made by President Perez, Presid^t Carter explained that we have intense feelings within the United States among the farmers of sugar and the ranchers of beef, and their Congressmen are deeply committed to protect- ing the cost of production. We have tried to get the Inter- national Sugar Agreement ratified, and the President has resisted efforts to raise the price of sugar. He concluded by saying that he has no objections to the expression of concern. Manley noted that it would be very useful if the International Sugar Agreement could be ratified soon and asked what were the prospects . Carter said that Senator Church, who is accompanying the Presi- dent, is extremely active in sugar policy, and is a firm advo- cate of higher sugar prices, perhaps as much as 17 cents. He said that he would be meeting with Senator Iiong next week, and Senator Long represents sugar cane producers, which are not always the most efficient. He pledged, in conclusion, that he will do the best he can to get the International Sugar Agree- ment ratified ajid to keep sugar prices down. By the time of the O.A.S. meeting, he said ^at he might have a clear picture, and he would try to relay that to the nations. He said that the problem Is that the Senate is far behind its schedule right now as the result of the Canal Treaties, and he is uncertain whether they will have time to look at these additional agreements. Nevertheless, he reiterated his complete commitment to ratifica- tion without delay. Michelsen put the discussion on commodity price stabilization in a broader context. He said that producing countries hurt themselves in the long term by excessively high prices because housewives inevitably reduce their consvin^tion or ch2mge to substitutes, for example, from coffee to soft drinks, from sugar to com sugars. Therefore, it's important not to force too high a price; indeed, it is in both Interests to try to establish fair and reasonable prices. Perez agreed with President Lopez Michelsen. Since President Carazo would be leaving after this session, Perez suggested a few additional iteios to be included in the press statement so that Carazo could agree with it today. On the Dominican Repub- lic, he said that we should express our satisfaction with the electoral process in a very discreet way which would make It easier for Balaguer to resist the pressure which he is feeling from those who would like to reverse the elections. Carter interjected that he believed that the certification of the final election results would be coming in one day. r trn n nf w m unmjiiiAtr -ijr* ■ • • -eaWBBMlr Perez said that a discreet statement would help overcome any difficulties that night arise in the near future. Carter agreed, saying that we should encourage the completion of the electoral process in the Dominican Republic as well as elsewhere. Manley said that the meeting they were holding presented the leaders with a historical opportunity to try to press along several outstanding disputes. He suggested that the group offer cooperation which might lead to a resolution of the Guatemala-Belize problem. He suggested that the leaders develop a simple plan to offer cooperation on this. This could be one concrete accon^lishment of this meeting. It would be preferable not to pviblioize the means by which the group would cooperate to help resolve the dispute, but it would be useful to begin to do that. perez said the decisions on Belize and the Andean tensions should be kept confidential. uunmiir UNCLASSIFIED 31. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Secmity Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter Washington, undated 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 58, Organization of American States, 5/77-1/81. Confidential. Brzezinski wrote “6-20-78” and “10:19 pm” in the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED C0NFIDEHTIA6 — "DS MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM FOR; FROM; SUBJECT; back from th^ 'resident THE WHITE HOUSE Washington THE PRESIDENT ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI Your OAS Speech Attached is your OAS speech which Jim Fallows and Bob Pastor worked on- It incorporates comments we received from the State Department today, and I think you will find it a useful description of the state of our relations with Latin America at this time. Under Secretary of State Newsom has raised just one point in dissent, and I wanted to bring it to your attention. He is concerned, on pages 4 and 5, that we may be over-extending ourselves in the peacekeeping area, pledgina our involvement in three extremely difficult disputes.?. He is concerned that we may be raising expectations that could not easily be satisfied. Of course, you have made all of the points in those two pages either in private conversations with each country's leaders, or in letters to them. I believe there are several important reasons why you should publicly state your position; — First of all, all of the countries in the region are looking for our leadership and have asked for our help. — Secondly, for the first time, you make clear that the "hard decisions can only be made" by the parties concerned; we will only be helpful to that effort. — Thirdly, these issues, particularly Bolivian access, are among the Hemisphere ' s most important since the Canal Treaties were ratified. Bolivia has obtained a seat on the United Nations Security Council and plans to take its case to the United Nations in every possible form, just as Panama had done. It would be to our interest to be put on the record at this time. CONFIDENTIA fe- - GDS ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 CONFIDENTIMr - '^DS . 2 — It would enhance your moral standing in the Hemisphere since everybody acknowledges the goal of Bolivia's getting access to the sea; they only disagree on how to do that. Lastly, the 100th anniversary of the War of the Pacific has been causing anxiety tremors throughout the region for the last two years, and this is likely to increase as we approach 1979. Your public statement of concern — like Mrs. Carter's visit — will be a sign of U.S. interest in stability in the region and peaceful resolution of that dispute. State is concerned that our offer of help is open-ended, and is therefore reluctant to make it. I believe that the time is ripe for such a statement, and it would be viewed as perhaps the most important part of your statement. I therefore recommend that you keep the relevant passages in; if you find Newsom's concern warranted, you could accommodate it by merely deleting the final sentence on page 4 and the first full paragraph on page 5. I do hope, however, that you will retain that portion of the speech, since I think it is one of the most valuable parts of the speech. CONFIDENg»IA - Ir - CDS UNCLASSIFIED 32. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, August 22, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 27, Latin America, 7-10/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth, Bartholomew, and Denend initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand crossed out Aaron’s name in the addressee line. At the top of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “v. interesting. ZB.” UNCLASSIFIED memorandum 5094 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OmON FiLE y, CHRO * -t August 22, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR; PROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI SUBJECT; ROBERT PASTOR Conversations in Santo Domingo With Andy Young and. others, I had conversations in Santo Domingo with General Torrijos, Former President Oduber of Costa Rica, Foreign- Minister Cohsalvi of Venezuela, and Armando Villanueva of the Peruvian APRA ^eurty. Copies of the memoranda of conversation are attached, but I thought I might summarize a few overall impressions. I In discussing individual country's political affairs and particuleLTly return to democracy, the theme that kept recu- ring is the probl^ of polarization. In Peru the activities of the ultra left and ultra right are threatening the efforts of the Constituent Assembly. In Ecuador the outspoken leftist Bucaram threatens to alienate the military eind provoke them into fixing the election to ensure that Bucarcim's nephew, Roldos, cannot' win. Oduber volunteered that leftist emd rightist terrorist groups in El Salvador were both strong enough to make political accommodation impossible. Torrijos even opined that in Bolivia opposition, leader Siles was as responsible for provoking the coup as Pereda was for making it. All of the people we talked with seemed aware of the need to help those who seek to develop the broad consensus necessary for functioning democracies: Consalvi is going to Peru at Perez' request to talk to leaders there; Oduber *s party is rendering technical assistance to Torrijos' new party and to Samudio's liberal party. Andy correctly observed that he sensed a new idealistic pragmatism among the leaders we met: an inner confidence that the direction of political change in Latin America was towards more democracy, and that the best guarantee of arriving there would be by small steps which reassure the military. There is a different variation on this theme in Nicaragua, where efforts are directed to finding a democratic alter- native to Somoza. Consalvi once again urged us to "twist aimns" on behalf of change in Nicaragua. ADP Declassification Review ■ CONFIDFMT-j AIr - ‘ DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 . CONFIDfiNT - lAI r Other interesting items: On Belize: Torrijos was very excited by President Carter's reference in the OAS speech, but there was general agreement that the new Guatemalan government would have to settle internal differences between the Vice President and the Foreign Minister and that the ball is in the Guatemalans' court. On Mrica: in response to Andy Young's briefing, Torrijos promised to provide troops for a UN peacekeeping force in Namibia . On Colombia; Consalvi expressed concern that the U.S.. had not given Gol^ombia sufficient attention and that a special effort should be made since Lievano, their Foreign Minister, will be assuming the presidency of the UN General Assembly. Andy Young is considering a trip there, and I am following up on this issue. cc: Jessica Mathews Attachments : Tab A “ Memcon with Torrijos Tab B - Memcon with Oduber, Consalvi et al. Tab C - Memcon with APRA Leader, et al. CONFIDENTIAL ' UNCLASSIFIED 33. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Seeurity Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, October 4, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8-12/78. Confidential. A copy was sent to Mathews. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM ' 39?8 CODTFIDENTI - AI r NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL October 4, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR; FROM: SUBJECT: ZBIGNIEW EZ INSKI ROBERT PASTOR Impact of U..S. Human Rights Policy in Latin America ( After our discussion at the staff meeting last week, I tasked the CIA to do an overall assessment of the impact of our human rights policy in the Southern Cone. No one questions mat the sensitivities of certain government and military officials have been affected by the human rights policy; the important ques- tions are whether our long-term relationships will be strengthened or harmed by the policy and whether the policy has led, and will continue to lead, to improvements in the human rights Situations in those countries and in others. While the human rights policy may be a good instrument of ideological diplomacy in other areas , I don ' t think that ought to be one of our purposes in this hemisphere. I was working under the impression that the goals of our human rights policy include: to contribute to a climate in which human rights are increasingly respected and the costs of re- pression have increased as well; to identify the United States with a universal cause, which you have described as "the increasing self-assertiveness of man on behalf of his own human rights"; and to project the U-S. as an idealistic^ moral nation actively working toward a better world. If our overall human rights policy is to be effective and credible, one aspect needs to be that we have warmer and closer relationdiips with those governments which share our ideals and cooler and more distant relationships with those governments that don't. This necessarily means that our relations with the military governments in the Southern Cone should range from being cordial and correct — as in the case of Brazil, where we have a wide range of consultative mechanisms — to being distant, as in the case of Chile, where the Letelier investigation currently prevents us from taking any other position. CONFIDENTIjVL ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 COinFIDEWTIMf Another element of our policy should be a willingness, at appropriate times, to back up our rhetoric with actions, many of which are mandated by law anyway. At the same time, we need to continue to distinguish between the three different "baskets" of human rights in implementing our policy. For example, with respect to Argentina, we have infoirmed the government that our concern with human rights there is focused on basket #1 (integrity of the person) , and we recognize and accept the government's assessment that demo- cratization is a long-term goal. I am sending you a couple of articles that were in the New York Times in the past year, which deal with this subject. I would be very interested in your comments on these articles and on my perception of our human rights policy. cc: Jessica Mathews - COMFIDENTIAEi UNCLASSIFIED 34. Telegram From the Embassy in Paraguay to the Department of State Asuncion, October 13, 1978, 1905Z 4451 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Asuncion, 1969-1979. Confidential; Roger; Immediate. The Department repeated the cable to Santiago as telegram 265779, October 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Chaimel, Santiago, 1963-1979) UNCLASSIFIED PACE 01 ACUMCI 04411 1321371 ACTION IN«D-0t INTO OCT-01 CCO-00 iSO-00 /000 V 020624 0 131S0SZ OCT 70 FK AHEHBASSY ASUNCIONE TO SECSTATE VASHDC IIWEOIATE 4260 0 0 NT I D C H T l IH: ASUNCION 4451 ROCER CHANNEL E.O. 11652: 00$ TAGS: POOV, SHUN SUBJECT: SECOND ICETINC VITH CHIEF OF STAFF RE CONriDCNTH tir- INCOMING epartment of State TELEGRAM 2630 ASUNCI 04451 1321371 ATTNEDEO. APPEARENTLY TUO BILATERAL HEETIHGS WITH CHILE AND ARGENTINA TOOK PLACE ONE AFTER THE OTHER AND SOHE 32,4n /45 ■ SESSIONS RAY EVEN HAVE OVERLAPPED. ^ S. RECOnNENDATION: THE TWO FBI AGENTS HERE ‘TELL HE ^ THERE IS LIKELIHOOD CONDOR HILL SURFACE DURING LETELIER TRIAL IN THE U.S. IF GENERAL FETES. OAVALOS IS ACCURATE IN DESCRIBING THE COtCKINICATIONS IT USES AS AN ENCRYPEO SYSTEH WITHIN U.S. COIWUNICATIONS NET lAHO I NAVE NO KROULEDGE WHETHER THIS IS TRUE), IT WOULD SEER advisable to review THIS ARRANGEHENT TO INSURE THAT ITS CONTINUATION IS IN U.S. INTEREST. WHITE LETELIER CASE REF: ASUNCION 4375 1. ON OCTOBER 11 I CALLED AGAIN ON CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ALEJANDRO FRETES DAVALOS. AFTER PRELIRINARY COURTESIES, HE READ HE THE ACTA OR SUHHARY HINUTES RESULTING FROH THE VISIT OF GENERAL OROZCO, CHIEF OF CHILEAN INTELLIGENCE, TO ASUNCION. THE OOCUHENT ITSELF HAKES HO DIRECT REFERENCE TO THE LETELIER CASE. FRETES SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD AUTHORIZED NIH TO BRIEF RE ON THE ACTA BUT HE PREFERRED TO READ IT VERBATin. < 2. THE OOCUHENT IS BASICALLY AN AGREEHENT TO COOROINATS ALL INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN ORDER TO CONTROL AND ELIHINATE SUB- VERSION. IT SPEAKS OF EXCHANGE OF INFORIIATION, PRORPT USE OF COHHUNICATION FACILITIES, ROHITORING Of SUBVERSIVES AND THEIR DETENTION AND INFORHAL HAND OVER FROH ONE COUNTRY TO THE OTHER. IT REPEATS OVER AND OVER THE NEED FOR FULL COOPERATION AND HUTUALIY FACILITATIVE ACTS IN THE CON- TEXT Of A FIGHT TO THE DEATH AGAINST SUBVERSION. 3. IN RESPONSE TO HY QUESTIONS, FRETES DAVALOS SAVE THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN CHILE AND PARAGUAY. IT WAS'SIHPIY ANOTHER IN A REGULAR SERIES OF MEETING WHICH TAKE PLACE ANNUALLY AMONG THE CHIEFS OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE SOUTHERN COME. THIS SYSTEH OF CONSULTATIONS CAME INTO BEING MAINLY AS A DEFENSE AGAINST THE THREAT OF ARGENTINE SUBVERSION SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, CHILE, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY HAKE OF THE NET, ALTHOUGH URUGUAY IS NOW ALMOST OH THE INACTIVE LIST. FRETES DAVALOS SAID THE MEETINGS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY USEFUL ANYMORE, IN NIC JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THE MAIN THREAT IFROH ARGENTINA) HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. THEY KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANTOHER THROUGH AU.$. COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATION IN THE PANAMA • CANAL ZONE MIICN COVERS ALL OF LATIN AMERICA. THIS U.S. COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IS USED MAINLY BY STUDENT OFFICERS TO CALL HOME TO LATIN AMERICA BUT IT IS ALSO EMPLOYED TO CO-ORDINATE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES. THEY MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THEIR COMMUNICATION TKROU THE U.S. FACILITY IN PANAMA BY USING BILATERAL CODES. IN HIS VIEW THE WHOLE NETWORK IS PRACTICALLY USELESS AND SERVES MAINLY TO PERMIT CHIEFS OF INTELLIGENCE TO EXAGGERATE THEIR OWN DIMINISHING IMPORTMCE. 4. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THIS IS THE COHDOR NETWORK WHICH ALL Of US HAVE HEARD ABOUT OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS. ALTHOUGH FRETES DAVALOS TOLD HE HE HAD ONLY MENTIONED TO PRESIDENT STROESSNER THAT WE WERE GOING TO TALK ABOUT THE MEETING, I SUSPECT THE PRESIDENT VETOED FRETES' STATED INTENTION OF PROVIDING ME WITH A COPY OF THE ACTA AND INSTEAD TOLD HIM TO READ IT TO ME. EITHER I MISUNDERSTOOD OR FRETES MISSPOKE IN OUR PRE- VIOUS MEETING BtEFTEL) WHEW HE SATO ARGENTINA HAD ALSO . fuJ- &/S f 6D no ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 conn DENT I # : UNCLASSIFIED 35. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency RPM-78-10410 Washington, November 6, 1978 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Job 80T00634A, Box 4, Folder 49, Southern Cone Perception of U.S. Policies. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified\. Prepared in the Latin America Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. Requested by Pastor. UNCLASSIFIED SECRE T lEO 13526 . . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE., AGENCr a;-; . - y .. National Foreign Assessinent Center y s^ NoyCT^er ■.19f78 ■■• 5 • ■ '.V- f ^ *.-» - • ~i ^ ‘ y *** * . *./• . •«. ,-*-•»♦.*•.> '••. /.’-w : •»; • ■' • • . ' . • ••.••«■ • •,•/• • f. V 'U’ i. -.Ty •.'» V*** i.,, •INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDElt T SOUTHERN CONE PERCEPTIONS OF US POLICIES Summary ; The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view of DS policies toward Latin America. Their perspective is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccu-^ • pation since the mid 1960s with other parts of the world has left the US. out of touch with Latin American re- alities. They view US policy toward their region as inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive. There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the ,DS has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing its ability to lead the West. ADP Declassification Review "declassified > by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 Th'is memorandiin was pTspaved by the Latin America Division cf the Cffioe of Regional and Political Analysis , It. was requested by the NSC Staffer for Latin America. EO 13526 3.5(c) RPM-78-10410 Copy No. ^ OCCRET- EO 13526 SEeitE T of the differences between the US and the ,' Sout^rh Cone nations have historical present time, however r each country ift ithe area has ; , spejCific- grievances ^ agiainst^fhe US , wrtiit the^mqsfc conane^^^ ■ problem:, being human‘- righ±s, :.,The jniLlitary^^ I^ . ■ region : believe - that!, secuf ityj against^^Ieftist' terrofis^-;^'^'-' and' xhternat'ionaL Conmniaisia ' takes preced^ce over - p^rsohai: well-being and individual freedom. Most of these! .leaders ' are convinced that intervention by the military prevented a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic de- velopment and a slow, incremental approach toward demo- cratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated national weaknesses. For the countries that have ex- perienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for national survival has been vei^ real. All of the Southern Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion, and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights policies. The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their poor image in the world press and in international forums, where their militaiy leaders are commonly described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilietn official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers that the Israelis were praised for staging a raid into Uganda against terrorists, while counterterrorist ac- tivities in Brazil were denoxinced by the US press. Leaders in the Southern Cone fcTelieve that investi- gations by unofficial aind official organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human Rights are over zealous and misguided,: and that tlS policy- makers accept' these findings uncritically. They deplore the United States' selective attention to Latin America while it ignores human rights violations in Communist countries. .. . This does not mean that US hxaman rights policy has had a ccCTletely negative impact on the area. On the - 2 - sscns T EO contrary, police and military officials in these countries are now sensitized to hiiman rights considerations . Eve^ chief of. state in the area claims to have made clear toU, v. : his- subordinates -that .tortiire^ and. arbitra^ af rest- ■ wi.ld;?/ ■ no longer, be tolera.ted. JSIl of these?, .countries^ hayet- ^Ii^J^ . shownl - g^e^al improveaehtr during' the ;'past . year ^ion. 'tfaei:r ^treatment -.of., prisonersi^ ; From their perspective, however, 1diese improveirien.ts. go \mackaowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent of criticism, adversenry treatment, and antagonistic US legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the US is playing a game with them-using hxuaan rights as a way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed, return to "democratic government" is the real issue, their answer is that competitive politics is not possible in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable until the various military regimes are convinced that they have established economic progress and ensured the permanence of political changes they have brought about. Continued US pressure to speed up the process will pro- bably only increase the bitterness and recrimination. Public Views of US Policies It is much more difficult .to get an accurate reading of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most citizens seem to support the military governments; the rest are either vmconcerned with politics or belong to a declared opposition. The Chilean ^vemment probably enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the plebiscite vote held there earlier thrs year> even though rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this support. > ' Judging from newspaper commentary and personal conversations, US human rights policy has had little impact on the general populace. Some political groups that have long opposed the various governments and other groups representing civil and human rights causes have used the policy to air their own specific grievances. - 3 - SECRET EO 13526 IsfalkfcWS Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar : to their own programs.. , . . • , ' Argentina -y-yy. X . The human rights issue-is . the; major point: ccm-- ~ tention.: between . Argentina "and the US, senxor Argentirne: . ' officials view human rights " abuses . aS; an. unfortunate but - inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship. Current US policy is perceived . by the Argentines as a sign that, the US considers good Hi i a-t-flu-y-ai r-j^l af i r>n« to be expendable. Tney bexieve that this policy is selective and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for "punishment" regardless of their internal problems. Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it . would also understand the government’s tough measures. Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating, the government is attempting to wind down its massive security operations and exert tighter controls over police and military units, it has ordered the release of many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal procedures, and the government has strengthened require- ments for proper police identification. In an effort to appease its critics, the government has piablished several lists of those arrested or xinder detention and is making a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter- American Exnnan Rights Committee has been invited to visit the count iry, possibly between March and May 1979. The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of _ 4 _ SECRET EO 13526 ■5 ECRE. '' X '~ EG 13526 foreign lailitary sales , the reduction in the size of the US military mission, the nonapprppriation of training., funds, and the lack of. auidiori ration for. Argentina, t^^^ pajr for militctry; trai^^ itt..'the\ ilS:;^ BuehosiAir^' -^.beep^-coff^rned - aboufr thel.-recently -impiem^te^Sumg^ f^KdbiiAdj^cuiu^dnieittE^thatr^^ f orevQh^ miri^ar ^-p i^ ‘ ' :?chasei^jt export: tlicenseA ) 'and-i trairiing^^^^ ..The^State he:;.-..;^ 'partment*’s fecehfc decision to "authorize’ aV's^ri ’mfliticy* training contract for noncoinbatan€s''alleviated some of ;; the tension, but Senator Kennedy* s letter to President Carter protesting the decision is stnre to rankxe Sttenos Aires. Another problem is the Argentine plai^fo^ai^*ex|^^ perimental" plutonium reproce ssing plant, vThe decision runs counter 3 >26 3.3('b to President Carter's desire. to curb the spread of pro- liferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, contending that it discriminates against countries with- out nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and the US will have to relent in its current policy. Mean-r- while, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can independently decide whether or not to reprocess. The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet e3g>ansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more active role in the nonaligned movei^ient to counter Cuban activities. The hardline attitude is. taken by Army General Agosti, who commented earlier \his year that Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead without anybody's help or advice" and that something should be done cibout Africa. There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos Aires against the US over the Export- Import Bank decision not to finance ecuipnent exports for the Yac^ta Dam project- The Sxport-xmport Bank's change of iiiina on this issue has lessened the hue and ciy, but many milita3cy men - 5 - SECR ET EG 13526 think that the financijtg turnaround, i&^ somehovr ' the. visit by the Inter-Amerlcaa. Human - lights Conur^sidn^fc- : j)rdhId[as^-mth'.,ti^:^S ,hi Il^hY^ Argehti^j^^^ -^eeifi^d^tdpZbdcfih^redirectln^^exi^f^iurtxy^s • policy " Eoreighil^'nister Mdittesr foie exato?I«iif argehtina*s potential as a nuclear supplier' during his recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers, meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abro- gating the Rio defense pact and expelling the US military group. Brazil Brazil* s foreign policy reflects its very real great power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is working to achieve and demonstrate independence of ths US in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but resentment of US hxnaan rights and nuclear proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance last year of military ties with Washington. Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted in- . trusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic demands for basic changes. T'Qiile President Geisel emd President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberal- ization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring habeas corpus in many political and national security cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime sweeping dictatorial powers. Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that the country'* s econoinic well-being is still fragile and - 6 - SECRET vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend ?to view certaui. US trade positipns-rsuch as counter-i. vailing duties--as harmful, to their. developmentJdrivei v ; fueled ..as it is ever-ggpanding expoerts..; ia. : especially true- tliis yeau:; because poor a^ibultural - performance has- forced the government to Concentrate' bh 5 alleviating the baleince of payments probli^ -by promoting more exports of manufactured goods to developedL nations. One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potenti- ally threatening to basic Brazilian interests ^ The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation concerns in a similar context, /often saying that US opposition to the Brazil-West ..German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth. They point out the critical importance to them of non- fossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high cost of imported oil. Argentina’s decision to develop reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt Brazil to follow suit. Added to these specific problems with the US is the growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and the aftermath of its experience in .Vietnam, The situ- ation in Africa is perceived as the best current example of this development. t. The US is viewed from an environment in which there is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses. At present the government is controlled and supported by a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the inter- national Communist movement, ■ - 7 - SCCRB T EO 13526 i The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to . .. the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist i .UCtiyity in tixe country and the growing; civil rights ; .*1 ;X mOy^^t among the black population; * The -Braz£iiah. ”X’^’—^ ; -'-'-1, 2 churcfefias also been a factor- throuc^jits; Ibn^ .champi-#' 'X ; ' ' jSX: bning'. of the • human f ighte cause and Mts' psnj tests: agaittst I - " “ ' , , government policies » Nevertheless , like other Latin^^^^ v^ ^ J American countries, Brazilians^ in. general, adhere to authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are: . ■ . much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than ' ^ North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service' rhetorically questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil — the US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil ' s problems and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward democratic government rather than engage in constant and unproductive criticism. Chile Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by tbis ^ because it believes that it has made substantial progress in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to hear any favorable_coin ment from Wa shington. President Pinochet is i3SB38EHHi disappointed by the lack of US recognition of the improving situation in • Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the same intensity as before he tried to make improvements. The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN Human Rights Committee ' s attempt to provide funds to "victims” of Chilean human rights violations. Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for political prisoners and official consent for most exiles to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the 8 EO 13526 intelligence service, which had been resconsible f'vr much of the abuse of human rights; civilian appointments to the- cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which " ir responsible for the intellig^ce service;; accelerated • completion o£ a new constitution and: advancement ..in^ th^;^. -.timetablerfor ah elected^ government; preparation; pi;a -new; . labor; code with plans tot reinstitube^epllective- b^gaihing next year; and the visit of the UK -H.T#an- Rig^ Ccrnmittee delegation. ^ .2 2.' 2 ' The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional ally of the 'US and. believes that Washington "encouraged" the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown, however, the military believes' that the US was forced by domestic political concerns to become strongly critical of the new govesmment and to deny any part in the coup. The Chileans are now convinced that US-ChilecUi relations will never be the same. They believe that there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist Allende regime. They also think that the US is being overzealous in its prosecution ' of the Letelier case > me Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the "truth" in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nation- alism is easily aroused. For excimple, a Washington Post editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be replaced by a Christiein Democratic goyerninent was de- nounced in a series of man-in-the- street interviews and was described by nearly everyone as am unwarranted in- trusion in Chilean affairs. The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US human rights policy as made to order for their own cam- paign against the government. The Christian Democrats, in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier case will bring down Pinochet. - 9 - SECRE T EO 13526 While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly treated by Washington, there is stilJL a strong, prp-DS / y; feeling in the country^; I:Iiiita^ officers and'pivili^ i 1; £ admire^ tiie and, votid- liKe ytl^ir jponnfc^^ ' eventually- to Evolve al<3ng' US 'ilnes\;>'-De:spi = pei:i;:epti-Qn ’-dist rus t - rdf the' US the* Chiid'ani^ £g^db^uron^;^ between the^ two countr ies The Chileans ' appear cerii.'is that the poor f-elations will deteriorate even further^ determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement against the US and continue tp hope for better treatment. For example. Foreign Minister Cvibillos.' recently devoted most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth the Chilean position the Beagle Channel negotiations with Argentina. Despite the poor irela.ef forts -ibf - the VS/Mest Germany.,' the ‘United ‘ kingdom, and France 'resulted in Laino *'s release from piri son . ' ' 'Indeed / ” • largely as a result of DS pressure, Paraguay has released almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem because of the subservience of the judiciary to presi- dential authority and the lack of control over police interrogation methods. The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last May that the Paraguayans were improvinq their human rights performance. He called the; move by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits euad the military training program for Paraguay from the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence. The Paraguayan Government's public response to the US human rights policy has been negative. President Stroessner often cites his staunch anti-Communism as well as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan po- litical elite are plainly worried by what they see as the US failure to meet the Soviet-Cviban challenge in Africa. They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They regard US criticism of their country as naive and an invasion of their domestic affairs. Because of the extent of media censorship in the country, it is difficult to determine what the populace thinks O— Stroessner regime. The President appears to.be personally popular, however, and his travels about the country^ are enthusiastically received by the citizens. - 11 - SECRhT ' EO 13526 A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely Uruguay --i vt / seme steps during the past’ 'year ^'tp'", -improve human rights conditions, ^ aittaugh the overall situation remains poor. The goyemment retains extensive'^ statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give 1 up. On the- average, fewer political arrests have been made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners. Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive controls and is far from independent, military courts are reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases and are ordering the release of , increasing numbers of detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more freely—if cautious ly--an expeditious return to civilian government. Among the positive measures taken by the government cure: ; permission for an America!^ Bar Association visit in April? plans to puolish a list of prisoners released since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the Inter- national Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground rules for a visit? and curtailment of prisoner detentions under emergency powers. Most indications are that the regime would like to improve its image abroad cind will move steadily to change its huiaan rights practices. Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay may now be the region’s most highly controlled society. To explain this , Uruguayan leaders point out that Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan military* sees this battle as a defense of its national moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and has attei-pted to discredit the US through a well-managed media esr^aign. - 12 - SECRET EO 13526 jEO 13526 Many rightist military officers oppose the US and want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the 'other hand^ General Gregorio Alvarez^ the cosmander ;in chief of the Army \rtio wants, to be President some dayr^ '^Vv' ^supports a new evaluation of the human fights . situation :^ 2 qid is raoying cautiousiy tO; compel military off icersf to'^'V^ accept his . reform iaeaLsures . ‘ . The strength of the" rightisti; officers, however, should not be xinderestimated, however.’ Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive. Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of ending its control of the gove3cnment until 1986. Mean- while, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together with US legislative and policy restrictions on ecoiiomic and militajiY assistance > are inpadiments to better relations . Uruguayans hope that a new , more positive attitude toward human rights will result in better re- lations with the US, but they insist that Washington should have no illusions about the prospects for an early return to civilian government. - 13 - 3ECRS? iEO L3526 Distribution List; Original - Robert Pastor, NSC Staff Chief, Executive Office Bldg. UNCLASSIFIED 36. Research Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency GC 78-10220 Washington, November 1978 1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 11, Beagle Channel. Confidential. An unknown hand wrote “Country File 1 1/29/78” in the right-hand margin of the first page of the paper. A December 1978 version of this paper, with document munber GC 78-10224, is identical except for a corrected map detailing the Antarctic claims of Chile and Argentina. (Central Intelligence Agency, [text not declassified], Job 79T01050A, Box 2, Folder 6, Argentina-Chile Dispute at the End of the Earth GC 78-1 0224) UNCLASSIFIED Confiden t ial - BMOW TMWUW 3W. IV oaorwoacflb National Foreign Assessment Center Argentina-Chile: Dispute at the End of the Earth A Research Paper ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 Coiifideiitia t GC 78-10220 November 1978 S3«OMV TVNOUVN 3Hii.V(B3nQ0tka« ^ O N F < DENTIAL Argentina-Ghlle: Dispute at the End of the Earth Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center November 1978 The current dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel and related territorial claims has a long and complex history. It is typical of many other South American boundary problems that stem from early, ambiguously worded agree- ments and treaties that were formulated before accurate maps were available. This paper addresses the major issues in the Argentina-Chile dispute. The Beagle Channel lies near the southern tip of South America and serves as an alternate route between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the Strait of Magellan and to the course around Cape Horn. A treaty negotiated in 1881 stipulates that the bound- ary between Argentina and Chile should run north- south through Tierra del Fuego, dividing Isla Grande into two parts, with Argentina getting the eastern part and Chile the western part. All islands along the Atlantic coast were to belong to Argentina: those south of the Beagle Channel as far as Cape Horn and all along the Pacific coast were to belong to Chile. Differing interpretations of the treaty soon arose. The Chileans claimed that the north-south line divid- ing Isla Grande was to stop at the northern shore of the Beagle Channel, so that the channel itself as well as all territory to the south belonged to Chile. The Argentines countered that the north-south line reached midchannel and that a portion of the chan- nel, belonged to them. The Chileans also held that the channel extends eastward as far as Cabo San Pio, making the small islands of Picton, Lennox, and Note: This oaoer was prepar ed by\ Offi ce of Geo- graphic and Cartoaraphic Research.] EO 1 3526 3.5(c) Nueva theirs; whereas the Argentines claimed that the channel turns southward to the west of Picton and Lennox, and the islands are therefore Argentine. Picton, Lennox, and Nueva. ownership of which has become a matter of nationai pride to both countries, have no more than a dozen or so permanent or seasonal Chilean residents and no Argentines; goid placers once exploited on them have tong since played out, and with the possible exception of some nitrate deposits, they contain no known mineral or other resources of significance. In recent years, however, the importance of Tierra del Fuego as a whole has grown, both economically and strategically. Oilfields and enormous sheep ranches occupy the northern part of the region. In the south. Ushuaia, Argentina, has grown from a mere outpost to a town of 6,000 inhabitants. It has an airfield, a naval base, port and petroleum storage facilities, a radio station, a hydroelectric piant, and a road that allows overland communication with the north. Chile maintains a small naval base at Puerto Williams, south of the Beagle Channel on Isla Navarino. Puerto Williams has an airstrip, a radio station, a hotel, and a civilian population of about 700. A series of incidents, including one in which a Chilean PT boat entered Ushuaia Bay and was fired at by an Argentine patrol ship in 1967, led Chile to unilaterally seek British arbitration. Argentina re- jected the idea at the time, but signed a treaty in 1972 whereby the International Court of Justice would study the problem and submit its verdict to ■ CONriOENT I AL [Omitted are iiiaps and photographs of the Beagle Channel and its islands.] the British Crown for approval or disapproval. In May 1977 the Court dedded that the Beagle Chan- nel should be divided between the two countries and the disputed islands awarded to Chlie; implementa- tion of the dedsion. which was accepted by the British, was set for 2 February of the foOor^ng year. But in December 1977, Argentina, which had al- ready indicated it would not accept the Court's ruling, began a press campaign and a rHimber of economic and mHItary moves to prompt concesdons from Chile. Preddents Vkjela of Argentina and Pinochet of Chile met in Mendoza. Argentina, in January 1978, and iri Puerto Montt, ChHe, in Febru- ary, and signed agreements creating a joint commis- sion and outlining a phased negotiation process. The first phase ended in April without any si^ificant progress. As the second phase of negotiations proceeded, the focus of attention shifted away from the islands in the mouth of the Beagle Channel to a number of smaller islands to the south. Including Evoiit, ^mevelt, and Homos. Argentina wants a boundary that would link these islands before it turns south along the Cape Horn meridian, or, better yet, an alignment that would place orre or more of the islands entirely in Argentine territory. Intrusion of the Chileans into the Atlantic is resented by the Argen- tines, who feel that it breaks a gentlerhan's agree- ment between the two countries that Argentina should be an Atlantic power and Chile exclusively a Pacific power. Argentina is also concerned about the affect the Court's awards to ChHe might have on control of ocean resources; both countries claim sovereignty over resources within 200 miles of the coast Owner- ship of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva may bear on the location of the boundary between the two respective 200-mlle zones and could give Chile a dzabie slice of the South Atlantic. Continental shelf petroleum and coastal fisheries are the resources of greatest interest, but the value and the ektent of these In the area are unknown. The shelf east of Nueva Island, however, is quite narrow, about 15 miles wide, beyond which the bottom drops rapidly to abyssal depths. It is. therefore, much less attractive for development than Argentina’s broad shelf on the northeastern side of Tierra del Fuego, which has rich, relatively untapped fish resources and potential oil deposits that may rival those of the North Sea— although the latter will take many years of exploration to determine. - An additional Argentine concern is that the Inter- national Court ruling will adversely affect their Antarctic claim which overiaps that of Chile: Pre- suinably, they fear that any extension of Chilean territory eastward into the Atlantic will lend weight to Chilean claims to territory directly to the south on the Antarctic Peninsula CUNt-IUhNTIAL 3 UNCLASSIFIED 37. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, November 27, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Latin America, 8-12/78. Secret. Sent for information. Inderfurth and Denend initialed the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM BECRET - ^NFORMATIOlj MEMORANDUM FOR: 7"4 I NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL November ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 2 U> I 27, 1978 j t / i ADP Declassification Review FROM: SUBJECT: ROBERT PASTOR Beagle Channel Update DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 since November 2 when the special Argentine-Chilean commission adjourned without having reached an agreement on the juris- dictional dispute in the Beagle Channel, several diplomatic messages between the two countries' Presidents have been exchanged. The Argentines agreed to a Chilean proposal that a mediator be chosen to resolve the dispute only if boundary questions could be discussed first. The Argentines want exclusive maritime claims in the Atlantic, and three islands in the Beagle Channel under Chilean jurisdiction threaten these claims. The Chileans have resisted the idea of setting such terms of reference for a mediator. Intelligence reports indicate that the GOA has been hastily purchasing arms: patrol boats from Israel, France, West Germany, and South Korea; aircraft from Israel (30 Mirage III jets) and France (parts for Alouette helicopters) ; ammunition from France (the Exocet naval missile), U.K., West Germany, Belgium, Italy; and communication egtiipmeat f - r-mn. R ranof* and Isra^. Hardliners in the Argentine military believe the time has come for a show of force. One of the leaders of this group, the commanding general of Argentina's I Corps, told our Ambassador that if the dispute is not resolved by the first two weeks in December, Araentina would take th^ initiative and fight Chile. Reinforcing this message, the admiral who commands the Argentine Coast Guard told an American Embassy officer last Friday (November 24) that Argentina will occupy the disputed territory and will break diplomatic and trade ties with Chile unless negotiations are resumed in ten days. We have just learned from the Chilean Foreign Minister that he is pleased by the conciliatory nature of Argentina's latest note, which is reported to have recommended the modalities of the December 11 Foreign Minister's meeting in Buenos Aires, and he will recommend that Pinochet accept it. it's not cle'aT yet whether this means that the Chileans have accepted Argentina's definition of the issue. Our position has remained one of talking to both sides (and others — e.g., the Brazilians) without getting in between. I continue to believe that is the best course. Trying to mediate between the Argentines and the Chileans would make Camp David look easy, and we just don't have the same kind of stake in the Beagle Channel that we have in the Middle East. UNCLASSIFIED 38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy Washington, December 8, 1978, 2343Z 310384 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507-0584. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Buenos Aires, Santiago, Bogota, Brasilia, Caracas, Montevideo, Mexico City, and Lima. Drafted by Ruser and Bumpus; cleared by Guzman and in EUR, lO/UNP, and S/S-0; approved by Vaky. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of ^ ceN P ip ew TO tt: EXDXS LownuEM Tr fti r PAGE 01 STATE 310384 ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT- 01 lSO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /02S R DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA: CWRUSER: ONBUMPUS : JMA APPROVED BY ARA;VPVAKY ARA:RGUZMAN EUR:tirE :VBROD lO/UNP -EESVENDSEN S/S-0:JETHYDEN 071250 082358Z /SI Z O 082343Z DEC 78 ZFF4 FM SBCSTATE HASHDC TO AMBMBASSY ROHE FLASH INFO AHEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE AMBMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE AHEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE . AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE AHEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE e " 0 M F I P B 1 4 T T A - L ' STATE 310384 EXDIS ROME FOR VATICAN OFFICE FOR AMBASSADOR WAGNER E.O. 12065:- GDS 12/08/82 (CWRUSER) TAGS: AR, Cl. PDIP SUBJECT; BEAGLE CKANNET. REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 09558 -IB) 1. -fe- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. SUMMARY. DEPARTMENT IS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED THAT CONFIBBHTIAL OOMDIDnNTIAL PAGE 02 STATE 310384 HOSTILITIES MAY BE IMMINENT IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ARGENTINA AMD CHILE OVER THE ISLANDS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL AND THE RESULTING CLAIMS TO MARITIME ZONES IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC. MEDIATION BY THE POPE — A POSSIBILITY IN WHICH ARGENTINA IS INTERESTED -- MAY BE CME OF THE FEN REMAINING POSSIBILITIES OF AVOIDING BLOODSHED. AMBASSADOR IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH VATICAN, EXPRESS OUR GRAVE CONCERN THAT ARGENTINA MAY RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION IF THE DECEMBER 12 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING IS NOT SUCCESSFUL AND ENCOURAGE VATICAN MAKE A FIRM OFFER TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 2. ARGENTINA AND CHILE HAVE CARRIED ON AN INCREASINGLY ACRIMONIOUS DISPUTE OVER TERRITORIAL RIGHTS TO ISLANDS AND ISLETS SOUTH OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL FOR NEARLY 100 YEARS. THE DISPUTE WAS SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION IN 1971 AND THE AWARD WHICH HAS HANDED DOWN BY THE BRITISH CROHN FOR THE THREE MAJOR INHABITED ISLANDS PRINCIPALLY FAVORED CHILE. ARGENTINA DECLARED THE AWARD VOID IN JANUARY 1978. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE THAT TIME HAVE BEEN LARGELY UNSUCCESSFUL AND ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Document View Page 2 ofjt^ EVEN BEFORE FORMAL TALKS ENDED ON NOVEMBER 2, ARGENTINA BEGAN SABRE RATTLING EXERCISES INTENDED TO CONVINCE THE CHILEANS THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD RESULT IF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE AGREED UPON. CHANGING POLITICAL REALITIES IN ARGENTINA HAVE PROJECTED HARD- LINERS WHO FAVOR A WAR WITH CHILE INTO INCREASINGLY POWERFUL POSITIONS. 1. OUR AMBASSADOR IN BUENOS AIRES HAS HAD SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS WITH PAPAL NUNCIO TO ARGENTINA, LAGHI, WHO eONPIBBHTIMr e eiWFiaEi ff iAL PAGE 03 STATE 310384 HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE POPE MIGHT BE WILLING TO MEDIATE THE DISPUTE IF HE FELT THAT SITUATION WAS SUFFICIENTLY CRITICAL AND THAT FURTHER BILATERAL PROGRESS COULD NOT BE MADE (REFTEL A) . 5. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT CRITICAL POIN^ IN THE DISPUTE MAY HAVE BEEN REACHED (REFTEL B) IN FACT, LATEST INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE SITUATION MAY BE EVEN MORE CRITICUUj THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT. 6. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY CONTACT HIGHEST RANKING CURIA OFFICIAL AVAILABLE AND MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS: -- USG BELIEVES THAT POSSIBILITY OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE IS IMMINENT. -- DEMARCHES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA BY THE US, THE EC- 9 AND NUMEROUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE NOT DIMINISHED THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR; THE TWO COUNTRIES MAINTAIN THEIR APPARENT COLLISION COURSE. --IF THE DECEMBER 12 MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS DOES NOT REACH SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT, AMD THIS APPEARS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF THE CHILEAN INSISTENCE ON LIMITING THE QUESTION TO MARITIME BOUNDARIES WHILE ARGENTINA DEMANDS THAT ALL TERRITORY IN THE FAR SOUTH BE CONSIDERED, WAR SEEMS LIKELY. -- HO?»BVER, IF THE POPE WERE TO IMMEDIATELY OFFER HIS (300D OFFICES TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT, THIS MIGHT POSSIBILY AVERT CONFLICT. ONLY THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE POPE NAY BE ABLE TO AVERT WHAT APPEARS TO BE A SLIDE INTO WAR. -- PAPAL EFFORTS COULD BE EXPRESSED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS, INCLUDING: PERSONAL MESSAGES TO BOTH PRESIDENTS, PUBLIC GOHPiDiarraAB - OONPIDUHTIAB PAGE 04 STATE 310384 STATEMENT URGING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND/ OR AN INVITATION TO PRESIDENTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO MEET WITH HIM TO REVIEW SITUATION IF THIS IS APPROPRIATE . --IF THE S,TUATION IS DETERIORATING AS IT APPEAR- TO US THAT IT IS, WHATEVER IS DONE MUST BE DRAMATIC ENOUGH TO GIVE ARGENTINA SERIOUS PAUSE . VANCE OOMPIDmrPIAi r UNCLASSIFIED 39. Memorandum for the Record Washington, December 8, 1978 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B001 12R, Box 15, Folder 41, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/ Agendas of Brzezinski/ Aaron Meetings, August-December 1978. Secret. UNCLASSIFIED 8 December 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown and Mr. Aaron, 8 December 1978, ori Covert Action Finding (U) 1. I raised the issue of a possible covert action finding on the Beagle Channel in order t-o^let iis usp our influence to keep the situat-ion- calTii. There was instant and vehement rejection of this in view ot tne fact that the United Stat oin 2 . I think we should send a cable ^QISBSSIffllfflDHHHHthat it is the US open position to oppose military con flict over the Beaole Ch annel issue and that they can support that position ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 UNCLASSIFIED 40. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter Washington, December 13, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in London, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem December 9-15. UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON SECRCT if II d. December 13, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT FROM; Warren Christopher, Acting La7. c. Beagle Channel . The meetings in Buenos Aires between tte Foreign Ministers of Argentina and Chile on the Beagle Channel dispute were not successful. The Argentines rejected a Chilean compromise package, including Papal mediation, by insisting that the two countries first resolve the issue of sovereignty over the islands. The Chilean Foreign Minister returned to Santiago this afternoon. Senior T^gentine military commanders are expected to meet tomorrow morning to consider further steps. Chile put its military forces on full alert early this morning, matching actions taken by Argentina several weeks ago. Yesterday I called in the Argentine and Chilean Ambassadors to warn them against using force to re- solve the dispute. Both reco^ize that it is a dangerous situation, but I am not at all confident that their countries will show the restraint I urged on them. Right now, the risk of armed conflict seems high. ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 [Omitt e d - h e r e ar e it e m fr unrelat e d - to Latin Ameriea] RDS-2/3 12/13/98 UNCLASSIFIED [Omitted here are items unrelated to Latin America.] UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 41. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina and Chile Washington, Deeember 15, 1978, 0118Z 315625 1 Souree: National Arehives, RG 59, Central Foreign Poliey File, P840139-1813. Confidential; Niaet; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate for information to USUN. Drafted by Bushnell; eleared in ARA, 10, and S/S-0 and by Brzezinski; approved by Christopher. UNCLASSIFIED Dbcmnent View Page 1 of 2 eo w w D eNT M t: eOMPIBB CTI M. PAGE 01 STATE 315625 ORIGIN NODS -00 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl R DRAFTED BY ARA: JABDSHNBIli.-NLF APPROVED BY D - MR. CHRISTOPHER ARA:R6UZMAN NSC: OR. BRZEZINSKI IO:GHELKAN S/S-0:SVAI.ERGA 010421 150131Z /62 O 150118Z DEC 78 ZFF6 FH SECSTATB MASHDC TO AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO NIACT IMMEDIATE INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE e e MPIDEWllAL STATE 315625 NODIS E.O. 12065: 60S 12/14/84 (BUSHNELL, JOHN) TAGS: POIP, PBOR, AR, Cl SUBJECT: BEAGIiE CHANNEL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT VIDELA 1. -fC'-ENTIRB TEXT) 2. EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES: YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SOONEST TO PRESIDENT VIDELA FROM PRESIDENT CARTER (EMBASSY SANTIAGO: THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN MAKING SIMILAR APPROACH SET FORTH IN SEPTEL) : BEGIN TEXT: CUNDlUtiMTlAL GOMFIBE WT iia ; PAGE 02 STATE 315625 AS YOU KNOW, FOR SOME DECADES ONE OF THE GREAT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE IS THAT DISPUTES HAVE BEEN MANAGED PEACEFULLY. IN THIS SPIRIT, MY COUNTRY NEGOTIATED WITH PANAMA A HEW TREATY ON THE CANAL TO DEAL WITH A LONGSTANDING SOURCE OF TENSICBI BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN ARGENTINA COULD RESULT IN EVENTS GETTING OUT OF CONTROL WITH HOSTILITIES COMMENCING AND ESCALATING. I KNOW THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED BY MANY OF OUR COLLEAGUES IN THE HEMISPHERE AND IN THE WORLD. WE ARE WORKING FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD AND HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FORTHRIGHT AND CLEAR IN QUICKLY CONDEMNING AGGRESSION. IF AGGRESSION HERB TO OCCUR BECAUSE OF THE BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE, WE WOULD SPEAK OUT STRONGLY AGAINST IT. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO INJECT ITSELF INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THIS COMPLICATED MATTER AND WE HOPE EARLY PROGRESS CAN BE MADE BUILDING ON YOUR TALKS THIS WEEK, PERHAPS INCLUDING A MUTUAL MILITARY STANDDOWN. HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE PREPARED, IF BOTH PARTIES WISHED, TO CONSULT WITH OTHERS TO HELP DEVELOP A PROMPT MEDIATION BY SOME OTHER PARTY. GIVEN THE PEACEFUL TRADITION OF OUR HEMISPHERE, I BELIEVE OPEN AND CLEAR COMMUNICATION OF OUR POSITIONS ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Document View Page 2 of 2 IS CRITICAL FOR ALL OUR EFFORTS TOWARD A PEACEFUL WORLD. PLEASE ACCEPT MY MESSAGE IN THIS SPIRIT. I AM ALSO INDICATING MY CONCERNS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CHIU;. END TEXT. e P UF i D EMTl M. - eew KPE i mAL PAGE 03 STATE 315625 3. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE TEXT AND WOULD PREFER GOA FOLLOW SAME PRACTICE. 4. FOR USUN: YOU MAY INFORM WALDHEIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ENCOURAGED THE PARTIES TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES. 5. PLEASE DELIVER TEXT IN ENGLISH, SINCE WE WISH TO AVOID ANY DIFFERENCES IN TRANSLATION NUANCES. CHRISTOPHER eONPIDBWTtA I f NNN CO W FI P e W TtA f UNCLASSIFIED 42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, December 21, 1978, 1754Z 321148 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780528-0313. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to Santiago and Rome. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared in ARA/ECA and S/S-O and by Guzman; approved by Vaky. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 2 eO N W Oe W TI AL EXDXS eowPlP B W T Bar PAGE 01 STATE 321148 ORIGIK SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 R DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA: JBUMPITS :TR APPROVED BY ARA:VFVAKY ARA/ECA: CANORRBD S/S-0:SVAliERGA ARA:RGUZKAN 096792 211802Z /42 Z O 211754Z DEC 78 ZFF4 FM 8ECSTATE HASHDC TO AHEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES FLASH INFO AKEMBASSY SANTIAGO IHMEDIATE AMEMBASSY RONE IMMEDIATE e e N P IPEW TI H It ' STATE 321148 EXDIS, RONE FOR VATICAN OFFICE E.O. 12065 ;GDS 12/21/84 (CANORRED) TAGS: PDIP, AR, Cl SUBJECT: BEAGLE CHANNEL DISPUTE REF: BA 9958- 1. -te-- ENTIRE TEXT) 2. FOR AMBASSADOR CASTRO: YOU SHOULD SEEK IMMEDATB INTER- VIEN WITH GENERAL VIOLA TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE. --ESSENCE OF HIS MORNING CONVERSATION HAS REPORTED TO USG, WHERE IT CAUSED DEEPEST CONCERN. -- USG DOBS NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESENT SITUATION IN OOHPIDBNTIAL CONriDBlTIAL ■ PAGE 02 STATE 321148 ANY HAY JUSTIFIES MILITARY ACTION BY ARGENTINA AGAINST CHILE . -- WAR IS DEFINITELY NOT RPT MOT THE ONLY OPTION AVAILABLE TO ARGENTINA. THERE IS THE REASONABLE OPTION OP AVOIDING HOSTILE ACTION. -- IF ARGENTINA HERE TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION, AND HE WOULD UNDERSTAND OCCUPATION OF UNINHABITED ISLANDS IN DISPUTE TO CONSTITUTE MILITARY ACTION, THE USG AND THE ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 WORLD COMMUNITY WOULD BE FORCED TO VIEW SUCH A MOVE AS AGGRESSION. -- IF SUCH AGGRESSION TOOK PLACE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES. — THE USG WISHES ONCE AGAIN, IN THE STRONGEST TERMS, URGE THAT ARGENTINA SETTLE THIS TE BRITORTA T. DT.qpUTE WITH CHILE IN A PEACEFUL MANNEk. CHRISTOPHER UNCLASSIFIED 43. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter Washington, December 21, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 21, Evening Reports (State), 12/78. Secret. Christopher was acting for Vance, who was in Geneva meeting with Gromyko concerning SALT. Carter initialed the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OP STATE WASHINGTON December 21, 1978 ^ MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting IfcC- 1. Beagle Ghannej. . The Pope toiia^ decided to send a special emi s s ar jr to Argentina sanp Chile to assist them in reaching a negotiated settiefflent of the dispute. Argentina has accepted the i=>™vssarv, and y?e expect Chile will do the same, uanger of conflict is still present. Basic differences over boundary lines remain. Hardline Argentine military officers who pushed Videla toward war retain their commands and could undermine the peace effort at any time. Late this evening (December 21) , Chile has called for a special OAS meeting tomorrow under the RIO pact. We hope this will not derail the Pope's effort. [ Omitt e d h e re ere items unr e lat e d to the B e agle Chann e l - disput e ] ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 RDS-2/3 12/21/78 UNCLASSIFIED [Omitted here are items unrelated to the Beagle Channel dispute.] UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, April 25, 1979 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 46, Latin America, 2-5/80. Confidential. UNCLASSIFIED ( ' COtlFIDB N^^Mr MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT: THE WHITE HOUSE wash I n gton April 25, 1979 THE SECRETARY OF STATE Consultations with Latin American and Caribbean Governments on Global Issues (C) An important new direction which the President set in his Pan Americcui Day speech of -1977 was his pledge to consult more fully with Latin Americein and Caribbean governments on global issues. This new policy direction rested on three premises: (1) that the cooperation and support of Latin AmericcUi cuid Caribbean govern- ments are necessary to deal effectively with a wide range of global issues; (2) that Latin American governments view world affairs from ' a combined western and Third World perspective, and thus their advice could be useful to us as we formulate our policies; and (3) that regular consultations on global as well as bilateral issues will demonstrate our trust and attention to these countries and help us achieve more balanced and mutually respectful relation- ships. (C) There is a great need today for such global consultations. Many of the governments in the area play important roles in global fora yet they often lack the infonnation with which to make reasoned judgments. Other governments sometimes fill the information gap and gain the kind of trust which genuine consultations can bring. We risk too much by remaining idle in this area. (C) Let me suggest that we begin to implement a comprehensive plan for consulting on a wide range of global issues on a regular basis with selected governments in the region, ooviousiy, one wants to tailor the briefings to the particular coiintry, and one wants to allow the Ambassador discretion as to timing, audience (Foreign Minister or President) , and even whether a particular briefing should be given. (C) With respect to Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, we should try to be sensitive to consulting on virtually all important issues or informing these governments of decisions, very much like we do with NATO countries. In addition, our Ambassadors should consult with the Foreign Ministers (or perhaps Heads of State) of other countries in the area with influence in international affairs. CONriDENT TRl: Z. Brzezinski . - . L ‘X '-3 April 10, 19 8 5 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 - 2 - r including Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad, Barbados, and Costa Rica. Issues for routine consultations could include: Southern Africa, the Middle East, Cuba, international economic issues of particular concern to the developing world, energy, and SALT. (C) UNCLASSIFIED 45. Memorandum for the Record Washington, May 10, 1979 1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R, Box 6, Folder 12, B-303 President 1 Jul-31 Dec 1979. Secret. UNCLASSIFIED S>»cutjT« 23L~//yy 10 May 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Conversation,'^ May 1979 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 1. I discussed the briefingsSE^SE dur respectiv e Ainbassadc conducted for the Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela. 2. A brief discussion took nla EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) _ The Vice President endbrsedi ■■■that Herrera was a likable personality, and said he thought the President woald enjoy working with him. 3. I mentioned Argentina and briefly noted that the war against terrorism had been won, but in the process a number of innocent people had been killed. Nevertheless, Argentina's human rights performance is now Improving. 4. In connection with human rights. I recalled the President's statement to the Cabinet a year ago The Carter Administration has approached Latin America, guided by three fiindamental principles: — A commitment to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries ^ -iGf — A pledge of support for democratization, human rights, and social justice, -fej- — A commitment to multilateral consultation, and to the extent possible, action. -(€}■ In practice, our policies have distanced the U.S. from the status quo and from authoritarian regimes of the right. (We had already found ourselves at such a distance from the one leftist dictator in the hemisphere that the impulse for communi- cation necessarily led us towards him. ) Our commitment to human rights and social reform not only led us to withdraw support from historical "friends" like Somoza, but it also changed the power equation in many countries — increasing the cost of repression, encouraging opposition groups, and in a sense de- legitimizing the arbitrary use of power. Our pledge of non- intearvention prevented us from direct involvement when our interests were jeopardized, but it didn't stop the Cubans and others from intervening. Our preference for multilateral con- sultations often meant that we would lose critical moments seeking support from others when independent action could have been decisive. (C) ' CONFID B N - TI Afe- Review on August 9, 1985 by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED . COltFIDEM g^Mr These are the drawbacks of our approach. Critics claim that we have de-stabilized Latin America without providing an alternative. This is a weak argxament, attributing too much ' importance to U.S. influence and too little to indigenous factors, but it is one that has been made. Nonetheless, there have been important and to a great extent unanticipated changes in inter-American relations these past two and one-half years, and unless we take them into accovint and maJce some basic changes in our approach, we may find ourselves trailing in the wake of the Cubans. The Heads of State and/or the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela, Coloxnbia, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, and Paneuna will be in Quito. These countries and a few like-minded countries from the Caribbean like Barbados, Dominican Republic, and perhaps Trinidad could form a nucleus of a working group to deal with the problems gripping Central America and the Caribbean. There are three objectives which could be set for the Secretary's talks: (C )~ (1) To seek a common perception of the problems facing Central America and the Caribbean . The problems in Central America are different than those of the Caribbeeui; the only thread that connects these divergent problems is Cuban policy which seeks to aggravate emd exploit local situations for their purposes, as they serve the broader geo-political aims of the Soviet Union. In Central America, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are all troubled, though to varying degrees, by gross inequalities and a rigid and closed socio-political system. The masses are increasingly alienated from the governments; political polarization is growing worse. In the Caribbean, a new and young generation of leaders are looking to Cuba for answers to the economic dilemma posed by non-viable mini-states, -(e) (2) To seek common action among as mcuiy of the leaders as possible . In Central America (including Nicaragua) we must actively seek to strengthen the moderate democratic process . In the Caribbean, we must make the Caribbean Group work, and demonstrate to the new leaders that a moderate democratic path can be more just and successful than a radical Ciiban model. We must also seek to contain Cuba as a source of revolutionary change, and try to deny Cuba the legitimacy it desperately seeks — from Latin America, perhaps as much as from the U.S. -tCT (3) To develop a mechanism to insure good coordination and immediate action on the problems that face us . We should not look to the O.A.S. at the beginning because it is too slow and too open. We need to develop an ad hoc mechanism to deal with the crisis that stands in front of us . Turbay of Colombia may want to deal in abstractions, searching for the "new dimen- sion" in in ter- American relations, but he, like Herrera, is also a problem- solver, and they are beginning to sense a problem. They need to be encouraged to act. i:Gf CONF I DENTtAl .- CONFIDENTIAL The success of the Cubans in Nicaragua has had a paradoxical | impact on Latin America. On the one hand, it has raised the | level of concern about Cuban motives and capabilities. On the f other hand, it has raised the level of respect by Latin | America for Cuba as a political force of global importance. | Undoubtedly, there are probably some leaders in Latin America \ who are questioning our strength and resolve as well, and it will be important to make clear that our policy in Nicaragua ! was not a reflection of weakness, but of strength. At the same time, we should make clear to them that the C\]bans are 1 pushing us to the limits of our tolerance. “fO 1 These Latin American leaders have a stake in the Carter Admin- | istration's policies for four reasons, which could be used as \ instruments to weld a new coalition of like-minded American democracies. (C -^- ‘ i I First, the principles which guide our policies are | Latin America's, particularly non-intervention and multilateral | consultation. (G) - ! — Secondly, events in Central America and the Caribbean will affect them as much, if not more, than they will affect the U.S. -fef — Third, the U.S. made good on its pledge to replace ; Somoza; our credibility with these countries ought to be high. (C) ' — Fourth, Cuban expansion and Cuba's military build-up should be sources of growing concern for Latin T^rican I leaders. Cuba now has one of the largest, if not the largest, ^ Latin American military forces; it has submarines; it has an offensive capability. It has recently increased its subver- sive political activities through legitimate (Caribbean) groups cmd illegitimate guerrilla (Central American) groups. (C -)- What specifically should be done? A lot, of course, depends on the extent to which agreement can be reached on the three objec- tives described above; and a lot will depend on what the Latins have to say. The Cubans have set us and our democratic colleagues off-balance, if not on the defensive, and I suspect this will be evident in the conversations. The Venezuelans, Costa Ricans, Panamanians, and others are all afraid that the child -- Nicaragua — that they thought they had fathered may actually be Fidel's. They need to stand together now- We should encourage them to raise their voices in praise of Ecuador and the democratic process and in condemnation of Cuba and the violent revolutionary path. We should share intelli- gence information more and consult regularly. (The Panamanians, for example, have a lot more information on the Cubans in Nicaragua than we do.) We should all agree to help El Salvador, 4 Honduras / and Guatemala by the formula we have agreed to; reforms fc«r assistance. If the conversations are productive, we may want to consider a summit meeting along the lines sug- gested by Colombian President Turbay, only much more soecific and only after full staff preparation. We may want to try to develop the idea of a multilateral military assistance program for Nicaragua eind for other Central American countries. CC) - The Quito meetings have certain similarities with the Common- wealth Summit in Lusaka* If we can emerge with a unified per- ception and approach, we will have succeeded in enhancing our policies and retrieving the initiative from the Cubans. (C) ^ ?r-f| UNCLASSIFIED 47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Nicaragua Washington, August 13, 1979, 2221Z 211262 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 84D241, Vance EXDIS memcons, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent Immediate for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts except addressees. Drafted by Bamebey; cleared by Pastor and Bremer and in S/S-0; approved by Vaky. UNCLASSIFIED ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED - WNF I DEMT I AL by John Rtepairiok, 4/24/2017 Department of State D I s f4GE >1 OF R OOtCIH SS-2i state S11262 STATE 211262 OUTGOING TELEGRAM 7914809 pt Lc% r E X 0 I S I D I ,S -‘u Ufo oct-so Aos-es sso-s« /ns r VRAFTEO it RR C:rReARIIEBEY;STP APPROVED tv AHA; VPVAEV t/S;JDREHER NSCeRPRSTOR S/ kSTEVEN (26322 132J34Z flS e 13222U AUG 7S Fi) SECSTATE WASHOC TO AflENtASSY OUlTO tIUlEOIATE AilElltASSY CARACAS IWIEOIATE AflElWASSY lOGOTA ItmEOfATE AHENCASSY UHA llUtEOIATE AflEHSASSY I A PA2 IHNEOIATE AicriBAssY Hanagua IHKEOIATE ikFO All AHERtCAN REPUBlIC OIPIOKATIC POSTS IIIHEOIATE XtlT AfiEHtASSY QUITO AhEHSASSY CARACAS ADEriBASST BOGOTA AKilBASSY llltA AiCIteASSV I A Paz AHEHBASSY HANAGUA -e- O- N f ■(■0 t <1 T 1 A t STATE 211262 ^XOtS E.O. 12Bt6 GDS-t/13/lS IBARREBEY. RAlCOlli R.t O, E ..D TAGS: Hass, xr, SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S HEETING VITR ANDEAN FOREIGN flINISTERS: II. HIUTARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA 1. ENTIRE CONTENTS O BN U B ERT I AL. 2. SUWIARY. DURING HIS AUGUST 11 HEETING IN QUITO WITH THE FIVE ANDEAN FOREIGN NINISTERS, SECRETARY VANCE ILUSa..SN.eSS^SUJLE I t X D I $ E X 0 I $ xto wE m CONliBiRlNG HOW TO AESPONO., ECUADOREAN FORIIIN PAREJA AM) OTHERS SAID THEY Nad not been approacheo for such aid, and reiieveo andean EFFORTS AT THIS STAGE SHOULD INSTEAD BE FOCUSSED ON ROKARltARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTtOH AID. END SUINIARV. 3. THE SECRETARY, ACCOHPANIEO BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAXY and ROBERT PASTOR, COHTIHUED HIA DISCUSSIONS HITH THE ANDEAN FOREIGN IIINISTERS B EE SEPTEli IN A DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE HlllTARY AHO/OR POLICE ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA. THE SAHE ANOEAN FOREIGN HlRlSTERS HEHTIONED IN SEPTEL PARTICIPATED. 4. THE SECRETARY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT iililTARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA. EXPLAINING THAT USG HAD BEEN APPROACHEO INFORNALIY TO PROVIOE SUCH ASSISTANCE. ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA SAID THAT THE ANOEAN GROUP HAD NOT BEEN Approached by tne gnr for such Assistance, and ASKEO IF other LA COUNTRIES HAD BEER APPROACHED. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT PAHAHA HAD BEEN ASHED FOR ASSISTANCE AND KAO RESPONDED VITN A HOOEST PRDGRAN. RE SAID USG HAD COIIE TO NO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT OUR RESPONSE TO THIS NICARAGUAN INQUIRY. HE ADDED THAT RE BELIEVES THERE ARE GOOD REASONS TO BE RESPONSIVE, AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD CONSIDER PROVIDING IMAT THEY CAN UEEPS OR tUllOOZERS, ARHS OR UHATEVER A DONOR COUNTRY NIGHT DECIDE UPON). HE SAID USG CONSIDERS THIS A SERIOUS ISSUE AND HE WOULD WEI- CONE VIEWS OF TNE ANOEAH FOREIGN HINISTERS OH THIS SUBJECT. 6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY VAKY SAID THAT TNE PROBLEH HAS A BEEPER OINEHSION; THE GNR NUST REFORK ITS HlllTARY FORCES AND POLICE, AND TNE tlANNER IN HHICH THIS IS ACCONPLISNEO IS OF INTEREST TO THE ENTIRE HENISPHERE. VAKY SAID THAT THIS BEQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD MEET A LEGITIKATE NEED. AND IN THE CASE OF POLICE ASSISTANCE THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR USG IN VIEW OF OUR LEGAL RESTRICTIONS. HE ASKED WHETHER, SINCE USG IS THUS IHPEOEO FROK CERTAIN RINDS OF ASSISTANCE, tfOULD IT NOT STILL BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF HENISPHERE DENOCRATie COUNTRIES TO HELP, SO THAT GNR NEED ROT RESORT TO SOVIET AND CUBAN SOURCES. 6. ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFI- CULT TO GIVE AN IHHEDIATE ANSWER. HE COKNENTED THAT TO Rid an arhy is a political act, in this case recalling ASSISTANCE IN THE CREATION OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD. HE SAID THAT PUBLIC OPINION WOUIO RECALL THE CIRCUHSTANCES OF THE FORHATtON OF THE GN (READ THE USG ROLEI. HE SAID THE HATTER IS A SERIOUS ONE WHICH SHOULD BE STUDIED BY THE ANDEAN GROUP, BUT HE DIO NOT SEE ANY HAY IN WHICH THE 606 FOR ITS PART COULD RENDER SUCH ASSISTANCE. 3. Assistant secretary vaxy stressed that he was noV SUGGESTING FORCING ANY AID UPON NICARAGUA, BUT RATHER ASKEO BOW LA COUNTRIES NIGHT RESPOND TO THE GNR'S OWN FELT NEEDS. PERUVIAN FONHIN GARCIA BEOOYA REPLIED THAT GNR MUST EVENTUALLY RE-EQUIP ITS ARNED FORCES IN ORDER TO HAVE A STABLE ARNY, ANO WILL ORGANIZE ITS HlllTARY FORCES 10 THAT END. RE SAID THAT TO HEET THESE NEEDS, IF OEROCRATIC COUNTRIES CANNOT PROVIDE THEN, GNR 'NIGHT HAVE TO GO EISE- NNERE.* GARCIA BEDOYA LISTED VARIOUS UNKNOWNS: WHETHER THE FSIN WILL BECOKE A REGULAR ARNY, WHETHER NEW UNITS WILL BE FORHEO, WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPKENT THEY WOULD NEED, AND WHETHER THEY WOULD SEEK EQUIPKENT FROH USG OR OTHER SOURCES. HE ASKED IF NICARAGUA'S ARKEO FORCES WOULD ONLY COKPRISE THE GUERRILLAS AS AT PRESENT, OR THAT GROUP PLUS OTHERS IN SOME NEW INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEH. HE ASKED IF USG NAD m>|I^IBA£OZf^;¥’;fH^»aeRETARY^^^ WE HAVE NO lilT RAfH» MLY a REQUEST IN THE HOST GENERAL TERNS FOR USG ASSISTANCE. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THAT A USG DECISION IS IHVOIVEO IN THIS CASE, BUT SUCK A DECISION AFFECTS TNE ENTIRE HENISPHERE AND TNE VIEWS OF OTHERS ARE IHPORTANT TO US. FINALLY RE ASKED IF A NULTI- LATERAl EFFORT NIGHT BE HADE TO PROVIDE EQUIPKENT, IF THAT WERE FOUND TO BE NICARAGUA'S PRINCIPAL KEO. B. AT THIS POINT COIONBIA FONHIN URIBE DWELT ON A LIST OF DIFFICULTIES IN HENISPNERie RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT BEHOCRACIES ARE IN DANGER DUE TO EXCESSIVE ARHS INVENTORIES. RE SAID THAT ANNS PROCURENENT NAS CAUSING PROBIENS, AS IK THE CASE OF TNE NIGH PRICES COUNTRIES HAVE TO PAY FOR THEIR ESSENTIAL ARHS. BE SAID THAT TO OFFER ARHS IN CENTRAL AHERICA WOUIO GO DIRECTLY ATHWART HEHISPRERIC AND WORLD IHITIATIKS FOR OISARHAHENT. HE SAID THAT LA OEHKRATIC COUNTRIES CANNOT BECOHE POLICEHEN, BUT SHOULD STRESS SOCIAL ICASURES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OEHOCRACIES. HE SAID IT WDUID BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR LA OEHOCRACIES TO HOUNT A nillTARY ACTION WHEN IT IS PRECISELY TRIS WHICH THE BEHOCRACIES NAVE OPPOSED FOR SO HANY YEARS. HE SAIO THAT TBIS IS THE GOC POSITION, BUT EACH COUNTRY IK CENTRAL AHERICA ANO ELSEWHERE WILL HAVE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF ON THE SUBJECT. HE CONCIUDEO BY SAYING THAT NEHISPHERE SHOULD NOT OVEREHPHASIZE ‘TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS' IN NICARAGUA BUT THE LARGER SOCIAL ECONDHIC PROBLEHS OF THE HENISPHERE. B. ECUADOREAN FONHIN PAREJA COUNTERED THAT HE HAS SOHE- COHFIDEIITIAL NOT TO IE REPfiODUCEO VfTNOUT THE «tiTuoe(76TfnFi n: juf tk^VoTiif? crrpcTSFY E X D I S E X D I S I MGE 0} OF 01 ST*TE lillGl Tihts "HAD TO UAlK WITH TOE OEVIl.’ IIE SAID THAT A CASE ♦llGHT ARISE, SAT IN AH UHMAJIED MEIGHflOR OF HICARAGUA, HMERE FORMER OR PERSOMMEl MIGHT TRY TO INVADE NICARAGUA, AND THEREBY THt GNH HAY NEED HEIP FOR ITS DEFENSE. HE SAID ANoEaN group fore I om Ministers womo have to cohsimt among IHEHSEIVES and UITN GNR Ik THAT EVENT. HE SAID NO DECISION COOlB Be taken TODAY AND TNE MATTER IS NOT PRESSING, AND THAT INSTEAD NUMAKITARIAN ASSISTANCE SHOULD DE REIIEO UPON TO HELP ESTABLISH DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA. UHEN GNR SEES HUMANITARIAN AlO PBOVIOEO WITHOUT CONDITIONS, PAREJA SAID, TNE CNR REACTION Will BE FAVORABLE, AND OECISIONS ON ARMS CAN BE DELAYED UNTIL MORE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE. PAREJA THEN SUGGESTED A HIGH-LEVEL COMMISSION, POSSIBLY TO IE SET UP IN SAN JOSE WITH ANDEAN GROUP AND OSG PARTICl- i PATING, to analyze developments in NICARAGUA. HE SAID THAT THIS IS MERELY AN IDEA WHICH HAS NOT YET BEER ELABORATED. 10. THE StCRETARY ASREO NMAT TNE PURPOSE OF SUCH A GROUP WOULD BE. PAREJA REPLIED THAT HE DIO NOT KNOW, BUT THAT A SPECIH COMMISSION TO STUDY THE AID NEEDS Of NICARAGUA MIGHT BE USEFUL. BOLIVIAN FONMIN FERNANDES SPOKE UP, INSISTING THAT ALL ACTIONS REGARDING NICARAGUA SHOULD BE coordinated THROUGH THE ANOEAN GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND ANY SUCH COMMITTEE AS SUGGESTED BY PAREJA WOULD BE ■MISINTERPRETED" IN THE ANDEAN COUNTRIES. PERUVIAN FONMIN GARCIA BEOOYA AGREED, ASKING WHY SUCH A GROUP SHOULD BE IN SAN JOSE, WHAT ATTRIBUTES WOULD IT HAVE, WHY COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT INVOLVED, ETC. PAREJA PER- SISTED That his suggested commission would avoid delays IN Andean group consultation and provide flexibility in andean GROUP DEALINGS WITH THE GNR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT COORDINATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL. 10 . iOLIVlAN FONMlK FERNANDES STRESSED THAT THE ANOEAN CROUP PRESIDENTS' RECENT AGREEMENT AT CARTAGENA PROVIDES THAt ONLY tHE FOREIGN MINISTERS CAN CONSULT ON POLITICAL OUESTIONS. HE SAID THAT AS THERE IS A NEED FOR DAILY IHFORMATIO* ON THE 'EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION* IN NICARAGUA, ANDEAN TECHNICAL ORGANS COULD PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION. PAREJA SAID HE 0ISA6RE5P 'A L.ITT.LE.: JN THAT CDHr i DE I ITIAl Department of State t X D I S \ 0 I $ ■ — 11 AN ANOEM^^BROUP DECISION, BUT THAT RE THOUGHT THIS IS AN interesting IDEA AND THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW IT OP IF TNE ANDEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS GO THIS ROUTE. 11. VENEZUELAN FONMIN ZAMBRANO URGED THAT THIS IMPROVED liaison COULD BE OBTAINED BY ASSIGNING -- AS VENEZUELA IS DOING — HIGH-LEVEL, EXPERIENCED AMBASSADORS TO MANAGUA TO ENSURE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE GNR AND A FLOW OF INFORMA- TION Back to the andean countries. 11. PAREJR THEN CONCLUOED THE MEETING BY URGING NIS COILEBGOES TO KEEP TALKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM OF COORDI- NATION. HE SAID That the andean group countries' ambassa- BORS Might be A workable substitute, ne then tHANKEb the SECRETARY AND OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR ATTENDING THIS Meeting, with the secretary's in turn thanking the chair- man, tHE IMeting Adjourned. Nance OUTGOING TELEGRAM •i r CONFIDENTIAL - NOT TD BE REPGDOUCED VITKOUT THE AUTKORIZATIOK OF TSE EXETUTIVE SECRET UNCLASSIFIED 48. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, August 13, 1979 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 20, Memos to/ffom Tamoff, Wisner, Perry 1979. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In an August 9 memorandum to Vance, Tamoff and Lake indicated that they had solicited input on Vance’s goals and objectives for the next 18 months. The memorandum is printed in Document 123, Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy. Copies of the other bureau submissions are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 20, Memos to/from Tamoff, Wisner, Perry. UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WachlivcWV. O.C. ma August 13, 1979 gge HE T MEHORMTODM The Secretary ARA ~ Viron P. < SUBJECT: Coals for Latin America rei^ested, the following are the goals and objec- tives I see for Latin America during the next eighteen months. As zm overall preliminary commeht, let me tuvderllne the point made to you during the Quito consultations: we need to refurbish o ur relationship and improve the reg ion’s Uel) p erception- df us. Bss enteiaxiy. this wlli mean being s^ST- by i;nege ks releva nt to their Drobletas a nd in** t ei^d&tli'. '‘"!lS'adlS.* cteveiflMli4H1!?^SS^fflTc§?^BOT5CTTV-lthes'^ are all major parts of our total relationship. We cannot be effective in them, however, without a) attention; b) resolution of conflicts with domestic interests, to jjh e e xtent possib le 2 uid, c) applying reasonable resource in- pntsr:? ■ ■ ' - Goals and Objectives 1. Central America Deal with the regional crisis in ways that will a) prevent the consolidation of extreme left regimes in the region; b) contain Cubah/Soviet influence and control; . c) prevent armed conflict within or among countries in the region; and d) promote broader political systems, equitable economic and social development and observzuice of human rights. The unl^eness of the Hicaraguan situa- tion is the key to this area, but this in turn can probably only be managed in a context of stability in Honduras and controlled cheuige in El Salvador and Guatemala. Specif- ically, we should: . ^ EC R ET - XDS-3 3713/99 . SECREJ... - 2 - — Sieek non-ooBattunist t>olitlcal develoiwnient In yTcaya^gtta as veil as (and through) economic recovery from great devastation. — Seek to redoce toe potential for violent confron- ^ Si' Salvairoy eund '^ateilBarla’ by promoting freer political .processes, development and elimination of repression. — Support Hoinduyas’ sceanar io of return to consti- tutional government ment. economlc/aocial develop- »/a- — ■ Help costa Rica stisiatln Its denoieratic system 2. Caribbean Improve political and econosiic stability in the region imd reduce vulnerabilities to Cuban expansion. Specif- ically, • — provide appropriate eoonCTidc and security assis- pl*' tance to ute Eastern Caribbean to reduce vulner- abiiifclea; en^ig^aae gnb-reniQBal cooperati on ■ -■a mong the mirt-states? and create a sense of O .S. interest ana concern that afiborfl's a d^fidMftlvmplo- matic trameW^rk' fbf "oiir on-g oi5jf‘?4'l^Tioftg7 wean Jamaica and Guyana away from radical inter- naticnal line ; Md' — preserve recent democratizing g ains in th e Do- ##6- minican Republi^^ Seek to : — anite or counter Cuba’s aggressive resolutionaury drives; discourage Soviet/Cob 2 Ui military ties; — contain Cuban power and influence in th^ NAM; and — reexamine and probe for ways to ease OS-Cuiban tensions and find a modus vlveteii that might Ib/C^ promise a way to affect and moderate Cuban objec- . tlves and intentions toward us. ‘ - 3BeR B « P- DECLASSIFIED Authority e wish to destroy the basis for some future relationship with the (^lean nation (as distinct from the Pinoehat government) . 9. Panama Canal ^Di^lement the treaties beginning October 1 in a peace- oL- ful, oonstructlve way and use the period ^ reaffirm, strengthened joint Canal defense posture.' 10. As an. overlay to our country-specific policies we need to pursue certain rea’ibnaT policies ; 1 -^ 1 -^ — Ccaiventional arms restraint— ^stimulating multi- laterai efforts such as Mexican CAT talks. “ Stoengtheninq the reglCTal instltutlona— OAS , zOb, Human Sights Commission — by ia^roved con- sultations with aK>roprlBte resource support, — Pursue reasonable ecwiomic and trade policies to reaped to widespread— and largely l^itimaie— demands for open markets and international co- mutt** operation in CamDoditles. In particular, to * * find ways to deal with the disproportionate. severe impact on one country of broad policies such as sugar and the Ocuainican Kepublic.' “ Strengthen otir human rights approaches , sepklng to reduce sanctions as human rights improvement and rewarding good performance in addition to sanctioning bad performance,^ - CBOnBO* - 5 - »•'*' ‘"(Si Iteciotiic^fcaalize our Military assistance pr*oanying .: -V Disapprove him on his trip. \k -IfliN ]us.u_ V. ^ JL tu. UNCLASSIFIED Tab A Paper Prepared by Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff Washington, October 28, 1980 UNCLASSIFIED October 28, 1980 THg CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND LATIN AMERICA; ASgEgSiagN3' : Introduction i h Brief bC four years Dtiring the lait €ottr 8ave more tiroe to Latin America and the Caribbean and f>ursued a more active, coher- ent, and consistent approach to Latin America tha;n any previobh Adiain- . ‘;4.htration. f ' v.' ; : \ -- '.C — In 1977, you gave a new direction to 0.8. pdlicies to l^e r<^gion* The foundation was set by youir decision to give a high priority to negotiating new Canal treaties. After a tometimes difficult interagency review CPRM-i7) , you enunciated a unique ..new approach to La^n_ America.' in vour Pan Amej^ican g^ Speech to the U.A.S^, wnxon described the tnree central principles tnat nave gjiided our policies : a recognition of the individuality and a respect .for the sovereignty (priaciple of non-intervention) of each nation, a commitment to try to improve respect for human rights and extend democracy, and a willingness to consult oh the global economic issues of central concern to the area. Rather than a slogan to mask the diversity of the region, you suggested a flexible approach more attuned to the important Changes that have occurred in the Americas in the last two decfideS/ specifically to the self-assertiveness of nations interested in shaping a new world rather than being satisfied .as just members of an inter-American system. Through Mrs. Carter's trip and your personal meetings in, 1977, you personally engaged twenty L ^ads of state in the region, explaining your approach, especially yqur personal commitment to human rights and democratisatlon, and. becoming convearasant in the gamut, of bilateral, regional, and global issues^ of concern to our countries. , We began a dialogue with Ctiba and opened interest Sections to 'permit regular coiramani cation. You beghn to define special approa^Jh. t© the Caribbean, and, initiated what' has since become known as the Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic peveXopment, led now" by the, World Bank with 31 nations a?Sd fifteen international institutions involved. You signed the > American Convention on Human Rights and Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco; both ^tiii await ratification in the Senate. The amount and the quality of 'attention which you and your Administration gave to Latin America in 1977 probably exceeded that of any other Adminis- tration’s first year, including that of Kennedy and the Alliance for ■ Progress. — 197^ was largely spent implementing the initiatives taken in ^ 1977. The <^|nal T^atdes^^;g,re. ratified ,and..jexchan 9 ed during your ^ trip to Pana^.""^ You trained to Venezuela, where you “gave an l[m- portant speech on North-South- relations Ccalling for shared responsi- bility to implement a new ecqnomic .order) and announced 'the Humphrey North-South Scholarship Program, and to Brazil where voja lent addi- tional credibility to your human r^gh-ts policy. Also, we moved to strengthen U.$.-Maxio 2 ui relations through the Consultative Mechanism, In consuitations with Mexico and the Ayacucho countries, arms control COPf CARTERUBftAlfY initiatives began to be seriously considered. The Caribbean Group took shape. ^ “ In 1979 > we faced pur mos^s aerious crises aivd challenges — Nicaragua ^ Grenada^ and the Cubah bf^ade and wp distinguished ourselves only in that we d^ veer too far fro® pur originai objectives.. 4ii three toiced us to fpcus on the aepurity dinension ■ of ■ '4nter-hwerican.' relations . in -a ht ; the 'saH|B. tiroe-^we','were .wreeitiing.'iifith'^these:- tluree^isiues^ . we alhf.; were/"strenfthehihg', our ,reihtiwP^3^S.:#it.h :the: ''Andeah/E*aot' ■aS''':h.; "|Frp'up ;(particuiariy ;becanse'.'Ot :the\ tr^|(^/tPward .deiiw in .ijcuad^^’Pld Peru) and with Vehezneiar i^ericoi Vour twQ_meeiinee^iW^^^ iiopez PortiiiOii ; tne strengtnenigg tne Qonsuitative ^chanisiftr^ appointment of a Special 5jrabaSs.^or to coordinate u. S.-Higxrcan relations within" the U, S. governments and to ensure that it be given the deseryed priority, the conclusion of a gas agreement and ah extensive spio^oe and tePhntlogy pact as a re Suit of Frank Press's efforts — all those led to more attiantioh and results than the reia- tionship. has seen for a long time. V^ice President Mondale's trip to Venezuela and Brazil «ind t*rahk/Press^s follow-up trip also served to deepen our reiationship with the two k®y GountrieS in South America . The Brazilian Foreign Minister was say in 1979 that U.s.-Braziliah relations were "excellent. " — In 1980, your attehtion has largely been focused on the. hostages, Afghahlsta'', hhe Persian Gulf , the . economy , and the esm- paign. to Latin America has been focused oh the Caribbean basin — instability in Central America and the Gar ibbeahi Cuban and Haitian ref eg[oee> and Cuban subversion. After Grenada, we have managed to turn tdie tide back in favor of democracy in the Eastern Caribbean’ and to halt the revolution in Central America by fostering moderste change in El Salvador and Honduras and by trying to play a positive role in Nicaragua. Through your personal initiative', "Caribbean/Central American Action," a unique experiment in people-to-people diplomacy^, was launched to improve the quality of our peoples' relationships in the aren. We hdvc done a good deai , but; hardly enough ^ The Caribbean Basin is one area in need of your attention in 1981. In svumnary , you have ssf «i eoursc in 1977 and kept to it even through the trying times in 1979, W^e have made remarkable progress tbwaid our goals. Stiil, there is that reit^ihs to be coB^ieted, and many new issues thSt remain to be confronted^ me disCuSs these within ■the ■dohtea£t"'of'':ctn..as^bssment.’ ' , . II . An Assessment This ass^sment will proceed by examining the goals associated with each of tie three basic principles. (1) ■ Peace , lecognitiop of the individuality of each relation^ ship. Re^ject for non-intervention. bbinr CARTERlIBRAitir A. Overall Approach — ~ . STogaiiSy Globa^ Consultations » The Garter AocOi^ hhoym not by its principles but by its TOost salient features; human rights and democracy by those who like oUi policies; Nicaragua, Grenada/ and Cuban refugees by those who don’t. Recognizing the increasing international role of many of the region’ C goveriunents, we eet a clear Objective of consulting on a regular basis on globai and fegiphal political and economic issues. We have prbb^iy done mbfe of this than any previous Administration/ but we haven? t done enough# arid we have :npt-‘ yet built';- a- systematic, mechariisn- j,;- ■ ■ for enSuririg Such Corisultatlons on a tlie region *s i^ in^oriajriCe in fhe bw/ the and^^^S^ iriternatiorial (Sl) # it, is essential that we Cohsult fiegulariy on policies and on developments in controversial 2ireas like southern Africa, Middle East, East-West reiations— issues where our briefings arid consultations ere likely to produce a corifluence of perspectives. Despite nuiny efforts to forge a coalitipn of likB-^ninded democracies (especially yenezuela, Menieo, GOlonbla and Brazil) to pursue a coimnon policy, to Central America and the Caribbean# we have not been successful. Mexico views the region's turmoil from a totally different perspective. Brazil is focusing on its borders end believes the Caribhean is our prob- leffl#v . not Venezuela, which is playing the most constructive rple in t^^ area, enjoys eonSultation, but prefers parallei rather than a common policy. During the Nicaraguan crisis, we were pulled into playing a more direct role in an internal matter , than what we had ori#inailyipref erred, but we have still clearly maintained the integrity of our pledge of non-intervention during the past four years, unlike many Other in Latin natioris. B, Non^^Brolif eration . The Senate has hot yet ratified Protocol I Of the Treaty Of Tlatelolco. It is not clear whether our efforts to diseoUrage Brazil and Argentina from obtaining a full fuel cycle wii^^ fUll^scope safeguards has had much effect# but it is clear that both goveriunents have scaled down their initial nuclear progfams considerably. At the sainetime, both rtations established a cooperative program in nuclear power. This is just one more indication that the longs taridingrlvaliy between Argehtlna and Brazil may have- passed into his tofy, thereby f educing our coheOrns about the explosive implicatioris of a possible nuclear arms race. ■ teswcAimaitiBBAfty L .j n_ C. Arms Control . We lent strong support to two regional arms control initiatives Cby Mexico aud by Venezuela) , and we made a preliminary effort to discuss the issue with the Soviets; all . three initiatives got nowhere. NonetheleSSr we haye exercised unilateral restraint, and this conceiyably could have helped restrain overall arms expenditures in idle hemisphere. At ^e same time, the US was byertalcen by five other nations in. arms sales to region. Despite your explicit decision Cin"2DTb;2j. to reverse the • deciine of the amount of PMS allocated to Latin America as a percentage of the global amount (from 2% to 4%) ,> thiS: has hot . been done. State is once again recommending a level Of 2%. for Latin America in FY 82. We need to take' a hard look at this issue again; perhaps the Secretary of State can initiate, consultations on this issue during his trip. D. Pea,ceful Settlement _0f Disputes . Before your Pan American Day speech, the US had refused to pilay jnuqh of a role in settling the irmuiy territGrial disfOtes in heiaisphere. Since then, we have played a very active rble, trying to stimulate the negotiating process from the side While keeping a mediator in front — the Pope bn the Beagle Channel, a fOmter Peruvian President on the HonduranrSalvadoreah dispute, and the British on. Belize> We have aiready raised other disputes, including Ecuador’s dGSire for access to the Amazon, Bolivian acceSs to the sea, and we have encouraged dialOgne Where only silent coitfrontation had existed before. E. Central America . We tried to find a poaceful path through mediation in Nicaragua, but failed for several reasons ; Somoza was too intransigent; tite middle class too ready to accept the pt°“d.ses Of the Marxist left; ai^ most importantly y our friends, Venezuela, Coast Mca and panama were so obsessed in getting rid of Somoaa and pre'^empting Castro that they thmittingly pl^ Castro ' s gamei successfuily insulating him from us. We are having a little more success in El Salvador, but it's by ho means clear that the middle will ’^#re;vail there.. Honduras is maki^ transition . frperiment by encouraging peaceful democratic reform in a region of violence; obsolete socio- politioai structures, and gross ihequalities . The Marxist left have dressed themselves in our human rights banners, and Ifldel Castro has concentrated his ehergies on helping them seize We are still intifaniSit. The problem of helping tb; nmtintSin dem^ the Caribbean has proved easi®^ Greating it in Central America. The eubans succeeded in subverting Grenada, but the same strategy failed in Suriname; and more importantly, Cuba’s radical allies were decisively beaten in free eleGtions by moderate , prb-uS groups in Sti Vihcent, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, ^d St; Kitts. The Caribbean Group has added stability to the region. Still, we haven’t done nearly enough to enhance the security of the region or ' ■::N • ■ to assist its developinent. Despite ypur promise to inersase aid to the area in your . Dctoberri, 1979 Soviet :^riggtap speeph. We maintained aid at the same level as the previous year, we need ■' an ■.i|^fihati^\;new;'^apsao.achv'to, 'the' areia..vdii<3h/taj^a^,,ihto aGoount its ai^ial in^prtance in,6eourity as well as in immis^ration matters.'' -v;'' ' p. . Cviha . While >e have had gteat success in the hw rights area ih: je^a^ we are further away from our geopolitical goals than in 1977. Cuba has. > more troops in iiK>re countries and is more actiyeiy pursuing its revolutionary today than in 1977. This is euiother area in he®^ pi a G. Sumiagy . With the eKception of Central Araerioa, LAC iSr by amd large, a more peaceful and less militarized place than in 1976. Panama Canal is safer; the border areas in dispute are subject to heated negotiations; South America is focused on development rather. than internal Security * (2) Human Rights and i^mocracy A. Oyer^l ; Approach. effective pursuit of human rights is clearly the most successful achieyem^t of your Ad^nistration. You have finally, and with some cost, imprinted ypdr obmmii^ent to;^^ rights on the conscioushess of all the^^ leaders in the hemisphere. Repression is now much more Costly, and there are fewer disappearances and political prisoners and less torture. You have restored the image of the US as a natioh that-standO for human rights, social justice, and de^cracy. B. Regional Norms Institutions . When yoti sicmed the American Convention on Huipan SLigKts on i3rune I, 1977, wbxle V Mrs. Carter was in San Jose, only two nations, had ratified it. Even though the Senate still hasn't acted, at our urging, 14 Rations have ratified the Convention, bringing, it into force, and establishing a. new. institution, the In ter-iSaerican Court of Htmian Rights. In addition, we have significantly strengthened the Inter-AiBerican Coitmdssdon on Hiunan Rights which has done five important Gountry \ ,■ reports. C. ^ Refugees. We have bOrn ihe burden of the refugee problem largely oh our own. We have net hpen successful in get^ other nations or ^e 0A& to play an ij^rtaht role. This is ^0 of the "hew" sety issues which we will have to address early ip the second term.' D- Democratization . We have tried to tise every opporttinity to show that democracy pays, and the trend is clearly in a positive direction — the first time in at least two decades. Brazil# Ecuador/ Peru, fionduras, Dominican Bfepublic — all have , c made the transition. We have also engaged the Andean Pact in trying to help facilitate this democratic prbeess. Our success is due to ' ' •‘GOPYGARTERlffiftAi^ letting people Hnow whete the U'.S. stands rattier than from helping to build poll tioal parties or train young leaders or fund private initiatives ^ However, when a young political leader in Nicaragua ashed Us td /help hi® a politidal party , we lafek i^ans to iieli>.; approach is strict neutrally respect tdpoiiticai parties and candidate^, but we are partial to free electioiiB, yet we haye no either training pec^le to Conduct free diectibns^^^x^^^^^^ and the OM has-^Bh®w^;--no ■interest;in>tbia*'' ■' ThisXa worth' . pursula^^v: ' •E*. New Forces 1 V-New. intethatiohal, political forces, have emerged recently and ate having? an iti^aGt though not very favorably from the perspective. of our interests., The Socialist International, the Conference of Latin American ' Political Parties (COPPAL — MexicCin the lead) , the German SPD and CDU Foundations, the Non-Aligned Movement -- ail organizations seem to have accepted as their working premise that the d.S. is the problem; some of them think Cuba may be the Solution. We have tried dialogue with them add should Continue, but wo also should reassess our approach, to each of thoso ©rgan- izations to see whOther they will listen, op just speak, and to try to comprehend Why we are so often the whipping boy, (3) Economic Cooperation A. Aid . Yoa promised to double foreign aid,^ b^ Congress and your intention to balance the budget prevented you from fulfilling that promise. During the 1970 's, we have been gradually phasing out our bilateral aid programs to the laiddle- income developing countries .3(b)(l) ■■■■■■■■I A sizable nuidser of officers reject Videla 's policy of conciliation and have called for greater restrictions on civilians and an even more ruth- less campaign against the terrorists. Videla and his military supporters have spent a good deal of time work- ing to block this concept. Navy chief and fellow junta member Admiral Massera has been especially strident. in his criticism of the President, apparently in order to gain the support of officers opposed to Videla *s moderate ways. Massera 's tactics are brazenly opportunistic and self-serving ; he is reported to be in contact with certain civilians in- terested in seeing him move up. The planning minister. General Ramon Diaz Bessone, could pose a more serious threat to Videla. hast year Diaz Bessone engineered the establishment of the post he now occupies, and he is now next to Videla in the line of succession. This was acconqplished over the President's objections. Diaz Bessone, who enjoys a reputation as a hard liner, obviously has his eyes on the presidency. At some point, Videla *s military critics may muster enough support to force him to abetndon his moderate ap- proach or step aside. The argtunents of such officers would take on increased importance if in the interim, under the leadership of Videla, the government should suffer a major reverse either in the anti-terrorist fight or on the economic front. I - 5 - •N -V SECRE T Outlook The military clearly do not intend to give up power in the near future. The problems they intervened to tackle are not subject to short-term solutions , and the officers are committed to their solution. As a practi- cal matter, moreover, there is no alternative to military rule in sight. The eradication of subversion will continue to pre- occupy the regime. The military are encouraged by the very real losses they have inflicted on the terrorists, but they know that the war is still not won. Many be- lieve the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been all but destroyed, but there is less optimism regarding the urban- based Montoneros. Although the Montoneros have been hurt by the counterinsurgency campaign, they retain the ability — ^and the will — to carry out attacks on businessmen, police, and others. It is possible that changes at the top will take place within the next month or so. Rumors to this effect are rampant in Buenos Aires. Should Videla lose either the presidency or his position in the junta, it will be taken as a decisive defeat for his moderate policies and a corresponding gain for his hard-line op- ponents . Real or perceived pressures from the US on human rights may have an important influence on Videla abili- ty to retain the upper hand. If he is seen as caving in to the US , the hard-liners can hope to use nationalistic arguments to strengthen their case against him. Videla must, therefore, make it clear to his detractors that he is willing to stand up to Washington. Whether ot not Videla remains in office the human rights problem will persist in Argentina. It will con- tinue to be a troublesome factor — and a potential cause of friction with the US- — as long as the Argentine military believes it faces a serious subversive threat. ':'6 — SECRET I L UNCLASSIFIED 53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, March 4, 1977, 0126Z 48062 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770074-0443. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Zimmerman; cleared by Luers and in S/S; approved by Christopher. Repeated to Santiago, Brasilia, and Montevideo. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 "2- eONFIPE N TIAL — ooMPiparPHtB PAGB 01 SThTS 048002 ORIGIN ARA-10 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 &S-15 DHA-02 CIAE-00 IHR-07 NSAB-00 PM-04 NSC-05 SP-02 SSO-00 NSCE-OO li-03 IGIV-02 TR8B-00 OMB-01 INRB-OO ( ISO ) R DRAFTED BY ARA:BCA:R1fZZMMER>IANN:IiK APPROVED BY THB OBPDTY SBCStBTARY ARAsWEUIERS S/S - SBANEDB 040224Z 014216 /14 0 040126Z HAS 77 SH Estate hashdc TO »fEKBASSY BOBNDS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0 0 H F I ' ""D B ' H ^ g ' -A r-a - STATE 048062 E.O. 11652 :6DS TAGSiPFOR, SHUN. AR SDBOBCT: CAUL ON DEPUTY SECRETARY BY ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR 1. DEPUTY SE»2RETARY CHRISTOPHER RECEIVED ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR AJA ESPID MARCH 3. 2 . THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OPENED BY NOTI^'G HE HAD. EARLIER TALKED NITH THE ARGENTINE CHARGE > HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED THB AMBASSADOR HAD COMB IN AS THE USG IS ANXIOUS THAT THB CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATKHI BE KEPT OPEN. 3. AJA ESPIL. REFERRED TO THE LONG HISTORY OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AMD THE U.S. BASED ON MUTUAL ONOBRSTANDING AND RESPECT. ARGENTINA ASSUMED THAT THE HEW OS ADMINISTRATIOM WOULD TAKE THE SAME VIEW. BUT THB GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA HAS NOTIFIED OF THE DECISION OF THE NEW AI»(INISTRATIOH TO REDUCE FHS CREDITS THROUai THE PRESS ■ eONg l PEMT IWL CONPiDBNTXAS PAGE 02 STATE 048062 WHICH QUOTED THB SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY AMO INOUYB'S REMARKS DURING THE HEARING OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON FOREIO> OPERATIONS OP SENATE APPROPRIATIONS OMHITTEE. THAT IS NOT, HE SAID, THE REAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER. THE PROBLEM IS THAT BY THIS DECISION ARGENTINA IS ACCUSED OF PERPETRATING GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS - A CHARGE THE GOA REJECTS. THBREF(»B HE BAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO PRESENT A HOTS SmTING THE DECISION OF THB GOA WOT TO nfig 1978 FHS CREDITS. 4 . AJA ESPIL THEN PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING FIRST PBRSCW NOTE: BEGIN TEXT: MR. SECRETARY: I HAVE THB HC»)OR TO INFORM YOU, ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTKRIS RECEIVED FROM MY GOVERNMENT, THAT THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC HILL NOT MAKE USE OF THE FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978. ACCEPT HR. SECRETARY THE ASSURANCES OF NY HIGHEST CmSIDERATION. END TEXT. 5. DEPUTY SECRETARY ACCEPTED THE NOTE OH BEHALF OF THB SECRETARY. HE SAID THAT THE OS RECOGNIZES THAT THE DECISKNI MOT TO MAKE USB OF FY 78 MILITARY CREDITS HAS ENTIRELY THE PROVINCE OF THE GOA, JUST AS THE DECISION TO ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 http://smartarcliive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 6/19^013 Document View Page 2 of ^ ^ EHJOCB THE FIGORE WAS APPROPRIATELY A DECISIOH FOR THE U.S. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RELATKXtS HOUU3 CONTINUE ON THE BASIS OF HOTUAL UNDERSnUIDING AND RESPECT AS IN THE PAST. THE U.S. IS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE SECURITY PROBLEMS FACING THE GOA BUT IT HOUUD SEEM THAT THE POINT HAD BEEN REACHED IN REESTABLISHING CONTROL NHERB IT SHOULD BE POSSIBIf TO COMBINE FIRMNESS WITH RESTRAINT. G. CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT HE HAD PERSONAL EXPERIENCE NIIH SITUATIONS SIMILAR TO THAT FACING ARGENTINA, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY HOT AS SERIOUS. IT IS SSSWTIAL IN TRESS ■eeW F I B EWT M ttr e e^IBB HT IAb PAGE 03 STATE 048062 ccmmass to combine firmness with restraint, othsrnisb STABILITY NILL NOT BE ACHIEVED. 7. SAYING HE LIKED THE AMBASSADOR'S USE OF THE WORDS mmiAL UNDERSTANDING, CHRISTOFHER AFFIRMED TEE OS DESIRE TO CONTINUE 6000 RELATIONS. HE St^ASIZED. HOWEVER, THE US BELIEF imT THE FUTURE DEPOmS ON RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAM AND PROTBCTICEI OP HUMAN RIGHTS. WE ARE ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN COMHUNICATICWS AND IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS, CHRISTOPHER SAID. AND IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT HE NAS RECEIVING THE AMBASSADOR. S . AJA ESPIL RESPONDED THAT BIS GOVERNMENT FULLY AGREED . WITH THAT PORTION OF THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMCMY REGARDING THE NEED TO FOSTER A CLIMATE OF COQPBRATICBI BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE U.S. WOULD DO ITS BEST TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOOTH AMD BKMEEN ARGENTINA AMD THE U.S. MB WOULD ALSO, KB SAID, SEEK TO MAINTAIN CXmSISTENCY OF STANDARDS IN OUR APPROACH TO PROBLOtS. AUA ESPIL REPLia} THAT THE LAST POINT NAS VERY IMPCKTANT. 9. AIMOSPHSRB WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY THROUGHOUT. THE JUffiASSADOR AMD THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID THEY HOPED TO SEE ONE ANOTHER SOm UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCBb. VANCE TWtfFlDBNTJLAL NNN http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_.,. 6/19/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 54. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance’s Delegation to the Department of State Grenada, June 19, 1977, 1830Z 52 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, OAS meeting June 14-17, 1977, Grenada. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Vance was in Grenada for the OASGA. In telegram 6019 from the Secretary’s delegation in Port of Spain, June 17, summarized the conversation. (Ibid.) UNCLASSIFIED ADP Declassification Review ■ DECLASSIFIED I by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 tment of State INCOMING TELEGRAM PUE 11 MEMO I0j$2 lltillE ECTioa ss-as IKFO OCT-11 ISO-II SSO-00 /KS * -fffilll tJUiaz /45 0 IJIUn JUR 71 EH USIEl CREMO* TO SECSTRTE MSHOC IHIEOIATE ffli t, 0 RE I 0 E'H r IT T CRERROA 1052 fOI S/S RUST OEUINC FROM MRK OIOR FROM USOEl OASCA USOAS SEE 3( E.O. USS2: 60S TA6S: PORT, OAS, OVIP (TARCE, CTRUS) SVSi: SECRETARY'S BIUTERAl RITN ARSERTIRA fJURE li) 1. rAITtCIPAMTS: US: SECRETARY YAHCE. AUASSADOR TOOHAR. UOERSECRETARY HABIB, AMBASSADOR UCCEE. W$ VAR REI6ERSSERC lIRTERPRETERI MR S ROGERS IROTETARERK AIOERTINA: UIRISTER MORTES, VICE HIRISTER CUATTER OSCAR ALIAIA, HIRISIER iUAR GARIOS ARltA, lOSE I CARCIA CHIREILI, ATIIIO flORBERTO UOTrERI. 2. SUBIECIS: IIIATERAI AT 0AS6A WITH ARCERTIRA; HUUR RiCHTS; HUCHLEAR ROR-PIOllFERATfOR. }. AFTER BRIEF REMARKS ABOUT FORMER FOREICR HIRISTER CUEIETII'S MEOtCAl YISIT TO THE UNtTEO STATES. ARO THE SECIETART'S COHMERT that he has ABOUT TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER fILUAHS IN TRIDIO, THE CONVERSATION RENT OIRECTIY TO HUMAN RICHTS. 4. THE SECRETARY INFORI«» THE ARGENTINES THAT THE US MUID ABSTAIN OR THE TM LOANS TO ARGENTINA IN THE MeLO BANK BUT HAKE A REFERENCE TO THE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAI HAD TAKER PLACE. MONTES NODDED BUT SIAO NOTHING AT THAT POINT IN RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY ASKEO MAT MONTES THOUGHT RQULO GOIrE OUT OF THE general ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. I. MONIES REFEIREO TO HIS S TATE MENT IN TH E INFORMAL oialoguL- nr theit lines IBEB M situation and vieibit ARGENTIA AT CONSIERAILE LENGTH. THE ISIS ARMY TAKE- OVER MAS A RATIQRAl REORGANlEATIOn. HOT A REVOLUTION. THERE HAS BEEN NO POLITICAL PERSECUTION. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, FOR INSIARCE, REMAINS LEGAL AND PUBLISHES ITS NEKS- PAPER FREELY. THE PROBLEM IS TERRORISM, NOT POLITICAL RICHTS CERTAIN GUARANTEES ARE INDEED SUSPENDED BUT THE CONSITITUTION PROVIDES FOR SUSPENSION IN A STATE OF SIEGE. ARGCRTIRES ARE BEING GOVERNED BY THE LAN. THE CONSEGUENCES OF THE STATE OF SIEGE APPLY ONLY TO TERRORIST CRIMINALS. IE COULD NOT SAY PRECISELY WEN THE STATE OF SIEGE HOULD BE LIFTED, BUT SO MUCH lil>IOVEHENT HAD TAKEN PLACE THAT TERRORISM MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE ENDED BY THE END OF U77. i. ALLARA DESCRIBED THE TERRORIST THREAT AT THE TIME THE ARMED FORCES TOOK OVER. MONTES THEN RETURNED TO THE OUESTION OF THE nORlD BARK LOANS. HE SAID HARTINE! OE HOI RAD REPORTED ON HIS CONVERSATION HITH SECtEURT ILUMCNTHAL ANO DR BR2EI INSKi. ST SAID 'ARGENT INA iS TERT CONCERNED THAT TECHNICAL MATTERS ARE BEING SUBORDINATED TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIOflS. HARTIHEI DE HOI HAD REPORTED THAT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES HERE NOT HELL-INFORKD FOR IHSIATNCE CONCERHINC THE NUMBER OE PEOPLE NHO NAD BEEN REALESEO. 7. THE SECRETART RESPONDED THAT HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DECIDE TO ABSTAIN INSTEAD OF VOTING AGAINST. HE MOULD HATCH FOR FURTHER PROGRESS TO SEE IF HE COULD SOON VOTE GRENAO $mi IB 19101 IN FAVOB OF LOANS FOR ARGENTINA. ALLARA THEN PROPOSED A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO BEGIN WITH A PERMANENT, FRANK AND THOROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE US ANO ARGENTINA ON ALL MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN. B. IN ANSNEI TO UNDERSECRETARY HABIB'S OUESTION, MONTES DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S VULNERABILITY TO TRAFFICKIRG IN ARMS FOR GUERRIllAS. MABIB NOTEO THE SENATE ACTION OF THE DAT BEFORE TO CUT OFF ALL ARMS SALES TO ARGENTINA AFTER SEPTEMBER SI, IB7A, IF NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE BY THEN ' ON HUMAN BIGHTS, INSltiD OF U UStOlATF CUT m *S PJflPflSFN 8V SENAIOI KENHEOT. ’THE SLwETAky SAID THIS REFLECTED THE UNDOUBTED PROGRESS ARGENTINA HAD HADE. 9. COMING BACK TO THE PORPOSAL FOI COOPERATION, MONTES SOCGESTEO A GROUP OF US ARMY OFFICERS VISIT ARGEHflRA TO SEE THE REAL SITUATION. ALLARA THEN EXPLAINED Af CENGTN WT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT ODES NOT FEEL THAT’ IT IS VIOLATING HUMAN RIGHTS. BETTER KNOWLEDGE ROULO SHOW THE US THAT ARGENTINA HAS MERELY OEFENDING THE WESTERN, I^T OF LIFE. If. ARLIA THEN NAMED FIVE 'SUBVERSIVE ACTIVISTS^fHO HE SAID WERE PROVIDING THE HOST ABUNDANT iHFORI|tUDN ON AIGENTINA IN THE US; lOBERT GUEVARA (CHE'S BROTHEIl, LUCID GARZON-HACEDO ANO GUSTAVO ROCA, BOTH LAHVEjl WITH THE P£M>LE-S REVOLUTIONARY ARMT. PEORO DUALDE, m HIS LILY HAZEAFERRO. HE SAID GUEVARA ARO ROCA HtpVOHKEO HI IK BRAOV TYSON ON THE US SJWHENI AT THE UN HUNM RITITS COWISSiOh. HE SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE NEK FREQUENTLY SEEN WITH FATHER DR IRAN. RDCA. HE SAI HAD iSUT BEEN ARRESTED IN OENMARI FDR ROBBING SltfPiiARKETS AND FOR HAVING FALSE IDENTIFICATION PAPERS. HE DISeuSSED'TRIS HITH MS DERIAN. 11. THE SECRETART DESCRIBED MS DEBIAN AS COWIET DEDICATED AND VERT KNOHlEOCERBlEi MONTES AND ALL AGREED SHE HAD BEEN VfRY USEFUL TO THE ARl ^NIINEl VISIT TO THEIR COUNIIY, THEY ADDED. SHE MIGHT BE FIRST LINK IN THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT THAT ARCE HANTS. IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY'S OUESTION, AR ARGENTINA FAVORED STRENGTHENING THE INTER-AMERIC RIGHTS COMHISSlOH BY BIVING IT MORE PRECISE TER REFERENCE. ITS REAL TOB HAS TO COOPERATE IN THE OF RIGHTS CENERAlir, NOT iUST FOCUSSING ON COVER ACTIVITIES. 12. AMBASSADOR TODMAH HAD EARLIER ASKED HKT ARGE HOT ACCEDE TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOCO. ARLIA SAI ARGENTINA'S POSITION HAS HELL KHOHN - THAT TLATE THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OiSCRIHINAT COUNTRIES THAT NEEDED TO DEVELOP THEIR NUCLEAR E CAPACITT, SUCH AS ARGENTINA. . ARGENTINA'S NEEDS A ENTIRELY PACIFIC. ARGENTINA NEEDS TO DOUBLE ITS CAPACITT BT 1952. NUCLEAR POWER IS INOISPENSASLE. U. THE SECRETARY ACCEPTED THAT ARGENTINA NEEDED POWER BUT SAID THAT NOTHING IN THE TREATY IHFRING RIGHT OF PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR CNERGT. IT WOUIO ENTIRELY CONSISTENT FOR ARCENTINA TO SIGN TKHE TL TREATY. ALLARA SAtO THE ARGENTINE COVERNMENT HAS ITS ATTITUDE TOHAROS TLATELOCO AND THE NPI, BUT S GUARDS HERE A MORE LIKELY APPROACH. AMBASSADOR TO STRESSED THE INTERNATIONAL FSTCMOLOCiCAL IMPORIAN ARGENTINA'S SIGNIRG TO ECNOURAGE THE FEW lEUAINIH TO 00 SO. 14. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETART SAID THE HOULD AS NS DERIAN TO CARRY ON HER CONSULTATIONS HITH THE ili ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON OTHER HATTERS, HE MOULD HOIK f OUR AIBASSADOR AND SPECIALISTS. HE HOPED THAT HE A'I MONTES COULD CONTINUE THEIR OISCUSION. MONTES ACRE MCGEE NOT TO DC KEPm AUTHOAlZATIOfl OF THE IJHOUY THE SECRETARY UNCLASSIFIED 55. s Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, June 27, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office Fil Country Chron, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret. UNCLASSIFIED p *• sechet THE WHITE HOUSE Y/ASHINGTON 'm6817 June 27. 1977 ACTION: ARA and D/HA COPinS: MEMORANDUM FOR . • THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUBJECT: Human Rights in Argentina RF:vhd The President noted that the Argentines have recently announced a series of actions designed to improve their human rights image. These actions include: D P S/P S/S S/S-S TMB TMC -- releasing of 342 persons from custody; -- processing in the courts the cases of nearly 1,000 persons awaiting trial on charges of subversion; and -- hinting at the reinstatement of the individuals' constitutional right to leave the coimtry. The President would like you to acknowledge this Argentine commit- ment to human rights. Zbigniew Brzezinski ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 SECRET— UNCLASSIFIED 56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter Washington, undated 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1977-1978. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. Pastor forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski under a July 7 covering memorandum and recommended that it be ^nt to Carter. A handwritten note indicates that Brzezinski discussed the memorandum with Carter on July 9. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 2-12/77) UNCLASSIFIED V MEMORANDUM |y ai "A" " — INFORMATION - MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: OECRET THE WHITE HOUSE WASIIINCTON THE PRESIDENT ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI Yoxir Remark That Argentine Improvements in Human Rights Should be Acknowledged The State Department has prepared a short report (Tab A^’ assessing the significance of Argentine Presid^t Videla's recent steps (on June 14) to improve the coiaitry's human rights image. Our mission in Argentina and the Department suggest that these steps — the release of 342 persons, the processing of 1,000 cases, the reexamination of the right of exile — should be "viewed cautiously." Nonetheless, the Department has sent a cable which instructs our Embassy to acknowledge and esqpress our continued interest and encouragement for these and other steps which improve the human rights picture in Argentina. The State Department also requested further information on whether the announced steps have been taken. A recent cable summarizing President Videla's trip to Uruguay appears to reinforce the conclusion that we should be more cautious about accepting announcements of reforms by the Latin American military govern- ments at Lice value. At his press-conference at the conclusion of his visit, Videla backed away from recent statements on democracy and instead said that his government has no fixed timetable for the installation of a democratic form of government. I SECRE T SECRET ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 UNCLASSIFIED 57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, My 9, 1977 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. This memorandum is also printed as Document 66 in Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol, II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. UNCLASSIFIED THE WHITE HOUSE WASH I NGTON 5601- GQNFIDENTfAfc ACTIOKAKV&S/PRS) J^3ly 9, 1977 ODPIES TO: S D P S/P D/HA S/S S/S-S 2MC TMD RF(rs) MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUBJECT; Recognition of Improvements in Human Rights The following is based on a conversation I had with the President this mornings 1. As you know, the Argentine Government has stated its intention to release 342 political prisoners* The President would like you to acknowledge this and express his gratification to the Argentine Government when they have released the prisoners. 2, At the same time, the President would like the State Department, on backgroxind to the press, to acknowledge this action by the Argentine Government and express the President's gratification. 3, The President would like it to be a matter of policy to acknowledge and express gratification for improvements in human rights once it has been determined that these improvements are real rather than cosmetic. This shoiold be done zu>t only with the Government concerned but, on background, with the press. Zbigniew Brzezinski coi > ?FiDENTiA"fa - ADP DeclassificsJion Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 UNCLASSIFIED 58. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Gelb) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, July 22, 1977 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 13, Human Rights — ^Argentina I. Confidential. Sent through Benson and Habib. Drafted by Rondon, O. Jones, L. Brown, and Borek; Titus, Robinson, Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas concurred. Rondon initialed for Jones, Brown, and Borek. Keane initialed for Todman. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it. An unknown hand initialed for Derian. Rondon initialed for Feinberg, Cutter, and Thomas. Titus initialed for himself and Robinson. Anderson initialed the first page of the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED a^l^^igWY»^iHlJWilliJ0W f^^^ted -in^^Se'-gouritr^ Argentina is a major food exporter and may have in its extensive continental shelf large reserves of oil. Although the country has recently suffered severe economic troubles, it is a generally self-sufficient industrial and economic leader in Latin America; Oy(af.*;iS:0 '^I^Tica'tTona^^lor -^Slfitt^r^Ta]?^ A^g e,njt iuna;^-are -pending . The most urgent of these cases is a $15 mxllTon commercial order from Bell-Textron for eight armored helicopters, equipped with exterior ,gun mounts and wiring. Two of them are for Presidential use and the rest for Argentina's Antarctic activities. If we approve this "major" sale, routine Congressional notification is required. There are alSdii^cfil^ Attachment)., aTfre' DepeLf tment^ has- been deny t•rtg‘*e6mme^^C'lal’"€xpo'^e2i3Loen6e a6B:l:l;cations.;for...Jdefense'‘article^ and services for police and other civil law enforcement use, and FMS purchase requests for articles and services which- could be diverted to such use. The extension of PY 77 FMS financing is also being withheld. The conference report on the FY 78 security assistance authorization bill contains a provision prohibiting all FMS sales and financing, grant training, and licenses for the export of defense articles and services to the Government of Argentina,, beginning, however, only in FY 1979. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, expresses a policy of promoting human rights and of not pro- viding security assistance to any country engaged in a consis- tent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, except in extraordinary circumstances. It is not necessary at any time to characterize expressly the human rights practices of a recipient governmeht. Moreover, the annual human rights report required by that section has been submitted to the Congress with respect to Argentina. Neverthe- less, the Congress .may:;:at3Sny 'time ,regu,e5.t:i;f rQro'yQaria:v.s;uppl.emen- ta'fy'-tepof't on Argentina. To continue such assist angg^^t-thSTi would .be-necessary for ..yo.ui,to. .state your.,op inion th at .ex tr ofd inar:y--G ir cumstances^^exist -So;.that>wOn..aI l .the -fact s.:-^^^^ ■CONFiriFNTIAL - CeNPIDEH«PIAi:i - 3 ngJ^auaX^iiteres t-. WhileHnjOumSuch*»£^por-t-»has“beerf®reqaest^d # to meet the requirements for continued assistance under Section 502B (c) }fj4©wSgisc'i®tf. TlSg|?mON5 * There is ge‘nere3s?vagr ee»e«t^^l:hatr=?we-Bhouldrn:crt^|SBlli«pr 14 £#.nsg.~ 3 ;he(?aaxport of-defense articles .and services. 'df Puseful- ^(gss'rto, pplice-K^nd - other- c ivi 1 1 aw -enf dr ceiiieri&o'rqaniz a t4^ Argentina, The presettt«^4's«aev" then;“;is,^.,wheji;iiiej£«4wa«^^ such r estr lctldh8^'^t&SS^.iici^ea3iifeEaiale8;i;ajadsa a|ui«iifc^;sp.fr;a«hich i' There are three options, all of which would be subject to review dependent upon the human rights situation: 1 , con^^owe :#ouc5^pies;feTMg®“dri'ei^Xdfn^ s^cutlty^jsalesj^allowlhg, on a case-by'^case'*basis>'*PMS^eraIe^ gnid'’^lSfw(ief Ciaf' expbr!f§ for the Argentine military. No new extensions of FMS financing would be contemplated, but dis- bursements against prior years' financing to meet payments for previously approved purchases would continue. Under this option, some of the pending 40 cases would be approved, including helicopters, armored vehicles, periscopes and torpedoes. D#Toys?^l^i;.-new^FMS-S|^etw#l-Pd2at*?seiis@Sa3ffiC£^^ This would ^aeny^'pjjadAh^gL^xequeatiS. 3. witht:theTfeiceptibn'^¥^^si^f§^artsx^iri^quip^^ PROS particularly those involving nuclear non-proliferation. — the Argentine armed forces - a dominant institution in Argentina - in a period of political instability. €0NPIDEHTIAL — n s latent •/ith our policy toward other rountrir^: g it^hrnc - ri>f!nrf.B.» f^.a. Korea, Iran, Philippines). — Pr%\fflSelS*^tJwe^lrrc^nt1ve '"for -the overnfiM»nt to-Aapivve its. human rights practices before the anticipatoi leg ir,] ar i ve embargo takes effect. eONS^ — IJill mean that weaoona- and other cquioment will bc-,i-ro- v^ded. tO»the Argentine military fnrres which ate directly il^Alved^ao human rights violationB*. — Will be opposed by a significant number of Congressmen and by other influential groups as inconsistent with the spirit of Section 5028, — May encourage the Argentine Government to assume the L’.S. Government's policy is hortatory only* and that there is no cost involved in continued repression. i)ption 2 - Temporary Embargo PROS — layjtoOfiSiStent with < the spirit of S02B« — Sends a clear message to the Argentine government that we cannot provide arms while human rights conditions remain as they are. — WliULlPXObablyihavelWlde >ublid and Congressional support. — Other instruments can be used to foster U.S. interest. CONS -- Will'cantagonize the' Cover nmeftt and the airmed forces a^d sellrioany damage such leverage as we have, both ion the- iwportafht nut!leasHP^vollferatlon problems and on. human righits. ' I c force Argentina to look elsewhere £^c arms#- possibly i USSR . thus complicating U.S. efforjts to develop^ few. mBHliVCaSOQQXcBtl - 5 - Sli9» pursuant to tiko now araa ^tsanafor policy. a^Cojcoa. f or -H^kd Or ayion ' ''if’" t!.'-j>^>^s%>-.v . ,'j ' . ..'" ; ■*' UNCLASSIFIED 59. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, July 27, 1977, 2151Z 5522 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770269-0610. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 3 C eWWPlW T XAL UMDIS eowf i PSwri M. SmB ox BUSHOS 05S22 272232Z ACIim ARA-10 INFO OCT-01 SS-14 3(b)(1) ISO-OO DHA-02 SP-02 THSl-00 P 272151Z JOIi 77 m JUIBMBASSY BOiarOS AIREB TO SBCSTATB KASHDC PRIORITY 1518 NSC-05 /040 W -102869 NSCB-00 ZNR-05 272249Z 775 C O N F i fl B N T 1 A L BOSTOS AIRES 5522 IiIMDIS B.O. 11652: SOS TAGS: SHDM, PDIP, AR SOBJECT; US INTEREST IN HUN2W RIGHTS IMPROVSiSNTS REF: (A) STATE 162292, (B) BUENOS AIRES 5309> 1. REF A INSTRUCTED THAT AH APPROACH BE HADE TO THE GOA AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL TO MOTE THE US6 INTEREST IN RECENT GOA STEPS TO IMPROVE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THE INSTRUCTIOI ALSO PROVIDED THAT, IF THE STEPS ANNOUNCED RY THE GOA AMD REPORTED IN B.A. 4638 HERE REAL RATHER TRAN COSMETIC, XHB ARGEHTINBS SHCRJLD BE MADE AHARE OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN THESE AND CCarriMUING steps TOMARO the RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAN. 2. REF B CmCUlDSD THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A DETECTABLE TREND TOWARD IHPIU3VBMENT IN RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE POINT OF WHETHER THE i3(» MEASURES CITED WERE REAL OR COSMETIC. AFTER ATTEMPTS BY ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM TO FOLUW-UP ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE HSASURBS ANNOUNCED BY THE CO WFI PE N PYMJ reWfIPEW tI AL PAGE 02 BUENOS 05522 272233Z GOA ON JUNE IS, HE HAVE NKNT CCNCLUDIOa THAT THEY DO HAVE SCmS SUBSTANCE, BUT SHCRJLD NOT BE TAKEN QITXRELY AT FACE VALUE. WE BELIEVE THAT SCME RESTRICTED FORM OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WILL BE FORMALLY REESTABLISHED (PERHAPS AS THE OPPORTUNITY TO ■PETITION" TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY AS NOW EXISTS IN PRACTICE IF NOT IN LAW.) THE SUPPRBSSKW OF CABILDO WAS NOT AS ExrnrsivB as it sgraiBD, since one the two SUPPRESSED EOniCEIS HAD ALREADY BEEN DISTRimnHD. WE HAVE STILL BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM THE RELEASE OF ALL OF 342 PEHSCWSLI^^^SRBIRWED BETWEEN MAY 27 AND JUNE 14. BOTH IgNMWK fcMBflH sAY THAT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT MANY OF THESE PBRSCWS NBRB RELEASED. HE HAVE CONFIRMED FOXHi CASES ACTUAUiY RELEASED AMD ASSUME, AS HAS OCCURRED WITH OTHER RELEASE LISTS, THAT MANY OF THOSE LISTED AS NO LC^GBR BEING DETAINED UNDER EXSCTOIVE POWERS HAVE BEEN FORMALLY CHAINED WITH SOME CRIME. (THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PROVIDE A LIST OF PBRS(»IS DETAINED OURINa THE PERIOD COVERED BY THE 342 RELEASES.) 3. IN THE APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS SINCE JUNE 14, THE GOA HAS ISSUED THREE LISTS OF DETAINEES AND RELEASEES UNDER THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THESE TOTAL 199 DETAINED AND ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 ht^://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.onse ik ■i«ese ihstances IS NOT PARTICDIASLY ENCODI»an«3. THE TACTIC OF BXFRESSING INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES DID NOT SXiICIT POSITIVE RESPONSES, FOR THIS IS AN AREA WHERE FEW WISH TO TAKE THE BIAHE OR SHARE CREDIT. CHAPLIN OJMHDKN'i'lAC NNN COW FIDE N TI jtt. UMOZS http://smaitarchive.state,sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS__... 6^24/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, August 15, 1977, 1758Z 192822 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770294-0106. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis; Limdis. Drafted by Bova, approved by Derian. In telegram 6644 from Buenos Aires, September 7, the Embassy forwarded the corrected text of this cable for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770345-0462) UNCLASSIFIED I)ociiment View Page 1 of 4 cow rapC N T tfli: UMDIS, STADXS cawymEHTim ' PAGE 01 STATE 1S2822 ORIGIN DHA-02 INFO OCT-01 lSO-00 A8A-06 SS-14 SSO-00 INR-OS INRE-00 L-Ol SP-02 /031 R CRAFTED BY D/HA/HR :MBOVA;Dl APPROVED BY D/SA:PDERIAH 0423B5 1S1903Z /SO O 1S17S8Z A0G 77 FM 8BCSTATB KKSBDC TO AMEKBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE e eWP I PENTI A C STATE 192822 STADIS/////////////////////////// UMDIS B.O. 11SS2: QDS TAGS: SHDH, PFOR, AR SDBiTECrr: DIKIAN VISIT WITH ADMIRAL MASSERA fOR CHARGE CHAPLIN BEGIN SUMMARY 1. AT HIS REQUEST, U.S. OXIRDIBATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PATT DERIAH MET WITH JUNTA MEMBER MASSERA m MORNING OF AnniST 10. THE ADMIRAL STRESSED THAT ARGENTINA NAS IN THE PROCESS OF RETURNING TO NORMAL LBGMi PROCEDURES AND THAT KIKS PSfWRESS SID BEEN MADE SINCE MS. DERIAN • S . LAST VISIT. MRS. DERIAN EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT NOiHALIZATICJN COULD BE ACONIPLISHBO SOON »SID IN SUCH A NAY THAT ALL LEVELS OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS NOULD UNDERSTAND IT. END SUMMARY. 2. THE ADMIRAL STARTED THE aWVBRSATICW BY STRESSING THAT ‘ OONFIDE H nAL ' " OONFID Bi rmC ' PAGE 02 STATE 192822 PROGRESS NAS BEING MADE IN CONTROLLING THE SITUATION. NHILB NOTING THAT FALSE INFORMATION CIRCULATES, AND SOKE INCIDENTS CONTINDS TO OCCUR C*SOHE GROUPS STILL ESCAPE US") HE STRESSED THAT THE END HAS IN SIGHT. MRS. DERIAN EXPRESSED HER HOPE THAT THIS HAS THE CASE AND NOTED TWO THINGS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE USG: (1) THE LARGE NUMBER OF DISAPPEARED AND (2) THE CONDITIONS OF BSI^ HELD INCCNIDNICADO NHERE PEOPLE ARE TREATED TOO HARSHLY. SHE SAID SHE HOPED NBH PROCSWRIS HILL BE INTRODUCED. 3. ADMIRAL MASSERA SAID HE DID NOT KNOH HHAT NUMBERS PRESIDENT VIDBLA OR ADMIRAL ALLARA HAD PROVIDED REGARDING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE CHARGED OR TAKEN ILLEGALLY BUT HE SAID THE LAST FEN MONTHS SHONED RAPID PROGRESS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE ARGENTINB ARMY HAS SC»$EHHAT DIFFERENT FSm OTHERS IN THAT ITS ORGANIZATICM CONTAIN CORE CCPWANDERS HHO HAD SOME INDEPENDENCE IN ADMINISTERING INTERNAL S^IRITY BUT SAID THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT PRESIDENT VIDBLA MAS NOT IN CONTROL. HE ADVISED THAT THERE COULD BE A DIFFERENCE BETHEEN THE IMPRSSSICHI RECEIVED OP THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Rfepatrick, 4/24/2017 http://sraartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/Doc View,aspx?key=CKibc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 5/10/2013 Document View Page 2 of 4 ACTUAL REALITY. 4. HRS, OERIAH EXPRESSED HER COKCBRH 0VBR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE NHO DON'T KNOW IF MEMBERS OP THEIR FAMILY ARE DEAD OR ALIVE. SHE MENTIC^IS THAT LABOR LEADERS AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN IN ^AIL SINCE 1975. SHE SAID THAT THE SYSTEM. SEEMS TO HAVE GROUND TO A HALT. E.G.. PEOPLE HERE PICKED UP AND NEVER CHARGED, SOME HERE HELD WITH m EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM, SOME HERE TRIED AND FOUND INNO- CENT BUT STILL DETAINED. Sm EXPLAINED THAT AFTER A ■ CONFIBE WT Ii ar UJNFIUKNTUSE” PAGE 03 STATE 192622 PERIOD OF TIKE THE GOVERNMENT, HAVING UtOS mS FI(^ AGAINST TERRORISM, SHOUID SHOHH ITS STRENGTH BY SAYING TO THE PEOPLE THAT IT HAS HOI BUT IT MEEDS HELP IN THIS MOP-UP PHASE. SHE SAID THE TERRORISTS ACHIEVE THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING TBS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATS IF THE GOVERNMENT DOESN'T AIMIT IT HAS HC»I THE tIAR AND MUST NOW RETURN TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BY BRINGIHS THOSE DETAINED TO TRIAL. SHE CITED THE CASE OF JACOBO TIHMEIUIAN AS AH BXAMPI2. AODIHC! mt HAS BStai MISTREATED HRILE UNDER DETENTldT. ^ilRAL MASSBRA HE DIDN'T BELIEVE TIMMEINON HAD BEEN MISTREATED ALTHOUGH HE MAY HAVE SAID HE BAS BEEN. 5. RETURNING TO THE GENERAL SITUATICHf, MRS. DBRIAN SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE IN THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAD TOLD USG REKSSENTATIVES THAT THE NAVY IS RBSPCETSIBLE FOR ABUSES NBICK OCCUR NHEN P^PLE ARE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AND INTERROGATED BEFORE THEY ENTER THE SYSTEM. ADMIRAL HASSERA RSSPOMDED THAT, NKILB HE DOESN'T WISH TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF •MASHING HIS HANDS OF THE MATTER, • INTERHAL SECURITY IS NOT THE NAVY'S RESPONSIBILITY. THAT THE NAVY HAS NOT TBRRITtNUAL JURISDICTICS AND WHEN IT DOBS DO SCBISTRING IN THIS AREA IT DOBS SO WITH THE KNDHLaSGB OF THE ARMY. HE SAID THAT THC»E MHO SAY OTHERWISE ARE TRYING TO DECEIVE. MRS. DBRIAN SAID THAT ON HER PRIOR VISIT SHE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ONE OP THE HORST INTERROGATION CENTERS HAS THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL IN BUENOS AIRES. THE ADMIRAL DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE NAVY'S ENTIRE ANTI -SUBVERSIVE ROLE HAS CARRIED OUT BY NO MORE THAN THIRTY PEOPLE. 6. MRS. OERIAN SAID THAT HHSN SHE NAS IN ARG^TINA BEFORE THERE MAS A GENERAL ATTITUDE THAT THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM ?(AS COMING TO AN END BUT HAS HOT REALLY OVER. THIS TIME SHE GOT THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT BVBRY<»IE CONCLUDES THE HAR IS NOH OVER AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOH UUNFlUbNTIRi: ■e OWFIP BN TmB PAGE 04 STATE X92822 REACHED THE EQUALLY DIFFICULT PHASE OF GETTING BACK TO NORMAL DQ40CRATIC PROCEDURES. SHE ADVISED THAT THE PEOPLE BECOME IMPATIENT IF THIS PHASE TAKES TOO LONG TO CARRY OUT. SHE MENTICEIED THAT SHE HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBI£H HITH THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND THAT HE GAVE HER THE IMPRESSION THAT HE, TOO, HAS WORRIED ABOUT TIKE. SHE REFERKTO TO THE LEGISLATION PASSED IN THE U.S. C<»«SRESS WHICH SETS A ONE YEAR TIME LIMIT ON CC»I- TINUING CERTAIN HBLATIflHSHIPS fffilCH HE HAVE HITH AR- GENTINA. SHE SAID THAT INTERNATIONAL OP1MXOH-TB5B BECCEfING MORE AND MORE CRITICAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUA- TION IN ARGENTINA AMD SAID IT WOULD BE DEVASTATING IF ARGarriNA became the next chile in the eyes OF THE INTER- NATIONAL COMMUNITY. MRS. OERIAN EXPLAINED THAT SHE THINKS THERE ARE PEOPLE OF GREAT INTEGRITY IN THE http://sniaxtarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=6dbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 5/10/2013 I^cument View Page 3 of 4 (X)VSRNMEH7 HHO HOI SPEAK UP. WE HAD RECEIVED MANY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE GOA'S eaSFIBEMTPBB— ■TOMFIPEN T IM ' PAGE 03 BUENOS 06281 01 OF 02 241937Z CAKPAIOI AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE ADMiNISTRATICW AND CONGRESS WERE STRONGLY MOTIVATED TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST ANY SUCH ABUSES. THE USG APPRECIATED THE CRIK:IAL SITUATION WHICH THE GOA FELT IISELF TO BE IN BUT COULD HOT BE SUPPORTIVE WHEN SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM VIOLATED THE RIGHTS OF THE INNOCENT. HE SAID THAT THE POLITICIANS HE SAN SAID T^T THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO DO WHAT IT DID TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND THEY GENERALLY SUPPORTED THE GOVHJNMKNT AND FELT TOE SITUATION IS GREATLY IMPROVING. THEY CCRITSND THAT TEE IMPROVEMENT IS SUCS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOW RELAX RESTRICTIONS OH POLITICAL ACTIVITY. 6. PRESIDENT VXDELA SAID HE WOULD NOT BE PICTURED AS ONE WHO IS UNOONCERNED ABtHJT.THE RIGHTS OF HIS CITIZENS. HE FELT THAT MAN, AS GOO'S WORK, MUST BE RESPK^SO AND VIEWED AS THE PURPOSE OF SOCIETY. HE ARGUED THE GREATEST GOOD FOR THE GREATER NUMBER AND CHALLENGED ASSTSBC TOOUKS TO FIND AN ARGENTINE WHO OISAIStEED WITH {XaiflEtBHTM NNH eO W flDB WT Htt. P»3S 01 BUEIM3S 06281 02 OF 02 241937Z "Action ara-14 INFO OCT-01 lSO-00 CIAE-00 DODB-00 PM-OS H-01 IHR-07 L'03 NSAB-00 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-IS DHA-05 . TRSB-00 MCT-01 ERDA-OS OBS-07 10-13 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-OO lNRE-00 /081 W 038473 242004Z /73 O R 24154SZ AUG 77 FM AI»VBRNMBNT HAD SUFFERED TERRORIST AGGRESSION AND HAD BEEN FORCED TO RESORT TO EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES. THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT OUTBREAKS OF VIOI^NCE, BUT DESPITE THESE THE GOVERNMENT IS PLEDGED TO RETURN THE COUNTRY TO NORMALITY. THE U.S. SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT PRESIDENT VIDILA'S COMMITMENT TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO RETURN ARGENTINA FULLY TO THE RULE OF LAN IN THE SHORTEST PERIOD OF TIME REMAINS VALID. 7 . MR. CHRISTOPHER STATED THAT SOME ACTIONS BY THE ARGEN- TINE GOVERNMENT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA DO STAND IN THE WAY OF BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED DISAPPEARANCES. D ETAINEES AND THB DEUTSCH FAMILY.^ WE CONTINUE TO HEAR OF DISAPPEARANCES} WE HAD HOPED THAT INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE PROBLEM, BUT THEY APPARENTLY HAVE NOT. THE LARGE NUMBER OF DETAINEES, PRESIDENT VIDSLA SAID SOME 4,000, IS ALSO A CAUSE FOR CONCERN. THB DEUTSCH CASE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PUBLIC MOD CC^GRESSIONAL INTEREST WHICH IS BEING CONCENTRATED OH ARGENTINA. THE U.S. JEWISH COMMUNITY HAS BE^ VERY INTERESTED IN THB FATE OF THE FAMILY. IT WOULD BE A VERY GOOD CASE TO RESOLVE. 8. ALLARA RESPONDED THAT THB ARGENTINES HERE AWARE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSED DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT PROBABLY CREATED MORE PROBLEMS THAN HERB MERITED. THB ARGENTINES HAVE TRIED TO INVESTIGATE REPORTS OF DISAPPEAR- ANCES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO REACH A CONCLUSICSI. S<»(E PEOPLE GO UNDERGROUND TO JOIN THE TERRORISTS, OTHERS TO ILLEGALLY LEAVE THB COUNTRY AND SOME "DISAPPEAR* TO ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COHMCN CRIMES. MOREOVER, ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WHO HAVE COmtITTED EXCESSES ARE BEING PUNISHED AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS INVESTIGATING ALL ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCES. EIGHTY PER CENT OP THE REPORTED DISAPPEAR- ANCES HAD OCCURRED BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN eatP i ProTt itt. eOW Pl PEWTI AL ' PAGE 04 STATE 270937 1976. 9. CONCERNING THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, ALLARA SAID THAT THREE OF THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD BEEN RELEASED BUT TWO WOULD BE TRIED BECAUSE THEY HERE SERIOUSLY COMPROMISED BY TIES TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AS WAS THE BROTHER, DANIEL, WHO HAD LEFT ARGENTINA. ALLARA USED THE DEUTSCH CASE TO DENY ACCUSATIONS THAT ANTI-SEMITISM EXISTED IN ARGENTINA. THE GOVERNMENT REPRESSED ANTI-SSIITIC LITERATURE AND HAD MADE IT A CRIME TO INCITE RACIAL HATRED. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAS CLOSE CONTACT WITH LEADING JEWISH CITIZENS AND ORGANIZATIONS. JEWS WHO ARE PROSECUTED IN ARGENTINA ARE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURTS BECAUSE THEY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES. NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE JEWS. 10. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WANTED THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TO KNOW http://smartaichive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/1/2013 Document View Page 3 of 4 THAT IT HAS HOT CaiLY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUT IBE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC WHO HERE STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF ACTIONS ON HOMAN RIGHTS. ON THE DEUTSCH FAMILY, MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WANTED ALLARA TO KNOH THE GREAT SYMBOLIC VALUE THE CASE HAD IN THE U.S. 11. ALLARA SAID THE ARGENTINES HERB VERY AWARE OP THE SYMBOLIC VALUE; PRESIDENT VIDSLA HAD WRITTEN PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER ABOUT THE FAMILY .' ARGENTINA IMERSfOiffi U.S. CraiCERN OVER HOMAN RIGHTS, AND HAS DONE MUCH TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION THERE. HOWEVER, NOT ONLY HOMAN RIGHTS BUT ALSO TERRORISM SHOULD BE (XRISIDBRm . TERRORISM HAS SPAWNED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATICRIS; PLANE HIJACKINGS VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE PASSENGERS. THE ON RECENT LY PA SSED A RESOLDTIOI^ CONDEMNING HZJACfaNS, lUT HE NEED SUCH mutsUKHS TO OMraAT TERRORISM. DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE GONPIDEaWHttr TDRFXtrarrnor PAGE 05 STATE 270937 AGREED FULLY HITH THE MINISTER'S CONCERN WITH HIJACKING. HE MOST WORK TO GET ALL STATES TO RATIFY THE ANTI -HIJACKING CONVENTION.. 12. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT HE WISHED TO INTRODUCE A HAPPIER HOTS; HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ADVISE SECRETARY VANCE •IHAT HE SHOULD ISSUE A LICENSE FOR THE EXPORT OF PERISCOPES TO ARGENTINA. FAVORABLE ADVISORY OPINIONS ON THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSES FOR THE EXPORT OP CHINOOK HBLICOPTKRS AND LOCKHEED C-130S HAD ALSO BEEN GIVEN. THESE ACTIONS HERE AH INDICATION OF OUR FAITH IN PRESIDENT VIDBLA'S MODERATION AND OUR HOPE THAT THE ROCKY RELATIONS WE HAVE HAD ARE NOW IMPROVING. 13. ALLARA SPOKE OF HIS CONCERN OVER THE LIMITATKRIS OH MILITARY EQUIPMENT- -ESPECIALLY SPARE PARTS AND FMS ITEMS FOR WHICH ARGESrriNA HAD ALREADY PAID. THESE LIMITATIONS WERE CAUSING REAL DIFFICULTIES. THE ARGENTINES HAD HOPED THAT THE SERIES OP HIGH LEVEL U.S. OFFICIAL VISITS WHICH RAO BEGUN IN MARCH WOULD HAVE CONVINCED THE U.S. THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON HOMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT. 14. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO SEE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ON THE ARGENTINE AGQiDA FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. PRESIDENT CARTER PLACES GREAT EMPHASIS @1 THE NUCLEAR (^IBSTION. THE U.S. DOES NOT WISH TO KEEP COUNTRIES FR(M EXPLOITING NUCLEAR ENERGY, BUT WE DO WANT TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH PRESENT A GRAVE DANGER FOR THE WORLD. WE WANT TO SEE Al^BNTINA USING NUCLEAR POWER, BUT AVOIDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AND REPROCESSING. THE PRESIDENT IS AKXIOJS FOR ARGENTINA TO RATIFY THE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO AND AGREE TO FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS. MR. CHRISTOPHER SAID THE SECRETARY WOULD PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WHEN HE NAS IN ARGENTINA. CLWFiDEffngg ttaiFIUENTrAg PAGE 06 STATE 270937 15. ALLARA SAID THAT NUCLEAR TOPICS WERE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO ARGENTINA, WHICH WAS A LEADER AMONG THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN NUCLEAR MATTERS FOR OVER 30 YEARS. ARGENTINA HAD DEVELOPED ITS NUCLEAR CAPACITY FOR PEACEFUL ENDS AND IT WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. . THE ARGENTINES DO NOT WANT TO DISTURB THE POWER BALANCE IN THE AREA BY AN IRRESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. ALLARA SAID THAT ARGENTINA MAS CONDUCTING A THOROUGH REVIEW OF http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/1/2013 Document View Page 4 of 4 ITS POLICY ON THE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO AND THAT HE SAW VIRTUALLY NO IMPEDIMENT TO ARGENTINA'S RATIFYING IT. THE ARGENTINES ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO A PULL DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WHEN THE SECRETARY IS IN BUENOS AIRES. IS. MR. CHRISTOPHER THANKED ALLARA FOR THIS GOOD NEWS ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS TO RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THE THOUGHTFUL AND CANDID CONVERSATION WHICH THEY HAD HELD. THIS TYPE OP EXCHANGE STRENGTHENED RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. PROBLEMS EXIST BUT THEY MUST BE DISCUSSED, HOT AVOIDED. IN THIS WAY THEY CAN BE RESOLVED. VANCE eatfPiBB NT i i ar NNN CONFlPEWTtAfc ht^://smartarcMve.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_.. 7/1/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 67. Briefing Memorandum From Richard Feinberg of the Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Vance Washington, November 19, 1977 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff — Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977-1981, Lot 82D298, Box 3, TL November 16-30 1977. Confidential. Sent through Lake. Drafted on November 18 by Feinberg. UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE BRIEFINS MEMORANDUM . S/S eOMFIPEWT IMr November 19, 1977 TO: The Secretary THROUGH s S/P - ^thony Lak .-‘t r*. ‘- Acting SUBJECT! Is the Argentine Navy on the Side of the Angels? Xoa requested our thoughts on whether Argentine Navy Cotmumder Massera may nol^be one of the villains in the Argentine drama, after all. Massera has worked actively of late to foster the notion that he is the most d«noeratic meDdser of the Argentine ruling junta and the one who would show the greatest respect for human rights. He has gone out of. his way to tnfriend^ union leaders, Feroaist politicians and Jei^sb leaders. Re has also made it a point to tell visiting Amerlc«i officials that his Navy is innocent of wrongdoing because it has only a peripheral role in counter-terrorism. But this is nonsense. Massera 's 1,000 man marine force is among the most active of the counter-terrorist forces. We have quite credible reports that the Navy has been responsible for repres- sion against priests, and that the Ha^ Mechanics School in Buenos Aires has been used as a torture center. Nona of these activities could escape Massera *s knowledge because of all the. services in Argentina, Massera 's is the most tightly control!^. On the other hand, Massera is the most astute and ambitious of the Junta members, and smart enough to realize that a public stance on behalf of human rights will enhance his chances to becone Argentina's President when he retires frcan the Navy (possibly late this year) . It appears that Massera would like to seduce Argentina's labor unions and the Peronist Party into supporting him. ■ag ewar (GD^) oe'cLassified Authority MNTi ^^9^7 By^NARA DMe 4-/8^l 6EORH1 - 2 - xitucb as Peron (no danocrat, either) courted labor in the forties, ^is explains Hassera's public of^sltion to the belt- tightening policies of the Econonqr Minister, tOio is at once anathetoa to labor and closely linked to Videla. H\n>an rights aside, Massera is, or affects to be, a jingoist. le ord^ed the Navy to fire against Russian trawlers last fall in an action idrLch caused casualties and had not been approved by Videla. hnd he seems to have flirted with the notion of a grandstanding military action against Chile in the Beagle Chaimel in an effort to curry nationalist favor. Be has not shared Videla* s desire for a close relationship with the United States, and had privately criticized Videla ' s attendance at the Panama treaty signing and indicated that Argentina should not accommodate to us on the nuclear issue. The prevailing Argentine view is that Massera is a strong leader, not usually said of Videla, but that he is unprincipled. fOiat militates most against Nassers* s aadbitions is that the Army, ^rtilch cares little for Massera, is by far the most important military force. At all events, the image which he seems to be successfully cultivating in some ipiarters does not cncactly accord with the facts as we know them. We have asked Ezdjassy Buenos Aires for further commenc. ARA:S^icHEH,/AaA/ECA!PRondon: jd 1/27/7B UNCLASSIFIED 72. Memorandum for the Record Washington, February 6, 1978 1 Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA-CIA weekly meetings, 1978. Secret. Drafted by Heavner. UNCLASSIFIED ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 QBCRE T - 3 - the human rights attitudes of the Argentine military leader- ship. He said the report indicates there are no moderates there on the question of using harsh it^thods against subversives. All the military leaders are in agreement that they must use rough methods to control subversives. The references we had heard to "curbing excesses" meant only that the regime will not tolerate use of the campaign against subversives as a cover for settling personal grudges jjiM Ted He^vner INR/DDC SECRET sp UNCLASSIFIED 73. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) Washington, February 15, 1978 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina II. Confidential. Drafted on February 14 by Rondon; cleared in draft in EB/IFD/ODF, S/P, and the Department of the Treasury and by Bova. Rondon initialed for all the clearing officials. UNCLASSIFIED rigii" ; r. ^ 7803232 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORANDUM S/S ■ ■ ■ FEB15I9?8 TOi PROMs SOBJECTs The Deputy Secretec; ARA - Terence A. ■TOdman I UlClTBffiD DlRECTliT SOsJ^L f~gcg asyigTOB BY g/s 0, S. Reaction in -Ifls to Argentine Human Rights Actions ISSOB FOR DBCISIOW Nhether recent human rights actions by Argentina are sufficient grounds for ^revising your earlier decision to vote against, two Argentine * loans in the World Bank, now scheduled for a vote On Pebruary 21. BSSERTIAL FACTORS A vote is expected on February 21 on two Argentine projects idiich, before the developments outlined below, you decided to vote against: a $109 million silo proj- ect in the IBRD and a $9 million cement plant loan in the International Finance Corporation. The Argentine Ambassa- dor has mentioned publicly that the silo project was developed after discussions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, referring to our possibly negative position on it as an indication of mixed and confusing positions being taken fay the O.S. goverment. Even if we follow current instructions on voting, we need to lofiow what to say to Argentine feelers about our response to human rights actions %fhicb they believe are positive., A progress report on the human rights situation in Argentina was sent to the nepartmeot by our Embassy on February 7 and is attach^. — PriTOner releases . Approximately 440 prisoners have been released from the state of siege powers of the Argentine Executive since Deceive 20, 1977. — Prisoner lists . On February 3, in a significant, long sought after step, Argentina published a list of 705 state of siege prisoners.* A second list of ySfS prisoners appeared on February 13 j further lists ^re ex- .pected. -• - ■ ' O b OT I BEWTIA g ' ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIRED by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017 — Right of option . Our Embassy believes that the right oC option pr^raa, irtiereby prisoners maty opt for exile, is now Mefinlteiy being inplen^ted, and the Argentine government has told foreign enhassies that it will cooperate in helping prisoners meet visa reguire- ments. Ihe Embassy has underscored the importance of this measure to prisoner releases. — Treatment of prisoners . Ihe International fflttit-^ tee of the Bed Cross resiSBed j^ison visits in Oecenditer and has reported that political prisoners are being held in the same physical conditions as other prisoners. This is an iaprovement. — Orf 8. interest eases . -The Argentines have author- ised the" departure’ of certain high 0. S. interest eases recently, including Guillermo Vogler and one of the Panero sisters. — Intangibles . The attached cable reports, that the ^Argentines " are ' becfohilng more "sensitised" to the impor- tance of human rights steps and are no longer "stone- walling" the subject. The cable states sIto that there Is an attempt underway to reorganize counter-subversive forces in order to achieve tighter control over them by the central ^vernment. Oh the other hand, and as the same cable reports, there continue to be many problems, Miile disappearances may have declined in 1977, more recently they appear to have run at the sane rate as a year before. According to our Embassy, it has heard of 39 disappearances since Deceiriier 1, including two French nuns and mothers of the disappMreds who were abducted without a trace in mid- Decembec-w Iffie ^t^assy adds enat reports or secret oeren- tion centers f^sisC, aiuJ that there is no evidence to suggest that, toptore for information is no longer practiced. In addition, the GOA admits that it is bold- ing over 3600 prisoners under executive detention. Human rights groups estimate that many thousands more are being held secretly, in non-official detention centers. To date the GOA has answered few of our requests for information on missing persons. The International Commit- tee of the Ked :Crpisa has not visited military camps %diere unaccounted for prisoners may be under detention. Few. t eoWg I PBWTtfttr - 3 - prisoners have been released by the right of option pro- gram to date. Xn the case of high D. S. interest cases such as Timerman or Oeutech, they remain detained. Internationally, the Argentine government has mounted a campaign in the United Nations against Amnesty Interna- tional and the International Commission of Jurists. However you decide to handle this issue, our re- sponse will come very shortly after Under Secretary Benson decided against the sale of »av further mil itarv training to Argentina, .'this TOans tnat we have continue to get progressively tougher 'with Argentina. Under Public Law 95-118 (PY 1U78 IPI authorislna legislation},-oppo8iti.oh to a loan may consist of either a no vote or an abstention. Neither of the proposed options recommend support for Argentine loans at this time. THB OPTIONS 1. Follow current instructions but aclcnowledge change privately , tte would advise the Argentines tliat we decided to vote no on the $109 million silo loan and the $9 million cement plant because of continuing concern with the human rights situation in Argentina. We would note that improve- ments in human rights will be factored into the stance we take on future projects. We would acknowledge privately, however, to both the Argentine and other bank directors that we have noted favorable signs and express the hope that they indicate a new trend. Pro : I — This would demonstrate our Ongoing serious concern over continuing disappearances and other human rights abuses but inject an element of hope into our IPX voting pattern in return for further human rights performance. We would not run the risk of suggesting that we are willing to alter our policies in response to minor improvements. Con : — Itois would fail to recognize sufficiently or encour- age actively Argentine human rights change, which may seem minimal to us but is important in the Argentine view of things. It risks' signaling, especially when we have just decided to deny all military training requests, that we remain opposed adamantly to j£he government, and xh the con- text of our posture, our action might not only servj| as a . CO NP I PE N TI AC e o H fiPEH' wia; - 4 - htaaan rights disincenbiire but Impact negatively on bthec major interesta, notably non-proliferation. 2. Abstain on both loans . We would inform the Argentines that their recent steps will affect our stance on the two loans, but we would not be more explicit prior to the votes. We would abstain on the loans, and explain privately to the Argentines and Interested Bank members that our stance was taken in recognition of recent positive signs, ex^hasixing the need for further steps leading toward overall improvement in idiat remains 'a poor situation. gro t — Uiis represents a prompt revision of our ear- lier negative stance in the XfZs, signaling our will- ingness to change as the Argentines chancy. It could also: a} help to stem human rights regression, because the Argentines would not wish to precipitate a return to no votes in the banks and, b) it would strengthen the hand of those in the government idio seeking human rights la^rovement and idio would be able to point to our action as indicating acknowledgment of steps being taken. Con : — She ^bllcation of two lists and some prisoner releases represent only Uie beginning of iri:at is needed for real improvement in the human rights situations to reverse our position with alacrity would undermine the seriousness with which we have viewed past viola- tions, including very recent dlsai^arahces. RECQMMEMDATIOH ^at you approve Option 2 to abstain on both the silo and cement projects, and privately eqglain our votes in terms of Argentine human rights steps (favored by AHA, S/P, Treasury, and the 0. S. Director to ^e XBSO). Approve . Disapprove ADTBIWATZ^DY, that you approve Option 1, (favored by HA) kalntalnlng your earlier decision tO oppose the CQW F l DB Wtoar i t >5 ti n . ’/'■Hr ‘ j, . e o W PIOB H TlMi . - 5 - t»io projects but authorize representations to the Argentines recognizing hopeful hunan riahts develop- ments. Approve Disapprove Attachment ; Cable - Buenos Aires 965 Drafted: ARA/ECA : PEROMOn ; j c 2/14/785x22401 Concurrences: {BB/OP^Nash (draft )/i^ VPrOWalker (draft)/^ HAtHBova (draft) Treasury sWEscoube (draft^^^ ■cd w pTpgw mfr UNCLASSIFIED 74. Note From the Deputy Executive Secretary of State (Wisner) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, undated 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — ^Argentina 11. No classification marking. UNCLASSIFIED HAioav wmivN 3H1 iv (Bonooadaa The issue here '•is whether to take a new look at the enormous backlog of Argentine arms transfe r cases, with a view toward making selectea approvals as an explicit "carrot" for Argentine human rights reform and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Harold Brown has sucrgested in his letter to you that we do this.- PM, S/P, AKA, and L agree with Brown's suggestion and have identified certain categories of spare parts and safety equipment that they think we should approve. These approvals would be given to Argentina with a request for significant human rights reforms to be made before October 1 (the Congressional -mandated cut-off date for further sales to Argentina) and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco before the SSOD. Argentina would be told that no further approvals could be made until these conditions were met. H also agrees that we should make some approvals, but proposes an alternative method of deciding which to . make. There is a "grandfather clause" in the Congressional cut-off legislation which would allow us to go forward with those cases where contracts or LOAs were signed before August 4, 1977. PM, ARA, S/P argue against this approach, because it would allow some large end-item cases to go, which they think should be held, and it would not allow some essential spare parts for items we have recently approved. They also suspect that the total dollar value of approvals made by the H-proposed method might be larger than the categories of cases they proposed for approval. HA is very much opposed to any approvals until Argentina has made meaningful human rights reform®. They have a considerable body of Congressional opinion on their side. Harold Brown has also recommended that we approve training for some 68 Argentine officers. This has already been decided against within the Department, but not yet ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 S3AIH3aV IVNOaVN 3H1 iV 033nQ0ad3a - 2 - communicated to the Argentines. Opinion is split: one side argues that training is the last thing we should cut off, so long as those involved have not been guilty of human rights violations; the other side argues that training should be cut, at least for now, because of the domestic political controversy about human rights abuses by military officers. The key consideration is whether our willingness to provide some of these spares as evidence of our continued interest in maintaining good relations with the Argentine military will indeed work to produce any "human rights" benefits in Argentina, or a more tractible Argentine position on nuclear non- proliferation. We have no firm evidence either way, except that they are moving very close to ratification of Tlatelolco right now. PM, ARA, S/P, and L believe that with time running out on military sales decisions, this "card" is worth playing. The Argentines may do nothing in which case they will have gotten much-needed spare parts without having to put up anything in advance. But their need for spare parts will continue and they will clearly be mortgaging any prospects for further approvals on our part if they show no response, a point we would make clearly to them in communicating our decision. Because of the very intense domestic political interest in Argentine hximan rights abuses, we must be well prepared to explain the rationale behind and nature of approvals on these cases, should you make them. There is a question of whether to consult interested members of Congress before or after making the decision. At any rate, no decision should be announced until after the President's trip. The recommendations are at pp. 6-8. This memo, although long, is the most concise statement yet produced of the issue and the various positions, and it is the only one that has proposed specific solutions. Whatever your decision, someone will be unhappy. UNCLASSIFIED 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, April 7, 1978, 0108Z 89468 1 Source; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780149-1018. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bumpus; cleared by Schneider, McNeil, and Zimmermann; approved by Bushnell. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 2, c owF Tpgi mw r CUNt'iUiaiTiAE'” PAGE 01 STATE 0894£8 ORIGIN ARA-14 ADP Declassificalion Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 C O « "F - l ' U E N T"l""a ~ C" STATE 089468 E.O. 116S2: CDS TAGS: SHUM, BR SUBJECT; REPORT OF NUNS DEATH REF: BA 2346 1. DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED WITH DEEPEST CONCERN REPORTS OF MURDER OF TWO NUNS AND FIVE OTHER WOMEN PICKED UP IN DECEMBER ABDUCTIONS. 2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES WE MOST ACT FORCEFULLY NOW TO MAKE GOA AWARE OF OUR OUTRAGE AT SUCH ACTS. ARGENTINES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT AS LONG AS SUCH DISAPPEARANCES OCCUR OUR RBLATICWS WILL BE PLACED UNDER GREAT STRAIN, EVEN THOUGH WE CONTINUE TO RESPECT VIDBLA*S EXPRESSED PERSONAL INTENTIONS. CONFIDEBTIBL INFO OCT- 01 ISO- 00 HA-OS ClAS-00 DODE-00 PM- 05 K-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-OO NSC- 05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 SCS-OS SY-05 MCT-01 AID-OS PC-01 /091 R DRAFTED BY ARA/ECA: JBUHPUS;BP APPROVED BY ARA t JBUSHNBLL HA:MSCHNSIDER ARA;FMC»EXL ' ARA/ECA: R?rZIMMEIU(ANN 027853 070235Z /20 P 0701082 APR 78 FK SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMSMBASSY BUSIDS AIRES PRIORITY fUNFIUB BT im PAGE 02 STATE 089468 3. ACCORDINGLY, AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDSLA TO EXPRESS U.S. SHOCK AT THE REPORTED DEATHS OF SEVEN WOMEN. WAIUJSS OF REMAINDER TO APPEAR ON ISH LISTS HEIGHTENS OUR CCHJCERN. AMBASSADOR SHOUID EXPLAIN TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS COME AT AN ESPECIALLY UNEORTiniATl TIME. THERE HAD BEEN SOME MODEST BUT POSITIVE STEPS ON THE PART OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERimENT AND THE UNITED STATES HAD RESPONDED TO THESE WITH POSITIVE ACTIONS. WE tUU) MOVED FROM "NO" VOTES m XFX LOANS TO ABSTENTIONS ON THE LAST TWO LOANS AND HAD APPROVED THE SALE OF SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT. OUR POSITIVE ACTIONS WILL BE HARD TO MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OP THE REPORTED DEATHS OF THE SEVEN WOMKM.J TO OFFSET THE VERY NEGATIVE IMPRESSION CAUSED BY THE SEVEN DEATHS — AND THE PRESUMPTIVE DEATHS OF THE OTHER 6 "MAORIS” -- ARGENTINA WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER VISIBLE PROGRESS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. 4 . AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONTINUE PRESENTATION BY SUGGESTING THAT GOA CONSIDER ACTIONS WHICH CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST THE PEOPLE WHO COMMITTED THIS CRIME . > THEY SHOUllT BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL AND IF SOME IN AUTHORITY WINKED AT THE CRIME THOSE INVOLVED SHOULD BE DISCIPLINED. THERE WILL BE GREAT PRESSURE IN THE UNITED STATES FOR CHANGES IN OUR POLICY TOWARD ARGENTINA IP SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE STEPS ARE NOT http;//smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.(ibo.SAS ... 5/20/2013 Document View Page 2 of 2 TAKEN. IfE REALIZE HOH DIFFICULT THIS HILL BE FOR THE COA. BUT HE MUST BE ABLE TO SHOH CCRWINCIl^ PROGRESS OR OUR RELATIONS HILL UNDOUBTEDLY SUFFER. OUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD COMMITTED THE GOA TO RELEASE OR TRY ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO RETUI® TO RULE OF LAH AND TO PUT A HALT TO DISAPPEARANCES. YET ALL OF THESE AREAS OF CONCERN CONTINUE. THE DEATHS OF THESE HOMEN UNDER- LINE OUR CONCERN. CONPIDia i WAir tONFiD Ba rroa r PAGE 03 STATE 089468 5. FYI. DEPARTMENT REALIZES THAT OUR INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEATHS OF THE NUNS AND THE OTHERS IS BASB} ON SENSITIVE SOURCES AMD THAT THE EMBASSY CORRECTLY IS CCWCBRNKD ABOUT PROTECTING THESE SOURCES. YOUR PRESENTATION HILL HAVE TO TAKE THIS INTO CONSIDERATICW . HE CANNOT, HOHEVER, REFRAIN FROM CONFRONTING THE ARGENTINES KITH THIS CRIME. 6. OEPARrHENT IS ALSO HOST CONSCIOUS OF THE REPORTS OF THE IMPENDING RATIFICATION OF THE TRBITY OF TLATBLOLCO, THE POSSIBLE RELEASE OF JACOBO TIMERMAN AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE LAST PRISCRISR LISTS. HE UNDERSTAND TTIAT OUR PROPOSED DEMARCHE COUtiD EFFECT THESE POSITIVE GOA STEPS, BUT FEEL NtWETHELESS, HE MUST SPEAK OUT. 7. YOU SHOULD KNOH THAT FRANK HQIBIL RAISED THIS MATTER HITH AJA ESPIL OH MARCH 30 ON BASIS AFP TICKER ITEM. AJA ESPIL EXPRESSED HORROR AT POSSIBILITY REPORT WAS TRUE AND SPECULATED THAT INCIDENT WOULD NOT ONLY ANGER VIDELA BUT PERHAPS PUT HIM IN TOSITION TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THOSE WHO SANCTIONED THIS OUTRAGE. SUBSEQUENTLY, AJA ESPIL SUGGESTED TO JOHN BUSHNELL, PRESUMABLY AS A RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS HITH BA, THAT REPORT MIGHT BE FALSI, 8. DEP^THEHT HILL MAIg PARALLE L PRESSITATKNf TO AJA ESPIL. TO INSURE THAT THE PRESENTATICOIS ARE SYNCHRCSillZED , WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CABLING DEPT DATE AND TIMR.i5£. AMBASSADOR’S APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA. VANCE ■COHFTDERTITnT NNN COWflOt-NI ' IHC http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/Doc View.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS ... 5/20/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 76. Memorandum From Stephen Oxman of the Office of the Deputy Secretary of State to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) Washington, April 12, 1978 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 27, Human Rights — Argentina III. No classification marking. UNCLASSIFIED FROM: SAO SUBJECT: Argentine Arms Transfer cases In view of the recent tragic reports out of j Argentina, it is not clear tnat now is tne appro- | priate monent to go ahead with any of the arms | transfers :^lch are the subject of t he under 1 vino __ -I Action Memorandum. Castro delivered the aemarcne on f Monday concerning the nuns' deaths. McAuliffe was with him which is good. ers of the l^al profes- sion who defend political prisoners exacer- bating the lack of legal remedies and due process; — standard practice of torture, brutality and psychological abuse .of political prisoners . (nemo attached)^' — the limited "right of option" for political prisoners under executive detention; — and a wide variety, of restrictions on religious, political, press and. labor activities (specifically, the arrests and disappearances of political and labor .leaders; prohibitions on political and union actiyiUes; constraints on the press, includ- ing pwitlve short-tem closings and arrests • of-nai^ journalists; official harassment of religious groups,- in particular the Jehovah's -.Witnesses and other sects denied government registration, and reports of imsldents of anti-semltlsm targeted at mem- bers of the Jewish ccmunll^ and Jewish pri.on„..) 7, If appropriate, the Dnd» Secretary would continue th\t the United Sta^d believes the following . are exang>les of the kinds of^ctrons which we reel iirould contribute tangibly to an in^roved ataiosphere for govern- ment-to-govemment relations; — A promise and perceptible, action by '.President - Vldela to curtail . the irregular detention and abduction practices of the security forces. S B CR BT ■SBC UB T An end to torture and miatreatnent of prisoners. — An accounting of those who have disappeared — or at ^asl^ those shout whom Informa^on Is known. . . — The establishment of a timetable for promptly charging and fairly trying (preferably In civilian courts) or releasing those held under . executive authority, ' in particular those not ' ^ suspected of violence. — The establishment of. numerical goals by the Argentine Military Review Board for Right of Option for the release each month of a signifi- cant number of persons from executive custody. — The actual release of a considerable aiimber of prisoners frcxa executive custody — either freed or remanded to civilian or military courts — by August 1. We have In mind action on per- haps 500 cases. The release of another tangible number of prisoners (for example, 500 additional cases) by September 15. — An undertaking to continue this process so that during 1978 the Argentine government will release, grant right of option to, fairly try, or schedule for trial, in civilian or military courts, all remaining executive prisoners . The enforcement of procedures to Investigate at a high level allegations .of security personnel Involvement In future desappearances and torture to try those who engage in, or are otherwise responsible for such practices, and to punish those found guilty. 8. The under Secretary will, on the basis of their replies to the foregoing. Inform the Argentines that as they take action on improving husian rights, we will respond In a calibrated, sequential fashion. -S E eRB T V- a BC RB T -rr-— , : • . 9. The Under Secretary nay Infom the Argentina Qoirernnent that aa hraian rights ii^rovenents are taksft in the above mentioned areas, the United States will begin to consider favorable action. In a calibrated manner, on pending aspects of the military relationship. These Include the purchase of military training^ safety related egulfmient, spare parts for previously supplied items, and items previously approved for sale or financing or needed to fulfill previously approved contracts. 10. If in early 1979, it is evident publicly that all prisoners have been removed from executive custody, and that there has been a resolution of the problen of violations of the rights of the person, including political prisoners, disappearances, torture and due process, and that some beginning steps have been taken toward restoration of civil and political liberties, the Administration would move to counteract the Xennedy/Bunqphrey Amendment. esengT" UNCLASSIFIED 80. Memorandum of Conversation Buenos Aires, May 24, 1978 1 Source: National Archives, RG 84, Lot 81F93, Embassy Buenos Aires Post Files, 1978, Box 48, POL 7 — Newsom Visit. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Rondon on May 25. There is no indication as to when or where the meeting took place. At the top right-hand comer of the first page of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “Key point is last paragraph of p. 4. See also — don’t know where — ‘scope paper’ for this visit.” UNCLASSIFIED NODIS DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation fty ^ ^ DATE; Wedriesfey, May 24, 197 SUBJECT; Human Rights and United States Relations with A^^entina 1 ^ 1 PARTICIPANTS: Lieutenant General Rafael Videla, President of Argentina — - y Col. Malea Gil,. Presidency ' David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador Raiil Castro ' < , ^ J _ Fernando Rondon, ARA/ECA r The Under Seerdrary met with President Videla for approximately 90 minutes. Mr. Newsom opened the conversation, outlining the purpose of his mission, on behalf of the Secretary of State, to seek an improve- ment in bilateral relations. The Under Secretary said that he recognized the problems Argentina confronted and the extraordinary steps that had to be taken to face the situation. He acknowledged important Argentine steps to restore normalcy, including Christmas releases, action on the Deutsch and Timerman cases, and Red Cross visits.'' The Under Secretary further acknowledged Presiaenc Videla *3 interest in good relations as manifested by the ratifi- cation of Tlatelolco, a new civil air agreement and the resolution of all but one investment dispute. President Videla welcomed the dialogue he_said he began with President Carter and Secretary Vance.' He commented that dialogue is worthwhile even if disagreeable things are said. Mr. Newsom noted that he had read the reports of conversations between -Videla and President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Assistant Secretaries Todman and Derian. Newsom remarked that Ambassador Castro has also conveyed the views of the United States, so that President Videla has participated in more than his share of dialogues. ADP Declassification Review ARA/ECA: FRondon/mn 5/25/78 DECLASSIFIED fD,.uhA Office .nd Office,) by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 (DiaUint Office and Officer) FORM jjj, ^254 2-65 I eeWFlDENlIAL - NODIS (2 Mr. Newsom then outlined the political situation existent in the United States after the sixties, stemming from Vietnam and controversies over relations with other govern- ments. He stated that there is a strong feeling in the U.S. Congress, represented, for example, by Senator Kennedy and Congressman Fraser, that while we should not interfere in other states, we should not appear to be endorsing the policies of other governments through our assistance programs, when it appears the human rights situations in these countries are not consistent with normal international standards. This predates President Carter's election. When he ran, htiman rights was part of his platform and, at the time, Patricia Derian was one of his national campaign managers. The Under Secretary cited the Eximbank situation as an example of a case where the Executive does not have a free hand. The Bank currently has authorizing legislation before the Congress, part of which deals with lending to human rights problem countries. Eximbank therefore does not wish to take steps which could complicate its dealings with Congress. This is not an embargo as some have pictured. President Carter, Secretary Vance, and Secretary Brown all recognize the importance of relations with Argentina, Mr. Newsom observed. In confidence, he said he is in Argentina because Secretary Brown raised with Secretary Vance the implications for the U.S, of a possible termination of mili- tary relations with Argentina. It was his task to determine, Newsom continued, whether present and future prospects for normalization are such that we can go before Congress and defend the resumption of military relationships on the basis that the Executive is confident of a favorable trend for human rights in Argentina. We recognize there are those who do not want good relations between our two countries. Actions may take place outside the control of Argentina which, nevertheless, affect the climate for relations. We had hoped that the Christmas amnesty would have helped us to demonstrate to Congress that resumption of normal relations is justified. Then we had the disappearance of mothers and nuns and we could not demonstrate a positive trend. Mr. Newsom said that all you can tell me regarding future hopes for normalization, including control over disappearances plans for the release of prisoners, right of option plans. TOWFIDENTIAL - N.ODIS CONFI - DEWfAfc - - NODIS .3 will help me to present a positive picture when I report to Washington. President Videla responded that Argentina confronted two types of subversive action: one armed and the other ideological. Both sought to destroy the Argentine way of life and seriously undermined the governing institutions. The armed forces had to step in to save the country. Having engaged in combat, borne the brunt of subversive action, and proven to be the only unified institutions, the armed services could not now risk internal disunity (within the military) and destabilization in order to prove Argentina is "western'*. Argentina had had no choice but to adopt certain measures. These were matters of Argentine internal affairs . Videla stated that Argentina will have full democracy when its house is in order, economically, socially, politically, and in the field of internal security. He would not be sincere if he were to give dates and nimibers in order to save Mr. Newsom's visit. President Videla stated there are no "loose groups" operating any longer. He added that the "right of option" would be applied with increasing generosity. As an example of those we are interested in, Videla referred to a recent German request for information on eight of their citizens, six of whom have been charged and are being tried, one who has disappeared, and one who is a two-time murderer who was released in the 1973 amnesty and jailed again by the military government. This latter individual cannot be brought to trial legally by the military govern- ment because of the amnesty, yet he is unquestionably dangerous to society. Mr. Newsom thanked Videla for his comments but noted the American tendency to ask for statistics and figures. Because we do get information from sometimes inaccurate sources, Mr. Newsom asked for statistics on detainees and a guess on the number of releases that might occur over time. Newsom suggested this information might be given to him later in the day. CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS NODIS -ettn • 4 Mr. Newsom referred to four categories of detainees, accord- ing to the Minister of Interior: — those arrested under military law and tried by military courts; — those being held for terrorist acts against whom there is insufficient evidence for a conviction; -- those who are being tried under civilian law and courts ; and -- those who will be permitted to exercise the "right of option" . The President observed that 2,000 of 3,200 prisoners were arrested before March 24, 1976. All these cases are under review. He could not say how many of the cases would be subject to military courts and how many to civilian courts. The review would determine who should be held because they are dangerous and who can be released or given option. In answer to the Under Secretary’s question, Videla responded that those being examined by the review commission do not have access to counsel or the right to appear personally before the commission. Videla said the com- mission is not a court. Mr. Newsom asked if President Videla might give us an idea of how many prisoners might be released by August 1 or September 15. Videla replied that commitments of this kind would be difficult. Mr. Newsom continued, asking whether the release of 500 prisoners might be possible in 1978. President Videla stated that there would be an important number of releases and options by Christmas. President Videla acknowledged that a U.S. parole iprogram would help to implement Argentina's right of option program. As Mr. Newsom moved to Siam up his impressions, President Videla said that he wanted to place a positive weight on the Under Secretary's scale. Argentina would facilitate a visit by the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and this decision will be communicated to the lAHRC in June when Foreign Minister Montes travels to the UNGA. Until then, / Videla asked that this decision be held confidentially, f CONFIDEN T lAi: ' - NODIS ■ COHFIDENTIAL - NODIS 5 Mr. Newsom then outlined positive signs, notably Minister Harguindeguy ' s decision to enforce humanitarian treatment of detainees by the police and security forces and Argentina's willingness to accelerate the "right of option" if we receive more prisoners. Newsom said he would have difficulty, however, with the question of indefinite detentions. After discussing the desirability of calls on the Supreme Court and other Junta members, Mr. Newsom said he would paint an honest picture of his conversations. Whatever decision is reached by the United States Executive, it would not reflect a lack of interest in Argentina. A decision would be made in light of the total political circumstances in the Executive and Congress. He noted that if progress continues, we will seek to reverse the Kennedy/Humphrey Amendment but that will take time and probably cannot be faced until next year. One way or another, Mr. Newsom promised that Ambassador Castro would convey the results of this trip. CONFIDENTIAL - NODIS UNCLASSIFIED 81. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, May 25, 1978, 1737Z 4040 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860101-2444. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 4 cowrapewTiAL ■" COMPI B BfTiatf PAGE 01 BUEHOS 04040 01 OP 02 2S2043Z ACTION NODS-00 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /OOl » --117663 252048Z /70 O 2S1737Z MAY 78 PM AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE SASHDC IMMEDIATE 5841 OO H-f IPBW TI AT : SECTION 1 OP 2 BUENOS AIRES 4040 NODIS FRC»f UNDERSECRETARY NEHSOM DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROKN DOD AND CHAIRMAN UCS 1. SUM4AEY: AFTER DAY OF EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS IN BUENOS AIRES, I CMNCDUDE THAT FAVORABLE STEPS ARK BEING TAKEN IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD IN ARGENTINA AND THAT PRESIDENT VIDELA, AT LEAST. WISHES THIS TREND TO CONTINUE. PICTURE EMERGING IN CMS AREA - PROCESSING OF DETAINEES - LESS CLEAR AND WE HERE ABLE TO GET NO NUMERICAL COMMITMENTS ON RELEASES. fKIST POSITIVE NEW ELEMarr WAS PRESIDENT'S CONFIDING IN US THAT HE HAS INSTRUCTED FOREIGN MINISTER AT OAS SESSIO) IN JUNE TO ANNOUNCE ARGENTINA'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE VISIT FROM OAS HIRIAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. ON THIS BASIS, j. Alt RECCXmENDlIK; THAT AMBASSAIX>R CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM VIDELA PRIVATELY THAT, ONCE THIS ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE, HE WILL, AFTER CONGRESSIONAL CCWSULTATIONS. RESTOIE SALE OP MILITARY TRAINING. END SUMMARY. 2. ON MAY 24, AMBASSADOR, FRED ROHOON, AND I MET SUCCESSIVELY WITH UNDERSECRETARY ALLARA AND GROUP AT POREIOT OFFICE, FORIGK MINISTER MONTES, MINISTER OP INTERIOR HARGUINDIGY, PRESIDENT VIDELA, PRESIDENT OF SUPREME COURT HEREDIA, AIR FORCE CHIEF AOOSTI AND ADMIRAL MASSERA, NAVY CHIEF.- THESE SBSSICWS WERE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER MEETING WITH CUNFiUKNTlSn- COtUlDSHTTg C PAGE 02 BUENOS 04040 01 OP 02 252043Z INTERIOR MINISTER AND GENERAL VIOLA DURING RECEPTION AT RESIDENCE IN EVENING. 3. MY APPROACH IN EACH MEETING WAS TO STATE THAT MY VISIT HAS MANIFESTATION OF DESIRE WITHIN USG FOR NORMAL REL- TIOHS WITH IMPORTANT LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY, BUT THAT SUCH RELATIONS HIRE NOT POSSIBLE IN LIGHT OF WIDESPREAD U.S. CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERCEPTICSJ OF SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. I WAS IN BUENOS AIRES TO EXAMINE WHETHER ARGENTINE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD WAS SUCH AS TO JTOTIFY IN EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS RELEASE OF OUTSTANDING ARGENTINE ORDERS. WE UNDERSTOOD WHAT ARGENTINA HAD BEEN THROUGH AND AGREED ON DESIRABILITY CLOSE RELATIONS THESE TWO SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN NATIONS, BUT POLITICAL REALITIES IN BOTH CCXINTIIES APPEARED TO PLACE LIMITS C»f WHAT WE COULD DO. 4. BXIM BANK LOANS WERE RAISED ONLY IN FOREIGN OFFICE MEETING. I EXPLAINED BANK'S DIFFICULTIES IN PROCEEDING WHILE ITS LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS AND IN FACE STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS FEELINGS, BUT EMPHASIZED FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN MADE. I HAD PEELING THIS NOT MAJOR LEVERAGE POINT WITH GOA. THEY HAVE AMPLE OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND PINANCll®, EXCEPT POSSIBLY, FOR $200,000,000 COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT ORDER. 5. QUITE APART FROM OBVIOUS INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatridc, 4/24/2017 http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/Doc View.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 5/21/2013 Document View Page 2 of 4 us BECAUSE OF MILITARY SUPPLY. I FOUND, I«)HE THAN I HAD EXPECTED, FSELIKG THAT RELATIONS MITH US WERE IMPORTANT FOR THEIR OWN SAKE. THERE IS MYSTIQUE ABOUT U.S. HERE WHICH IS IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN DECISIONS THEY MAKE. 6. FROM CONVERSATKWS, THESE POSITIVE ELEMENTS EMERGED {IN ADDITION TO ACTIONS ON TIMEHKAN, DEUTSCH, AND DECEMBER RELEASES) ; eeilFI P BWTTAL' ' tfaW F IDEW T IKg PAGE 03 BUENOS 04040 01 OF 02 252043Z A. PRESIDENT INFORMED US IN CONFIDENCE (WHICH I PROMISED TO RESPECT) ARGENTINA WOUU} ANNOUNCE ITS WILLINGNESS RECEIVE OAS HUMAN RIGHTS CCN(HISSI(Rf AT MEETING IN JUNE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DECISION HE MADE AS RESULT MY VISIT. IN EARLIER MEETING WITH FOREIGN OFFICE HE HAD BEEN INFORMED ARGENTINA UNHAPPY WITH OAS COMMISSKMU BECAUSE THEY HAD INTERRUPTED DIALOGUE TO PRESS FOR VISIT. I HAD MADE CLEAR IK THAT AND OTHER CONVERSATICaiS IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHED TO VISITS BY OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS. B. MINISTER OF INTERIOR IN RECENT SPEECH TO POLICE CHIEFS HAS EMPHASIZED NEED FOR HUWUfE TREATMENT OF ALL ARRESTED PERSONS. SIMILAR WORD APPARENTLY HAS QOSB OUT MORS QUIETLY TO ARMY. THERE APPEARS DEFINITE OIHINDTKRI REPORTS ANTI- TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DISAPPEARANCE. (IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT, I ASKED FOR ACCURATE DATA ON DETAINEES. MINISTER OF INTERIOR HANDED ME FACT SHEET IN EVENING STATING THAT 3.363 PERSONS ARE PRESENTLY DETAINED -- 1.544 APPREHENDED SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER IN MARCH OF 1976. THE REMAINDER BEFORE THAT DATE. CLAIM IS MADE THAT 3.328 PEOPLE ARRESTED FOR "TERROHIST" ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM CUSTODY (2,554 OF THEM SINCE THE MILITARY TAKEOVER), AND THAT A TOTAL OF 1,679 ADDITIONAL HAVE BEEN SENTENCED OR RELEASED THROUGH JUDICIAL PROCESS, CIVIL MID MILITARY. (OF THESE CASES, 911 HAVE BEEN TRIED SINCE MARCH OF 1976.) THE FACT SHEET STATES THAT 600 PEOPLE HAVE BESI PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY UNDER *RIGHT OF OPETION". 160 FOREIGNERS EXPELLSb, AND 58 PERSONS HAVE DIED WHILE IN CUSTODY. (NOTE: NO DATES HERE GIVEN FOR THESE LAST FIGURES, NOR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES EXPLAINED.) MINISTER AND TOREK® OFFICE OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGED FAR LARGER NUMBERS OF DISAPPEARED. REFERRING TO LISTS PUBLISHED IN PRESS BY HOMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS THEY SAID THEY WERE NOW SEEKING TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY SO THEY COULD RESPOND TO RELATIVES.) -eOMWBBNTnOS CUNFlUUN'X'fAi; PAGE 04 BUENOS 04040 01 OF 02 252043Z C. CASES OF ALL SOME 3,300 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE NOW BEING REVIEWED TO DETERMINE WHICH SHALL BE GIVEN RIGHT OF OPTIC®, WHICH RELEASED, AND WHICH REMANDED TO CIVILIAN COURTS. D. PRESIDENT VIDELA STATED HE WOULD SPEED UP EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF OPTIC® IF WE WERE TO OFFER MORE SPACES IN U.S. (I DID NOT MAKE ANY COMMITMENT IN VIEW MY UNCERTAINTY AS TO NNN TSJITFTDENTliar http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_.., 5/21/2013 Document View Page 3 of 4 PASS 01 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252044Z ACTION NODS-00 INFO OCT- 01 ISO-00 /OOl W 117673 2520S2Z /70 O 251737Z MAY 78 FH AMEHBASSY BOEmS AIRES TO SECSTATE KASBDC IMMEDIATE SS42 c O N P“I D 2 K T 1 X“i: SECTIOS 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 4040 NODIS FROM UNDERSECRETARY NENSCM DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY BROHN DOD AND CHAIRMAN JCS HHAT ACTICWf ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY TAKE IN PENDING PROPOSAL FOE 500 RIGHT OF OPTION PAROLES.) E. PRESIDENT VXDELA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF JUNTA MADE CLEAR THEIR GOAL OP ULTIMATE RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE. WHILE IT HAY BE SUPERFICIAL IMPRESSION, I DID NOT GAIN FEELING THAT PERSONALITIES IN JUNTA WERE SEEKING TO RETAIN POSITION FOR OWN PERSONAL POLITICAL OR FINANCIAL GAIN AS IN SCME OTHER COUNTRIES. I WAS IMPRESSED BY FACT THAT EACH HAS DATS FOR STEPPING DOWN FROM JUNTA HOLE. HOWEVER WE MAY DISLIKE THE WAY THEY CARRY IT OUT, THERE DOES SEEM DEFINITE FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGItiQ COUNTRY BACK TO NORMAL POLITICAL PROCESSES. F. ICRC VISITS CCBJTINUB TO PRISONS WITH EFFECT ON CCttlDITIONS. 7. THERE ARE, ON THE OTHER HAND, LESS POSITIVE ELQiSNTS: A. THE DETAINEE REVIEW PROCESS IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE ONE ONLY; THERE IS NO OPPORTUNITY FOR ACCUSED TO APPEAR OR BE REPRESENTED AS DOSSIERS ARB REVIEWED. CUHfflPEN'nag ■eew F i oE WTi ftc- PAGE 02 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252 044 Z B. PRESIDENT AND OTHERS HERE UNWILLING HAKE COMMIT HENT OH TIME TABLE FOR REVIEW, ALTHOIX3H THEY SAID RELEASE OF ADDITION 500 BY END OF 1978 WAS *REAS(»IABLE SXPECTATIOT . * C. IT IS UNCLEAR HOW LONG THOSE WILL BE DETAINED WHO ARE SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, BUT ON WHOM THERE IS INSUFFICIENT evidence to CONVICT IN COURT . I HATOIERED HARD ON DHACCEPTA BILITY THIS SITUATICRJ IN US AND HAVE, AT LEAST, RAISED THEIR CONSCIOUSNESS OF' THIS PROBLEM AREA. SINCE TOTAL REVIBN STILL GOING (»l IT IS DIFFICULT TO STATE HOW MANY MAY ULTIMATELY FALL IN THIS CATEGORY OF INDEFINITE DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL. D. THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE ARRESTS UNDER STATE OF SIEGE ORDERS. PRESIDENT OF ONE COMMUNIST PARTY DOMINATED HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION HAS ARRESTED FEW DAYS BEFORE MY ARRIVAL. I POINTED OUT THIS WAS EXACTLY KIND OF EVENT WHICH SET BACK EFFORTS TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS. HE HAS RELEASED t-asT NIGHT (MAY 25) AFTER BEING HELD AT POLICE PRECINCT STATION. E. REPORTS OF TORTURE CONTINUE TO BE RECEIVED BUT CONFIRMATION IS DIFFICULT. 8. IT WOULD BE RASH TO PREDICT THAT WE HILL BE UNINTER- RUPTED POSITIVE TREND IN HlDtAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA. HARDLINERS WITHIN REGIME WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO SANCTION OR TAKE REPREHENSIBLE ACTICSJS WHICH WILL GAIN WORLD ATTENTION. CCHITROL OVER ELEMENTS AT LOWER ECHELONS IS FAR FROM COMPLETE. NEVER THELESS, THERE IS ON PART OF PRESIDENT VIDELA AND MEMBERS OF JUNTA I MET CLEAR DESIRE TO IMPROVE SITUATICET. SUCCESSION OF DISCUSSIONS WITH US OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT CARTER, HAS clearly RAISED CCMSCIOUSNESS OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS AND ht^://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://S AS/SAS.dbo.SAS_. .. 5/2 1/201 3 Document View Page 4 of 4 ! HAS, I BEIiIEVE HAD POSITIVE IHPACT. AMBASSADOR CASTRO HAS EFFECTIVELY CONTIITOBD DIALOGUE AMD IS IN POSITION TO OJNTINUE AND. PARTICULARLY, TO RAISE INDIVIDUALY ACTS WHICH REPRESENT SET BACK TO OUR EFFORTS. -COBFTDSimSir -coRrrnENrnor PAGE 03 BUENOS 04040 02 OP 02 252044Z 9 . OUT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS, I REACH CONCLUSION THAT TRENDS HERE AND IMPORTANCE OF RESPC^ING TO ARGENTINE DESIRE FOR NORMAL RELATIONS JUSTIFY («3DEST STEP. WITHOUT SUCH STEP, I CANNOT SAY OUR ACCESS HERE WOnai BE SERIOUSLY REDUCED, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT WITH SUCH STEP OUR LEVERAGE IN HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CCWTINUB AND COOPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS (SUCH AS NUCLEAR QUESTIONS) MORE LIKELY. 10. PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO PERMIT VISIT BY OAS COMMISSICaSt GIVES US POSITIVE STEP ON WHICH TO BASE POSITIVE RESPONSE. TO LET HIM KNOW THAT WE ARE RESPONDING, PROPOSE THAT AMBASSADOR CASTRO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM HIM IMMEDIATELY THAT, AS RESULT VISIT, I AM RBCCKMENDING THAT, ONCE THIS ANNOUNCraiENT IS MAOB‘, WE WILL CmSULT WITH KEY MEMBERS OF CCfflGRESS AND, FOLLOWING Surn CONSULTATTOVS WILL RESUME SALE OF MILITARY TRAIKll^. Ws' WXLL XHEREAFTBR, aNlTIMOE TU EXAMINE SITUATION AND, IF POSITIVE TRENDS OaJTINUE (PARTICULARLY ON DETAINEES) , HILL SEEK TO RESPOND WITH OTHER RELEASES. 11. AT SAME TIME, I AM SUGGESTING TO AMBASSAIX« THAT HE CONTINUE, AS HE HAS. TO POINT OUT IMMEDIATELY THOSE ACTIONS WHICH WILL COMPLICATE OUR EFFORTS (StX» AS FURTHER ARRESTS, REPORTS OF NEW DISAPPBAR^CES , ETC.) 12. GENERAL 8URUT AND ADMIRAL SCHULLER WILL MAKE CALLS TOMORROW ON SERVICE CHIEFS AMD WILL CONVEY MESSAGE SIMILAB MINE (PARA 3 ABOI^) :. THEY WILL HAKE MO COMMITMENTS ON FUimE SALES OR GIVE INDICATION OUR CONCLUSIONS. THEIR VISITS WILL BE HBLFPFUL IN GIVING US FURTHER FEED BACK OH YESTERDAY'S CC»VERSATIONS . 13. 1 WILL MEET WITH U.S. CORRESPONDENTS IN BUENOS AIRES C»l BACKGROUND BASIS BEFORE M Y DEPARTURE EMB ASSY WILL S END REPORT. MY PLAN IS MERELY TO OUTLINE PROBLEM WITHyUT INDICATING WHERE I COME OUT OR WHAT I AM RECOMMENDING TO DEPARTMENT . CUNFIUENTIST t l UMFIPEN ' IIAL PAGE 04 BUENOS 04040 02 OF 02 252044Z 14 . I AM ALSO MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES FHCT4 HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING "MOTHERS OF DISAPPEARED" GROUP, AND PRIVATELY WITH BUSJOS AIRES HERALD DIRECTOR COX, NOTED FOR HIS COURAGEOUS PUBLIC ADVOCACY OP HUMAN RIGHTS. CASTRO CUHimENTTK C NNN eeNHPewTmt: http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/iii/\iew/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS ... 5/21/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter Washington, May 30, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 20, Evening Reports (State), 5/78. Secret. Carter wrote, “Cy J” in the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM FOR; PROM: THE PRESIDENT Cyrus Vance C*^* Omitted here is mataial unrelated to Argentina ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina Argentina ^ We have had our first indication that Under Secretary Newsom's trip to Argentina may be sparking needed action on human rights. Subsequent to News<»i's return. Ambassador Castro informed Videla that military training would be resumed when Argentina announced publicly that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission was being invited. Videla was obviously pleased, and responded that in addition to the announcement, positive strides would be made in prisoner releases before September 30, and that by year end an impressive jiraaber- of- People would be released. Such action could enanie us to resume some - 3 - shipments to Argentina and hopefully ultimately create conditions which could allow us to recommend repeal of the Kennedy /Humphrey new eucms embargo. Videla * seems genuinely to want improved relations with the OS, and the question is whether his political situation will give him room to take the necessary steps. Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina UNCLASSIFIED 83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, June 26, 1978, 2313Z 162533 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265-0540. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom; cleared by Schneider, Bushnell, McGiffert, Oxman, in H and S/S-0, and for information in EB; and ^proved by Newsom. UNCLASSIFIED ■Document View Page 1 of 2 S E CRK T EXDIS ■aSCRET P&SE 01 STATE ie2533 ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R DRAFTEO BY FiDDNEWSOHiCHG AFPROVS) BY P - MS NENSOM HA - MSCHNEIDER EB (INFO) ARA - HR BUSHNSUi DOD/OSD - MR MCGIFPERT H - MR COTTER D - MR OXMAN S/S-Oi SCASTRODALE 048292 270013Z /62 0 2S2313Z JON 78 ZPP4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEHBASSY BUWiS AIRES NIACT IWlBDIAfE ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 S B C ~ R ' ' S -T~ STATE 162S33 EXDIS E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS; SHUN, AR, MMOL SUBJECT :Hro(AN RIGHTS AND U.S. PROGRAMS IN ARGENTINA REP: STATE 16150::' 1. ON BASIS FACT THAT lAHRC DOBS NOT FEEL ABLE ACCEPT CONDITIONAL ARGENTINA INVITATION .-“ISCtlTART aJS DF- CIDED THAT; (A) HE CANNOT GO FORWARD, AS HOPED, WITH MILITARY TRAINIIR3 PACKME AND DEFENSE IS BEING INF0RME5?J SECRE T - S E CRE T PAGE 02 STATE 162533 (B) IN RECOGNITION OP MODEST IMPROVEMENTS, WE WILL (AFTER CONGRESSIONU CONSULTATIONS) RELEASE SAFETY ITEMS (LISTED SBPTBLJ INCLUDING COMPASSES FOR VESSELS OF U.K. MANUFACTURE; (C) HE HILL INFORM EXIM BANK THAT, m FOREIGN POLICY GROUNDS, HE RBCCN91END AGAINST FINANCING FOR ARGENTINA AT THIS TIME (THIS APPLIES PRIMARILY TO ALLIS CHALMERS APPLICATION FOR YACIRETA HYDRO- »OJECT,, (D) WE RECXJMMBND AGAINST EXIM^INIWCING-OR .AIR4HAFfl BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO EXPORT IF THEY CAN BE PRIVATELY FINANCri). 2. DEPARTMENT HOPES ARRANGE CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTA- TIONS, INCLUDING SENATOR KENNEDY, ON THESE CASES THIS WEEK. 3. EMBASSY MAY INFORM GOA, STRESSING DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE EXTEND NORMAL INVITA- TION TO lAHRC (ALONG LINES OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN htto://smartarchive.state.seov.cov/ui/view/DocView.asDX?kev=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.S AS ... 4/22/201 3 Document View Page 2 of 2 COUNTRIES) AND HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN ABUS MOVE APPRECIABLY ON EITHER RELEASES OP DETAINEES OR ESTABLISHMENT OP RESPONSIVE MACHINERY FOR THOSE SEEKING INFORMATION ON RELATIVES MHO HAVE DISAPPEARED. OF COURSE, ANY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE lAHRC AND THE GOA ENABLI1K3 THE COMMISSION TO GO TO ARGENTINA WOUU) BE VXENPn A S A POSIT IVE D.EV1LOP- MENT'. THESE POINTS STRESSED To DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ALLARA AS REPORTED REFTEL. (FYI: ARGENTINA ALSO HAS NOT HALTED ILLEGAL DETENTIONS AND DISAPPEARANCES. SBeiU ft ■SE C RE T PAGE 03 STATE 162533 END FYI) 4 . FYI ; ANY PROSPECT THAT WE MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED EXIH BANK FINANCING APART PROM HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS WAS ELIMINATED BY ALLARA' S INSISTENCE THAT GOA LOOKED UPON RESTRICTIONS ON EXIM FINANCING AS POLITICAL ACT AND CLEARLY SOUGHT APPROVAL OF SUCH FINANCI1K3 AS IN- DICATION OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE. END FYI. 5. EXIM HAS IHFOIU4ED BOTH ALLIS-CHALKERS AND BOEING OF DECISION. VMICE ' "S ' KCKB T NNN fleener EXDXS http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS^_... 4/22/2013 UNCUSSIFIED 84. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) Washington, Augi^t 9, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Inderflirth initialed the top right-hand comer of the memorandum. In the top right-hand comer of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, “What do we do to get hold of the initiative? ZB.” UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL GOMFIDBNT £Mi- ~ CDS August 9, 1978 MEMORflJIDUM FOR; FROM; SUBJECT; ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI DAVID AARON ROBERT PASTOR Argentina; Your Questions \J^ A ' You asked for three items on Argentina: (1) current status of the human rights situation in Argentina; (2) whether U.S. policy is in a bind with respect to Argentina and also the Southern Cone, and if so, how we got into it, and whether the NSC was involved; and (3) an alert item for the President. The itCTi for the President is at Tab a, The“otfier questions are answered below. I. Argentina *s Human Rights Situation ^ Argentina is still one of th e woijiilAJafiafc— serious human ' * rights problem countries. Just this month7*'^®t8S^5'*®^J^*’ national launched a major campaign world-wide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina's dismal record, which includes, since March 1976, 15,000 disappearances, 8-10,000 political prisoners, the majority of whom have not yet been charged; over 25 secret prison camps; and numerous documented stories of ari^st and torture. IQne ^report from our Embassy is at Tab B.i On ftiiman rights-related matters, world opinion always seems to lag behind the reality; Amnesty intends to correct that. While Argentina still has the worst record in the hemisphere, there has been some improvement in recent months. We under- stand that the Minister of Interior has instructed tne police, and reportedly the military, to curb excesses; arrests under executive power have decreased and lists of those detained have been published; and a limited right of option for political prisoners to request exile has been reinstituted. On a number of cases in which we have expressed special interest — Jacobo Timeinnan, Alfredo Bravo, 4 of 5 members of the Deutsch family — the Argentine Government has released them. II. U.S. Policy In recognition of this progress, we have switched from voting "no" on non-basic human needs loans in the IFI's to abstaining. GONFIDENTiair - GDS ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 COMFIDENgl - Mr - Gud f We have also approved the licensing of 16 safety-related munitions items from FMS, and are currently considering another group of requests. We have informed the Argentine government that if they reach agreement on terms for a visit by the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights/ and there is no deterioration in the human rights situation ^ we will go ahead with military training to them and will recommend that the Export- Import Bank permit two major credit sales. The most pressing deadline is October 1, 1978, when the Kennedy- Humphrey amendment prohibiting new anas transfers, and the Roybal amendment, eliminating grant military training to Argentina, come into effect. Both the Argentines and we are eager to take steps which would permit the enormous back-log of credit to be com- mitted before then. (There are over 75 pending FMS cases for $50 million and $150 million on the munitions control lists.) There are also funds for military training, which are being held up, and which the President noted (on June 29) that he had a "slight" inclination to find an excuse for approving. Our current objectives are to urge the GOA: (1) to permit the lAHRC to visit in accordance with the lAHRC's regulations; (2) to begin releasing large numbers of prisoners (without re- arresting them) I (3) to stop the disappearances and explain those which have occurred; and (4) to seek a return to the rule of^ law. Everything is stuck now pending Argentina's reaching agreement ( with the Inter-American Commission or moving on one of the other objectives above. This basic decision, made in accordance with various legislative requirements , was made State without con sulting J? Sfc. — III. Future O.S. Policy; Who Blinks at the Brink ? Have we gone too far? Have we pushed our policy beyond its effectiveness? Are we pushing the Argentines over the edge and jeopardizing our future relationship? Does the terror justify the repression? The last question is definitely the easiest. First of all. President Videla told our Ambassador in April 1978 that the war against subversion in Argentina had ended and that he wais working to restore the rule of law. Terrorism has not left Argentina, but it is now the exception, not the rule. And Videla, himself, admits that the war is over; we are just encouraging that he secure his own promise. But regardless, a central tenet of our human rights policy is that government- sanctioned repression never solves terrorism. As Vance said in his OAS speech last year, "The surest way to defeat terrorism is to promote justice. , . Justice that is summary undermines the future it seeks to promote. It produces only more violence..." — GONFIDEMTIA - L - GDS CONFIDEM'H Mr - GDS -3- I, myself, believe that we may have overloaded the circuits and pushed too far, but like our policy to the Soviet Union, there is a logic to it which is difficult to argue. Indeed, it is even more difficult to change direction than with the Soviets because there are laws on the books which mandate that with respect to Argentina we tie our X-M credits, oppose bans in the IFI's, and condition our arms sales. Anything less, or a step backwards from the place we currently find oxir self, would be judged as a Presidential retreat lust as siirely as a different decision on Dresser. ^Personally, I am most disturbed ab out the decisio n not to 1 finance $270 mill ion worth of Export-Import Bank credits. rr'dflh'T I'ftW t-liflit this is either a legitimate or an effective [Tinstrtnaent , though I do agree with State that the law aave_u3 little choice. The ^decision did have an unintended positive impact in that it has finally aroused the business conraiunity (there are $600 million worth of credit applications pending in X-M) , and they have descended on me, and I have deflected them to Capitol Hill, where they helped defeat more restrictive amendments to the X-M bill last week. I had sensed that we were approaching the brink when Newsom told me he had decided to hold everything up until the Argentines agreed to a visit by the Inter-American Commission. Newsom, Bushnell, and our Ambassador Castro all thought Argentina would reach agreement soon, but I had my doubts and still have them. Vaky agrees with me, and we both are looking into ways to step back from the brink without appearing as if it is we who blinked first. It is not at all clear that the Argentines won't blink first. For one thing, the Europeans made a joint demarche in March, and they seem to be behind us. Secondly, world public opinion is becoming conscious that Argentina is this year's Chile, and the Argentines have become so nervous that they took out a half dozen pages of ads in the Times and have given at least $1 million to a Madison Avenue P.R. firm to improve its image. Most important, Videla, for the first time in a very long time, is in charge. And he keeps saying he is eager to move forward on his own to restore the rule of law. As he takes those steps, I will make sure that we are quick to respond. So I will work closely with Pete Vaky to try to develop a strategy to make sure we don't totter over the brink. Since we will have to act before October 1, I am conscious of a quick turn-around, and as soon as we have a strategy, I will get back to you. IV . The Southern Cone; Are We Winning or Losing ? I think Kissinger's observation that if we don't turn our policy around to the Southern Cone soon, we will have them allied against CONFIDENT lAb - GDS CONFIDENTlMr - GDS -4- us is out-of-date and wrong. For a short time, in early 1977, the Southern Cone countries — led by Brazil but including^ Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay — tried to establish a bloc to confront our human rights policy. Because these governments distrusted each other more than they despised President Carter, the movement did not get off the ground, and indeed they were all over the lot at the O.A.S. General Ass^ibly. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are big countries with eKtremely narrow, ultra-conservative authoritarian governments. The narrowness of their view is reflected in, among other things, the pettiness of their international disputes with one another. Chile and Araentina have almost_gone to war over the B eaole Channel, and BrazilT and Argentina have sWainec tneir relations almost to the breaking point on the issue of water rights. Our relations with Brazil are now better than they have been at any time since January 1977, and they are as good as can be expected given our non-proliferation policy, and the deliberate chill which Silveira injects into the relationship. We have tried through the working groups and the visits by the President and Vance to develop a cooperative relationship, but that will have to await Brazil's new government next year. What Kissinger failed to see, after completing his talks with the military leaders in Argentina and Brazil, is that Jimmy Carter has inspired a younger generation of Latin Americans; no other American President in this century has done that. Even Jack Kennedy, who was loved in Latin America, was suspected in the universities because of his strong anti-Conmunism and the Bay of Pigs intervention. Carter is clearly viewed as a man of great moral stature in Latin America, and that inspires the young and the democratic and embarrasses, and unfortunately, sometimes infuriates some of the conservatives and the military. Carter's stature has translated into real influence unlike any- thing the U.S. has had since we turned in our gunboats, and at the same time, it has given the U.S. a future in Latin America, which we had almost lost. The best indication that the U.S. is winning in the Southern Cone, even though governmental antagonism is evident, is that the Argentines are still hungry for a return to normalcy in our relations. They use every opportunity and every channel — including Kissinger — to try to get Carter's approval. Thirty, twenty, even ten years ago, the idea that the Argentines v«3uld ask the U.S. to bestow upon them the mantle of legitimacy would have been unthinkable, even laughable. Today, it's real. The Argentines are a proud people, but they are also embarrassed by the human rights situation. They are also more sophisticated CONFIDENTIAL - - GDS GONFIDBHraMr - GDS ^ 5 _ than in the days of Peron when they looked for foreign scape- goats. There are limits to their sophistication, no doubt, and I will take care that we don't cross them, but I think it would be a mistake and an injustice if we turned our policy around at this time. GOIilFIDEWTIAE - GDS UNCLASSIFIED 85. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, August 10, 1978, 2100Z 6232 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 18, Memos to Secretary 1978, 1 of 2. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to USICA. UNCLASSIFIED CONF I DENT I AL 2 of 4 CQNPIDSMT ' fft ' ii - PAGE 01 BUENOS 06232 102137Z ACTION ARA-14 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 SP-02 SS'15 HA-05 AID-05 10-13 XMB-02 EB-08 COME-00 TRSE-00 /085 W 033212 102143Z /61 O R 102100Z AUG 78 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SBCSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6958 INFO USICA WASHDC C 0 N F -I D ' E N ' T" I A li- BUENOS AIRES 6232 E.O. 11652: GDS TAGS: SHUM, HR, AR SUBJECT: DERIAN TESTIMONY TO HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 1. PRENSA, CLARIN AND BUENOS AIRES HERALD CARRIED PROMINENTLY UPI REPORT OF TESTIMONY BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY PATRICIA DERIAN BEFORE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE,. SAYING DERIAN "CHARGED THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT WITH 'SYSTEMATIC TORTURES' AND 'SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. ■ AND CLAIMED THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT SIGNS THAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA IS IMPROVING." 2. "IN TESTIMONY BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MISS DERIAN DECLARED THAT SO MUCH EVIDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ARGENTINA HAS ACCUMULATED THAT TO ARGUE ABOUT IT WOULD BE A ■ WASTE OF TIME ' . " 3. ACCORDING TO UPI DERIAN ALSO SAID THE GOA HAS FAILED TO CARRY OUT ITS COMMITMENT TO INVITE THE lAHRC TO VISIT ARGENTINA AND SAID ARGENTINA HAS A CON FI DEW TI AL CONg I ' D ' ENT ' IAL ' ADP Declassification Review DFa A^JSIRFD PAGE 02 BUENOS 06232 102137Z by John Fitzpatrick. 4/24/2017 VERY SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM. 4. HERALD HEADLINED "HARSH STATEMENT ON ARGENTINA IN THE U.S.," AND PRENSA "ACCUSATION COW PIDE WTIAt 2 Of 4 C0NFID5NTIAL 3 of 4 AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT . " IN AN UNUSUAL MOVE , PRENSA COLUMNIST MANFRED SCHONFELD STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE REPORTED DERI AN REMARKS IN WHAT WE EXPECT WILL BE THE FIRST OF A NUMBER OF EDITORIAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. BESIDE THE DERIAN STORY IN LA PRENSA WAS A UPI PHOTO OF A PHILADLEPHIA COPyT^USHING HIS FOOT DOWN ON THE HEAD OF ONE OF THE MOVE GROUP ARRESTED TITLED "REPRESSION AGAINST EXTREMI STS IN THE U.S." 5. WE RECEIVED THE WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND USINFO 092045Z BRIEF REPORT ON SOME OF HER TESTIMONY.- HOWEVER, THE LATTER DOES NOT CONTAIN THE QUOTE THAT UPI FEATURED.- WE HAVE ASKED ICA TO PROVIDE IF AVATT.ABLE THE VERBATIM TESTIMONY ON ARGENTINA ASAP. 6. COMMENT; IN THE ALREADY OVERHEATED ATMOSPHERE I BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT EVEN SHARPER GOA AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE DERIAN REMARKS THAN WE HAD AFTER THE EXIM BANK REFUSAL OF CREDITS TO ALLIS CHALMERS WHICH WAS PERCEIVED HERE AS A PUBLIC AND FORMAL ACCUSATION BY THE USG OF ARGENTINA. THIS IS THE SECOND BOMBSHELL WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD. I ATTENDED A RECEPTION THIS MORNING SPONSORED BY THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE AT NEWBERRY (AEROPARQUE) . I WAS THE ONLY AMBASSADOR AND ALSO ONLY U.S. EMBASSY STAFF PERSON INVITED. I FELT AS THOUGH I WAS WALKING INTO PROVERBIAL LION'S DEN. IMMEDIATE REFERENCE WAS MADE TO PAT DERIAN 'S ALLEGED STATEMENTS. GREAT CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT A TOTAL DETERIORATION IN USG-GOA RELATIONS. THE ARGENTINE CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED IN A TACTFUL AND CO WF r P g W T IAL e OW F IPEW TI AL PAGE 03 BUENOS 06232 102137Z COURTEOUS MANNER AND NOT IN ANGER, AS I HAD ANTICIPATED. I DO ANTICIPATE THAT WHEN THE WHOLE AFFAIR IS BETTER DIGESTED ALL HELL WILL BREAK LOSE. 7. MY"GUT REACTION" IS I MAY BE CALLED IN AGAIN BY THE FONMIN AS TO THE SOURCE OF ASSISTANT SECRET^^RY'S INFORMATION ON SYSTEMATIC TORTURE AND SUMMARY EXECUTIONS.' I FEAR GOA'S ASSUMPTION IS INFO CAME FROM THIS EMBASSY. GOA MAY WELL DEMAND THAT USG SUPPORT ITS PUBLIC ACCUSATION WITH EVIDENCE. 8. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON LINE I MIGHT TAKE WITH GOA. CASTRO CONFIDENT I AL 3 of 4 UNCLASSIFIED 86 . Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, August 14, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Inderfurth initialed the top right- hand comer of the memorandum. Brzezinski wrote in the top right-hand comer of the memorandum: “RI DR item for the P.” UNCLASSIFIED COPYCARTEftUBRAfSIf . V. 4877 Add-on NiEMORANl^M eOHFIDEWTIA ir - GDS ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL August 14, 1978 ZBIGNIEW BRZE21NSKI ROBERT PASTOR /! ^^1 V U.S. Policy to Argentina H rr M- This Diemorandum responds to your questions and conmients on my memo of August 9 on Argentina.. ~~ You asked how we can get hold of the policy and also asked me for a memo on the fact that State did not consult with NSC in selecting its policy towards Argentina. I don't think it would be productive to send a memo- I randum to the Secretary expressi'ne displeasure for not being consulted on a previous decision. On Friday, I spoke to Vaky about Argentina. I asked him as well as Christopher's office, to keep me fully informed, atj.d I expected that I would be asked to attend the meeting to discuss it. I wasn't, but Vaky brought me up-to-date. He said that he and Newsom had agreed to [send Vaky to Argentina at the end of the month to make one last attempt at breaking the impasse in U.S .-Argentine relations. "In order to Improve the prospects of a successful meeti ng between V akv and. Videla, they hope to obtain State-NSC approval of several items in the munitions control list. COdld then be presented as a positive gesture of our interest, in good relations. In addition, it is vitally important that we make an attempt at mediating between an Inter-American* Commission on Human Rights and the Argentine Government in a way which permits the latter to save face and the former to pre- serve its institutional integrity. Vaky also thinks that a Presidential letter reiterating the President's interest in good relations with I Argentina would be useful, and while I think it is also a good idea, I I think we should wait until we have looked at the whole range of . ' decisions that need to be made before we consider a letter. "-I had originally planned to recommend that you send a memo to Vance which, in effect, requested that the next round of decisions on U.S. policy to Argentina would be made with full NSC involvement and con- sultation by the NSC, but after speaking with Vaky, and repeating your interest that we stay very much involved, he assured me that he would , keep' me Involved . I am not so certain that Dave Newsom, who made. the previous decisions without the NSC's involvement, is as interested as Vaky is. Perhaps a brief mention of this to the Secretary would be helpful. To the extent that I am involved. I will, of course, keep you fully informed. ■ CONFIDENTIAL - GDS “7 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 ty P UNCLASSIFIED 87. Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to Secretary of State Vance Washington, August 22, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78. Secret. UNCLASSIFIED VWASMINCTON. O C 20301 25iAUGlS7S ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Rizpatrick. 4/24/2017 Oear Cy; . . , ■ 4$ a follow-vip to the Aoipust 17 dUcuasicn hetween you, ?hlg. an^ . rte'-,tb<.wlthdr^vfroQ>UM(<%l|>'in^^ ^ . just the first steps whieh the 60A will feel forced to . take\ unless /we ^ nodetata'eur approach, Wle,.qpr^huflan rights policy' ■ ii very In^rtant, we need also to take into account that Argentina ts/ a nation with reside t ins our i^n^pfoliferation ■^t a’:gp-:It-a1one Arg^tinavr*--irthethiervthat-^--rfil^t-.'-»eah^fOrwa!t|oh cMf dcstabilialng provocat ive stand "^fteaile''Chahnel isfue^-^ vit.thdri^.l the'IUo-pact , or ^enhan^d,^ ■' relations with Soviet hide If not Ih our interest, Rirther, it may well J>e at this pot At thdt some modification of our approach, if properly explained, will actiially help on the human rights Issues, f ynslcoffie Secretary %i^'s pro|x}sed Septen^^ But in addition, ednerete actfons^^l^ Ihi- the military side, 1 recommend we moderate our position hy a^rov I ng hefore Septenier 3^1 ali the pending /'Ai^«itine spare\pa«^s:-reduests, ;ihciudinE-hut sot' i'tmited' to-thdsd which are safety i^latedv, offering this 1 a gesture of hi S> good ' ■ faith., at'a ' time.- whea/tddft^' An&es Sador ':testro charagterlxes aS.^VjUt--' raged nationalism'^ Sweats to he the governing factor in xrgentTne politics. Aiso^ to the extent our law allows, T believe we should approve the pending requests to purchase PoO training courses. There have been several developments since a hold was put on these transactions. Argentine public reaction to the denial of the %t70 million EXlrt Sank loan for the hydroelectric project^and to the public testimony by fat Oerfan before the House Subcbniroi ttee on Inter-'American Affairs/ has been, as we understand it, very negative. N Ci. /./' ,\/’N:/ ^ -a ' IfS: A ■' GE^OiU. isGS^^siriCAria::,?:: Honorable Cyrus R. Vance Secretary of State lilash ingtOn , &. jC . 2©520 . |2 The terrorist bombing of /Wmirel Lambruschioi 's r«sidenGe,' resuitlng lii the ideath of hfe teeha^ge daughter, has’ also served to stT^^gthen the afgijpe^ minority hard-^line elementi of the Argent military that rdfofnis ere pren^tyre. The alleged Tyson stafl^nt reflectino USi support for the Hontonefo terror? star, even thOj^h totaHy false^ ha% dOrte ftirther SerlOtts harm to our efforts to prcHhote d^^eratlie-? tion, Ihe GW has. In feet, taken some positive sieps to the condltiens laid down durihg Dave Newsom's visit by inltTlting an invitatioh to the iANAG. by agreeing to a irajority of eondieiohs neOessary for such a visit, and by continuing to consider the remain- der. Finally* in view Of the new iunta-oresideot oOwer reVatiOnshio estahrished August A, power plays between the pres i cent and junta, ' and Within the junta Itself, will probahly continue for the near term* delaying the resolution of key pol icy Issues. Unltlce the EXIN Bank decision, our decision to withhold traTnlng and spare parts has hot been made public here or in Argentina. For this reason, i think we could safely modify our Current position without -seottlngfs.^^ do this- immediate ly or at the \lateiat hiy the Vaky visit because of the administfatiye lead-time prior to the legislaited embargo date of September 30 which .woui^ be needed to implement any go-ahead decision, in connection with such a decision we Could inform the' GOA privately that J (i) , we recognia* tbe ihtcrnai pol itical.dTffiCulties which have recently deveioped, (Z) we are offering these approvals a$ concrete eyidence of Our good faith and determination tO work together toward mutual objeccives, ahd (3) we hoge and expect tiiey will see fit to develop and ia4>isment a set of substantial htmtan rights initiatives soon. Slocerdly, UNCLASSIFIED 88 . Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, August 28, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 1-8/78. Confidential; Limdis. A copy was sent to Mathews. At the top right-hand comer of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezirwki placed a check mark and wrote the phrase “a compelling, forcefiil report. ZB.” UNCLASSIFIED 5115 3DC r f j MEMORANDUM 1 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONFIDEMT I AL/ LIMDIS XGDS-4 August 28, MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZ INSKI ROBERT PASTOR Human Rights i^Argentina Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single- spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co- President and one of the founders of the Arge ntine Perma- nent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself reading through the entire 14-page Memcoh r '(hHougn i naa intended only to skim it. / . Co J JL T ^ Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay A the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have pre- pared below a short summary of that Haacon. Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance" — plain- clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. Then begins the horror. Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punish- ment. He himself was; — beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs; — subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed; — subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and then shoved into a bucket of boiling water; — subjected to "the submarine" — repeatedly being held under water until almost drowned. CONTTBEWTIAL/ LIMDIS XGDS-4 (Classified by Z. Brzezinski) ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 CONFIDBlf¥fM r / IiIMDIS . XGDS-4 Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to: — As he was moved from detention center to detention center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture. — Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was ap- plied? a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by and her boy friend shot when he objected? the group was beaten. Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a litany of questions about the activities and political affilia- tions of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session, Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded, heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired- Then he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and to detention. Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on an entirely different plane— as civilized people conducting a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner", and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would be found to have committed suicide. During his months in La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his own and worse. In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said he provided Jdiis infoinnation " to st^ow vou w hat you are f iaht ing for " . He asked tnat the ianoassy treat tne information careiuixy, "as my life is in your hands". cc: Jessica Tuchman COHFIPEKTTAL/ HMD IS XGDS-4 UNCUSSIFIED 89. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, August 31, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/77-12/78. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen and Denend. At the top right- hand comer of the first page of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “set up meeting, inch McGiffert, you, DA, & Vaky ZB.” UNCLASSIFIED 5150 ME^RANbUta r^TiONAL sEGURi'ry coungil August 31j» 197^ Mmo$mbm foe ; EECM : ' SUBJBCO?: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZII^I RbfiEBT PASTOR U. $/ Policy to Argentioa > '/•i) 0^- In my last ra^oranct'iM to you on this subjects I told yoo that Vaky had aaaured me hys would keep NSC fully inforifiod as we developed an av#jfall strategy to deal with our deterio- rating relationsi^ip y^ith Argentina. I regret that this has not been the case, ©ecisibns are beginning to bh ,made by the ^tate Department in a haphazard^ uncoordinated manner. I understand that 'Newsom has approved the licensing of several munition items, and today Christopher's staff called to inform me that Chnistoisther had approved the sale, of two Boeing helicopters for the Argentine army. I asked Vaky wlmit had happened to our agreement to develop an overall strategy, and he said that he had a strategy, and it was "in his Jiead". Vaky said that these individual decisions are designed, to send positive signals to Argen- tina r thus improving the atmosphere in our relationship and providing an Induc^ent for Videla to agree to meet -with Vaky. >g@aaeviiy^: It I think thf^#-(a*l® s^crious aaper which sets c business comni^ity Idarns that the Export- Bnport Blank "has , at St^te Department request, denied issuing. a letter of interest on a $^“^0 million sale of hydro-electric equipment,- while a few weeks later State fecommends the issuance of a license for the sale of' two Army helicopters and other military eguiiaa^nt, the President and our ^‘licy will look foolishly inconsistent, in other words, while individual decisions may appear right one day, they may (appear to) be inconsistent, unless we put all the steps together in a logical and coherent strategy v^ich' is puhlicly defensible, we will leave ourselves open to serious and leg it imate criticism.' ' ■ (GDS> ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 ; ■ (GDS) ftftfjp reguestipg aix %ccowt;iiig, of it^s ciji^rent^ belttg wifK*- held by the Sfato Departnipht for months/ filially Pete Vaky .gave;,|fte a-':ll.st/ and ’;l '•am-^^afes o.ljiifceiv astoitttded:-Ky'''-the ;s h^ ■ ■g^ai |M^^;'Oif ffae ti^<^':\w e^-:haa?fe.;v i;dn^e^£eo^^ : ' A 3 ra^ta.i^ . : ,. ,■ requests, valued at $.145 million; 29 Commerce license requests, valu^ #t $31 millioh; and approximately 11 Export'^^|)drt Bank ^ ttahsacstions, valued .at nearly $600 million. ^The iatter figirfe 1 iri the brief which Coleman left with Owen; the brief indicated that the State Department had estiiaated that there was $1.25 in nonHmiiitary , ekpor^^^^^ ■ i^gehtlnd -beihg held' up for /human ;ri:ghfcs 'reasons. ).,/ ■ She;' iiSt ■ da ad. ataggering . that.-;-'l',.am'led to .wonder 'juit'^how-' much trade world-wide is being held up by the State Department; it may be /enough to have a significant impact on pur balande of -i paymehte’^*. - The, letter' 'drcmi ■'■-Harold B-rd^ini--. to -■■secretary,.- '(he' sent you a^copJ^:C;at .Tab'-'-B'),-'‘-’yhtfdrtu¥ately'; doe ■ US- -ahif' ■-guidance'* ' -bCp'-,-.-he'e-'. ■.no. 'strategy, ■ except '’to open ' the - :I ,bel-ieve -that there -.are- -certain -s-teps ''''that .we -.can. -take -'s--, r-- (1)^ our Ambassador Castro in to see Prefiddht Videla (or General viola) to convey a personal message from j^resident Carte^v.of concern about the state of our relationship and a wish that we both take steps to improve ' ''that '''rb-iationship,- .'•-h®'-,'-i'-\pd,:Sitive. gesture, Castro can tnfdrm -VideXa '-'"that we. have 'cpcroved'. licenses for- -the- 'helicopters' and ■for - sevp?ai ■■Other 'Sd^ty^relat©! equ-ipraentt. '.'■■: He'-'. Should also 'S'tate--'-tha'-t ■ l-reSident/=^art'^-.; would; l.ihe it''"-if- '.■P-res''ident Vid'e'la - , could receive feaba^^ to discuss ways it^ reda-tidnship "in gr-e,ateir:;,-detaili. , ,'■’. ;■. ■ ■ '■' -- (2) We appresph t^.e inter-American (^itmis^^ Human Bights in an ih^dri^ way and suggest various foonil^ which could possibly break the deadlock and secure an agree- ment from the Argehtihe: Goyerimient for an early yisit . (Qhce ■an /-agreement Is 'reach-^-^.-'- we 'are'-in a '/legitimate -/pp-sition- to ■begin moving, on a- .-la^e Share, of ■ thqSe- .i-t^s' whiC;h-are cu-r- - ... re rttiy sUspehded. )_ ' "■ '■*'''■ - (3.) ■ I-n.-advaqic-e''cf ''Vaky'-S' yisit.,’','the--'jExport-*--Ifflpdrt Bank should begin dp|u:qying several loans Which ate from '■qqr-.private. sectO'r ."'tq":-.:-&eir' private sector. '■'■;-We:"; can .■■gius.'tify . ■' that by eayiug,-h'ha-t,’---tftd$h::-'lo-,Phs cannot- in 'au-y ■■■'’bay .■’he-,' ihter- - preted as Supportive of the ^vernmeht if they go directly to the, private -.sector* ■''■■'.■ ' , — (4) The Vaky yisit should be more than just atmospherics , ■■aithovigh thst \:ShquJc'- bd 'Wi' ' it®ortant-'-'ei®peht.'>. He,"'Shduld--make'- ' ■-c'lear-'-'ro.-'Vid'el.a ■■’thah-'we 'are'' prepared'-.'jto'- '-■move- 'iiiHai^ie-.tely ■-■on -a- large ntaaber of items if Videia reaches agreement with the Inter-^imierican ConwiiSsion on Human Rights and takes several ■ {'GDS-.)-' UNCLASSIFIED 90. Memorandum of Conversation Rome, September 4, 1978, 10 a.m. 1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments — Trip Files, 1977-80, Box 22, Vice President’s Visit to Rome and the Vatican, 9/2/78-9/4/78: Background. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Gardner’s residence. Clift sent an abbreviated record of this conversation under a September 5 covering memorandum to Vaky, Aaron, and Pastor. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 9-12/78) UNCLASSIFIED SEC1E T / SENSITI?E XGDS OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON September 5, 1978 MEMOBANDTOf OF OON?ESSmON» AMBASSADOR GARDNER'S RESIDENCE September 4, 1978, 10:00 a.m. ARGENTINE SIDE D.S. SIDE President Vldela Col. Miguel A. Mallea 611 Dr. Ricardo Yofre Vice President Walter F. Mondale A. Denis Clift Interpreter: VP; I- am pleased to have this meeting. I remember the meeting we had In the White House at the tla« of Ae Panama Canal Treaty ceremony. We want goon relations and, speaking candidly, there are strains now. I hope today we can make some progress. I told the President of your inquest. He said by all wians I should meet with you and he asked me to extend best wishes. He said we don't want trouble with Argentina, but human rights are a central concern. I will report to the President personally on your views. V; Thank you, Mr. Vice President, for inviting me. For me It is an extremely Important opportunity to discuss these matters becai»e I feel our relations are deteriorating. I fully concur with President Carter's position on human rights. We have profound belief In the democratic ’ process so that men can live with dignity and freedom. We are with the United States and we are not troubled by criticism when It Is objective. However, we are concerned by attltt^es projecting Intervention In domestic affairs. I spoke with President Carter about this at the time of the Panama Canal Treaty signing, but since that time we have had to delay our announcement of an Invitation to the Interamerlcan Coonlsslon on Human Rights because of U.S. criticisms projecting Intervention. A second probfem — Argentine political were Invited to visit the. United States, but they, too, did not visit because ADP Declassification Review «ECiasT/SENSiTivE XGDS DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 Ifenorandum of Conversation Ambassador Gardner’s Besidence ■«B«ifiWSENSITIVE XGDS page 2 September 4, 1978 V: (continued) of the n.S. statements intervening in our affairs. Mrs. Darien's statements are contributing to a deterioration in our relations. ‘ yP: Were her statements made in Argentina or in Washington. V: In Washington before Congress. Mr. Vice President, the western world must be united, and the Dnited States must lead the western world. At the same time, the people of Argentina cannot tolerate intervention. This is our concern. VP: I fully understand. We don't want to get into such a situation. We want to work with you to have good relations. As you know, the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendnent is coming into effect. We must soon take decisions on the Allls-Chalmers deal. We want to be helpful. It would be inqjortant if you could have the Interamerlcan Human Rights Commission received in Argentina on terms acceptable to the commission. We would not link your actions with our own, but if you do something, then we could do something. As you know, the U.S. press covers developments in Argentina closely. There are certain human rights cases with the people known to our press — people such as Jacobo Tlmezman. To the extent that you make progress on these cases, it will help us to make progress. We know that you have had problems in your country, and we want to work with you to establish a firm basis for progress. V: I understand, and govemment-to-govemment relations are not easy. My concern is when a problem between us is raised to the level of a public or popular issue. This leads to situations where our citizens adopt partisan positions against the United States, to situations where our businessmen adopt partisan positions because they cannot conclude deals when £x-Im does not grant a loan. VP: I understand. If we could get this turned around then we could move ahead, for example, on Allls‘-Chalmers. I would also like to suggest that it would be good if Assistant Secretary Vaky could come to Argentina to meet with you or with a person of your choice for a review of our relations. V: Would this be after the Interamerlcan Commission or before. ^BQffiT/SENSITIVE XGDS ^fi€KB¥/SENSITIVE XGDS Memorandvim of Conversation page 2 Ambassador Gardner's Residence September 4, 1978 VP: Oh, I think It should be as soon as possible. V: Perhaps ve could arrange a visit by the commission by mid-October. VP: But could you announce the visit earlier. V: Perhaps. I would like to point out that since our meeting at the Panama Canal signing, there have been a series of events showing the efforts on the part of our government : — we have Issued a list and names of all the detained; — we have published a list of all of those who disappeared and then reappeared; — last Christmas we released approximately 500; — this last week, 65 Individuals were freecl; — I have Indicated that we are prepared to give a favorable response to the Com^sslon on Human Rights; — Tlmerman's situation has changed; he Is now out of jail and imder house arrest; — Professor Bravo Is now under house arrest and we expect the court to lessen the charges against him. Officials of the U.S. government are welcome In Argentina, but they cannot give the Impression that they are coming to Inspect us. VP: No, they would come exercising discretion. It will be Important to have the announcement on a visit by the Human Rights Commission on the terms acceptable to the commission. V: We could have done so last month, but Mrs. Darien's statement before the Congress forced us to suspend our announcement. In the course of a few days, I believe we could develop a satisfactory announcement. ■SfiCRBT/ SENSITIVE XGDS SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS Memorandum of Conversation Ambassador Gardner's Residence page 4 September 4, 1978 C: In considering the announcement. It Is Important to remember the tight timing In the United States. The Ex-Im Bank must take Its decision by September 15. The Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment ccnnes Into effect on October 1. VP: We would hope the announcement could be taken care of before then. V: This was our Intention. I don't think It c^ be done, however, ' before September 15. VP; We are encouraged that you will receive the commission. Will you authorize me to tell the President that this will be done. V; Yes. VP: When may Assistant Secretary Vaky come. V: After our announcement on the commission. ** For Vaky we would prefer no other stops. VP: You would like him to visit Argentina alone. V: Ideally, yes. VP: I won't give you a yes on this, but I will recommend It and I will get back to you. V: Will you let us know ahead of time what his mission will be to permit us to prepare for It. VP: I will report to the President on mv return and we will contact your ambassador Immediately. V; Mr. Vice President, D.S. -Argentine relations proceed in multiple channels — economic, political, cultural. Now our relations are focused solely on human rights. We can understand this problem If It is addressed In the broader spectrum of our overall relations and Is not the single focus. SBCKBT/ SENSITIVE XGDS Memorandum of Conversation Ambassador Gardner’s Residence ^fieSfi¥/SENSITIVE XGDS page 5 September 4, 1978 VP: We have no desire to interfere in the affairs of your country. We have enough domestic problems of our own,. If we can get on the road to progress in human rights, this whole other vista will open. We want the best possible relations. The President was taken by you during the meeting he had last year. He is disappointed in the current course of our relations. He wants our relations to head In the right direction. I think we are now at a point where we can turn the right way. V: I think we can. Mr. Vice President, I know your time was limited. I appreciate this meeting. Please give my greetings and best wishes to President Carter. ♦ ^BCMT/SENSITIVE XGDS UNCLASSIFIED 91 - Memorandxim From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Vice President Mondale Washington, September 15, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries — Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential. UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON 5496 CONFIDENTIMr September 15, 1978 BffiMORANDUM FOR: FROM: THE VICE PRESIPENT DAVID AAROn' SUBJECT: US-Argentine Relations; A Status Report Since your Meeting with Videla Following up your meeting with President Videla, we asked our Ambassador to speak to Videla’ a assistant. Ricardo Jofre, to obtain a timetable for Vaky's visit, we learnea tnat the deadline for the submission of the bid by Allis-Chalmers was put off one month to October 15. We were also Informed that the Argentines plan to announce in early October an agreement with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for a visit and that they expect a visit from Pete Vaky by the second or third week of October. Christopher and Henry Owen met with John Moore and decided that a letter of interest could be issued to Allis-Chaimers about October 1, which is satisfactory to the Argentines and to Allis- Chalmers. The Argentine Government will be taking a number of steps, including releasing prisoners, before then, and that will make it easy for us to explain to the American public why we have altered our x-M decision. Dave Newsom will be chairing a meeting next week to discuss an overall strategy for US policy to Argentina. - We have noticed in our conversations with the Argentines a new receptiveness and interest in discussing a wide range of issues, and we believe this was made possible by your conversation with Videla. Still, there is a long way to go. We have learned, for exeimple, that the Argentines are playing games with us on ratify- ing the Treaty of Tlatelolco primarily because they feel we are playing games with them on human rights. GOI- the impending deadline of the Kennedy amendment, and the Harkin amentoents, particularly on Ex-Im. At one point an effort to explicitly define a "strategy" was made — with bad results. That was Newsom's instructions for his visit there' last spring. To a certain extent, that approach was repeated in’ MondalS^s ' ADP Declassification Review ■ xeNFiBgNTtAir/GPS DECLASSIFIED byJohnRtzpatrick. 4/24/2017 ObiPyCARTERltBRAftY 2 recent meeting wl,th Videla^ . in thet we tried to define an explicit tradeoff for the GOA you do this and we'll do that. While that approach seems tight and neat^ it doesn't work because, when the GOA doesn't do what it promises we cannot be flexible without appearing to ."blink". When we change the conditions or give the quid without the quo, I suspect that we streos^hen the hands of the hardliners within the GOA and further weaken the credibility of the moderates.''' I have only two .prescriptions and helther has to do with Argentina they are of general application. The first is that . we devote considerahle effort to an education project to convince Congress that linking certain trade and investment policies with human, rights does not further the cause of hiiman rights. This would be a .long, slow process withc»it a new . "acGompliahment" at the ahd, but I suspect -it. wcxild be:.well worth the ef fort. The second is that we try, in adninisterlng the human rights programs, to avoid judglr^ trends — poaitive or negative —r at less than annual, intervals. This would be hard vto apply on visits .from the Presidential level down to the Assistant Secretary^ for it is on these occasions . that we most often look for some hook oh which to hang a positive action -- gift, loan, agreemeat or whatever, but there are other artificial deadlines to which we frequently react an Impending IFI vote for example. The truth is that in reacting -to short term changes we inevitably coi^emn ourselves to folinw a jerky and inconsistent policy, for chaij^e that is lasting aaid meaningful on e societal sc^le. seldom occurs in less than a year's time, and generally in much longer (obvloualy there are ^ceptions — r a revolution, etc.}. Making this change in poiicy would requiz'e a Presidential decision since it would alter established ways of doing. business. It also obviously carries the risk of being overly tl^d, but least it seems to me worth, a serious look — - a study of its pluses and minuses, RECOMMEWPATION: That you approve my drafting a Dodson-rTarnoff memorandtim directing an interagency study of the a dvanta ges and d isadvant ages Of a policy that would eacpllcltly seek to aVoid^ny US evaluatioiT of positive or negative trends in human rights' ^servance at less than annual intervals. APPROVE V bo .Sr' DISAPPROVE ■ ■ ' 9 ^ O yv ) V cc: Bob Pastor \ 0 \ v ^ Madeleine Albright ^ » John Renner ■ jCQMP IDEW Ti a L/GDS UNCLASSIFIED 93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina Washington, October 3, 1978, 0029Z 250739 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 10, EXDIS 1978 Memcons for Vance. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pfeifle; cleared by Ruser, Newsom, and Vaky and S/S; and approved by Perry. Vance was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly. UNCLASSIFIED uuiuu inu P*8£ 01 STATE 250739 08ICIH SS-2S IKFO OCr-01 ISO-CO SSO-30 /02ii ft OfiAfTEB BY ASA/CE«:LPFEIFIE:JHA AfPROWB BY SiJPEBRY ARA/ECA - C, W., RUSER PjOIIEtfjOH S/S - JPERRY m-.emi . Department of State TELEGRAM .... n«i .7 -031039 0301222 /13 0 0300292 OCT 78 FH SECSTATE UASHOC TO AHEHBASSY BCEHOS AIRES IHIUBIATE « B 0 F I 0 E R I "rTT STATE 250739 7819344 4. WOnTES ilOTED TRAT THEBE WAS SOOE CONCERK IN THE UNITED STATES AIIO ESPECIAUV IH THE STATE JEPARTHEIIT UITH RE6ARD TO THE TREATY OF TIATEIOICO. < HE EXPlAllinP- THE PROCESS OF RATIFICATIOII. -THE FOREIfiH HINISTRY SEHT A ORAFT TO THE OEFESSE AND ECONOHIC HltliSIRIES AND THEN THE TREATY WAS SENT TO THE PRESIOEMT. THE . PRESIDENT RETURHEO IT TO' THE FOREIOH HINISTRY FOR CHANCES AND THE TREATY HAS SEHT TO THE DEFENSE HINISTRY OH AUCUST 14 FOR SI6HATURE. IT THEN WENT A6AIH TO THE PRESIDENCY. FROH THERE )T HAS SEHT TO THE AOHIHIST.-ATIVE AND lECISlATIUE COHHISSlOH FOR .APPROVAl. nONTES INDICATED IT HOUIO THEM REOUIRE PRESIOEHTIAl- SIGHATORE TO COMPUTE FORKAl lECAl RATIFICATION. HE EnPHASITED THAT IH ACCORDANCE WITH WIOEIA'S IHSTRUCTIOHS. AU STEPS IN THE RATIFICATIOII PROCESS WOUID BE TAKEN AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.. E.O. 11652; COS TAOS; ■ PEPR, AR SUBJECT: S ECRETARY WAHCE'S MEETING WITH AROEMTINE FOREIGN fllHISTER tIOtITES ^ 1. SECRETARY VANCE MET WITH ARCEIITIHE FOREIGN flIIIISTER ^ tIOHTES OH SEPTE.MDER 29 H i NEW YORK. AHBASSAOOR ROS AND AHBASSAOOR AJA ESPIL OF ARGENT IIIA AND UNDER ‘^ SECRETARY NEWSOH WERE ALSO PRESENT. FOREIGN HIHISTER HQNTES RAISED THE HUnPHREY/KEHNEDY ANENOHENT AND THE O TREATY OF 1LATELOLCO AND OFFERED ARGENTINE ASSISTANCE ON HtODLE EAST EFFORTS. ■3 2. HOHTES NOTED THAT DURING THE flEETlHO BETMEEH VICE- PRESIDENT NDUDAiE AND PRESIDENT VIOELA IH ROHE, IT ‘ ■’ NAS AGREED THAI CERTAIN STEPS WERE TO BE TAKEN BY THE _ UNITED STATES AND THEN BY ARGENTINA. HE KAO REEK ^ IKFORHCD OF THE INCREASED FLEXIfilllTV in THE US EK-IN BANK AND THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THIS. THE NEXT O STEP, WAS UP TO AR6EHI1HA. ME LEFT IN lUEHOS AIRES A ORAFT OF THE POSITIVE REPLY TO THE IHTEB-ANERICAN O***^"*)* RIGHTS COttniSSIOII IIAKRCI AND VIOELA PLANS TO REPLY BEFORE THE OEAOIIIIE. HOHTES MOPED THAI IF THE -i^^lANRC GOES TO ARGENTINA IT Will BE AS OCJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. ^3. HONTES NOTED THAT THE KUHPHREY/KENNEOY AOHEHOHEHT GOES INTO EFFECT OCTOBER 1. FOR HANY YEARS THE U.S. HAS SUPPLIED ARGENTINE HIIITARY EQUIPHENT AND TRAINING. THE CUT OFF OF SPARE PARTS WILL EE PRR- IICUIARIY DIFFICULT. PERHAPS THE NEXT STEP WOUIO BE FOR THE U.S. TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AHO DETERHINE If LEGALLY SPARE PARTS COULO BE SUPPLIED TO ARGENTINA. AMBASSADOR NEHSOH NOTED THAT THE BROOKE AflEHOREHT NAMES IT POSSIBLE TO RELEASE SOME GOODS WHERE THE CONTRACT WAS NADE BEFORE INE NUttPHREY-KENHEDY AIIENOIIEHT. IK HAG REVIEIKO SOKE CASES AHO HAD RELEASED SME ITEMS, IHaUDIIIG HELICOPTERS AND PERISCOPES. NEWSOM ADDED THAT THE USG NAD LOOKED AT A NUMBER OF ITEMS IN LIGHT OF LEGISLATION AND IIIEOUITIES TO MANUFACTURERS. CONSUL TATICWS WITH CONGRESS, HOWEVER, 1NO,ICATEO THE AUTHORS OF THE AHENDMEHT TOOK A STRICT VIEW WITH REGARD TO HIIITARY SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY SPARE PARTS. NEWSOM SAID THAI THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZED THE HARDSHIP FOR AR.GEHTIHA BUT MUST AWAIT AH IMPROVED SITUATIOII AND COIIGRESSIONAl ACTION. NOHtES NOTED THAT IN TERMS OF THE POLITICAL REIATIOIISHIP SPARE FARTS iKRE VERY IMPORTANT. SECRET.ARY VANCE SAID NE WOULD LOOK IMTO THE ISSUE. 5; THE SECREIARV BRIEFED MONIES Oil CAMP OAVIO AMD NDHItS COHCRALULATED HIM ON THE SUCCESS. HOWES RELATED THAT WHE* HE SPOKE WITH PRESIOEMT CEAUSESCU IH ROMANIA, THE ROHMIIAN LEADER SAlO THAT ARGENTIHA COULO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES EFFECTIVELY WITH BOTH THE ARABS -ANO THE ISRAEliS. MONTES PERSONALLY HAD SPOKEN TO BOTH THE JEWISH AND ARAB COMMUHITlES IH ARGEHIINA AH OFF EHEO. TO SPEAK TO THE AIIBASSADOB IF THE SECRETARY THOUGH THAT WOULD EE USEFUL. THE SECRETARY SAIO HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HOHTES WOULD SPEAK TO THE AMOASSAOORS IN BUENOS AIRES. 6. MOMIES SAIO HE PERSONALLY HAD TAKEN STEPS TO IWROVE RELATIONS BECAUSE HE FELT THAT US/ARGEHTIHA RELATIONS WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO BOTH COUNTRIES ANO NOTED COMMERCIAL RELATiWS WERE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED IKE DESIRE TO MOVE THE RELATIOHS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN A POSITIVE BIRECIIOM AND WAS PLEASED THAI THE MOHDALE/VIOELA MEETING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE. CHRISTOPHER ADP Declassification Review ^ DECLASSIFIED : by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 ^ NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHOR I ZAT I ON Of THE El^OUltVE SCCRETARY UNCLASSIFIED 94. Memorandiim From the Vice President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale Memo No. 999-78 Washington, October 19, 1978 1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 57, Foreign Countries — Latin America I, [2 1978]. Confidential. Sent for information. UNCLASSIFIED memorandum i OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON INFORMATION Memo No. 999-78 COtlFIBBNTO ai- October 19, 1978 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM: SUBJECT: Denis Clift Argentina to Accept Human Rights Commission Delegation Argentina announced October 17 its willingness to permit a visit by a delegation from the Inter-Aii«rican Human Rights Coimnission (lAHRC), preferably between March and May of next year. An official in the Argentine president's office told Embassy Buenos Aires that the lAHRC delegation will have access to prisons, political leaders and the relatives of missing persons — but not to military bases. Even so, he added, the decision to accept the delegation was contro- versial in Argentine military and government circles. GONFIDEMTIM ' ADP Dedassificalion Review DECLASSIRED by John Rtzpatrick, 4^24/2017 UNCLASSIFIED 95. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) Washington, January 26, 1979 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D1 13, Box 28, Human Rights— Argentina IV. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in D at 6:02 p.m. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote, “WC — Here is Patt’s thinking on Argentina, which I mentioned in my memo for your meeting Friday.” Reference presumably is to Friday, February 2. UNCLASSIFIED TOi FROM: SUBJECT: OEPARTMENT OF STATE / 1^90jL704 WwHIrwnn, O.C. »5» i^. jjtiSi ^ ik ^ W 6 03/ January 26 , 1979 The Seciretary The Deputy Secretary HR “ sz&mRED siRscraT Patricia K. Deriaj: PM BEyiEtrEP by S/s Rext Stepe in Argentina flie Increaeii^ aagnltude and brutality of Argentine buaan rights yiolatlons convince ae that it is tine for US to taXe additional iseasures to underscore our concerns and bring pressure to bear on the Junta to aaXe iaprove- ■eata . Only substantial pressure across a broad front is likely to have any real effect, and there are a number of things we can and should do. iwf The situation is clearly|tetarioratdLn^ ^ — 38 bodies, •many of them without heads or hands, were recently washed ashore on one of Argentina's Atlantic bea^MS. A Buenos Aires newspaper which had investigated the report killed the story at the direction of the Presidential Press Office. Our Embassy estimates that about a month taka place in Argentina. The International Red UfdlF'fepresentatlve in Biwnos Aires recently characterised the disappearances as "a calculated poll^* of the I Argentine authorltiei. the past three weeks, security forces have arrested uid threatened to imprison mothers of the dis- a^iea^red idio have held weekly silent desionstrationa in the capital's swln square for the past two years. This heavy- handed police intimidation follows by <»ily a few weeks the soothing promises given the mothers by a Presidential Palace sp^esaan at Christmas. — An officer of the Argentine Permanent Aasemb lv fo r Buswin Rlgd^ts told our Embassy in December cnau secrurity forces simply snirdered a cot^le in their own home without bothering to take them to a dstention center. The same source said he had received other recent reports of such killings. ^ SBOXSt- {ROS-4 01/26/94, DERZAH, Patricia M.) I ADP Declassification Review DECUkSSIFIED by John Fitzpafrick, 4/24/2017 -■> If* continue to receive nuiMroiis highly credible reports thet interrofatlon' of detalnsar. me electric '^picena , “ .SOMthing lUee e siqpercharged cattle prod, is still apparently a favorite tool, as is the "sobnarlne” treat- aent (isaarsion of the head in a tub of eater, urine, excrement, blood, or a ccxnbination of these) . — Prison treatment of the 3,200 acknowledged political detainees has deteriorated sharply in recent months, acterding to the Internatimaal Bed i^xoas. ra^presentative in Argentina, for cure, nestings, and dietary neglect are eaasmn for them and for the lUiackBbM'ledgad detelnees held in secret military facilities. Another source reported that fifty female detainees recently transferred between prlscms "have not been exposed to the sun for so long that teeir skin color is greenish... Scsie have lost their eyesight. Many are mentally dteranged.*' Ihese tevelopsnnts illustrate the reasons why I believe we should,, at a minimum, taka these action s »» — Vote *»o" on air ipr loans to Argentina which do not clearly meet the basic human needs criteria, and at least invite, other, donor countries to take similar action. — Switch fttei "yes* to "Abstain" on XFl loans triiich meet the basic human needs criteria. — > Znstraet our Delegate : to the int Human Rights Comsdsaion to make a strong statement condemning Argentine human rights violations. » Begin to den y cfiBtmercial licens es of militery- relatte ..eg uipsient destined te the argontine Axmed Forces, aanraTnow do with equipment for the poll<%. — Deny or delay Bxport-lnport Baric flnanelno for new projects in Argeatina.\j 11 necessary, we shteld seex a Presidential determination under the Chaffee Amendjqsht that denial would advance XJ. 8. human rights objectives# SHCBBf , gac B W - 3 - Moant niBjoc new dlplonatic effort t o. peraue de IgMlan erae_eaca3liar« to stop selllno mllltarv and poxiee agulpownt to Argentina . — Give oareful consideration to snspending or baiting Mitlrely tbe p^ipeliz» of 0. S. - origin Military eguipment parehased by Argenuna under earlier programs. — In connection with, and explanation of, tbe above Measures, Issoe a strong p^llc statoaent condeMning tbe continuing deterioration of Argentine hunan rights practices . llm siaply have to begin to take measures like these if we expect to see any meaningful isq^rovesients . There is no longer any doubt that Argentina has the worst human rights record in South America. We cannot %iait for the Mter-American Buman Ri^ts Ckmmisalon visit at the end of May. Mhile we hope that Argentii» Government prepara- tions for the visit, aM the visit itself, will result in ( sosM IsgicovesMnts, we should not rely exclusively on this event. A high-ranking Voreign Ministry official recently said his government plans to stonewall the Cosmiission on the disappearance issue. Me would not be alone in taking more forceful measures. I understand that both Canada and the OK share the view that the situation is worsening. lust of _a as WB'il~a8 suu considering opposing XFI loans to Argentina. # s te w st UNCLASSIFIED 96. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Vaky) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamoff) Washington, February 13, 1979 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chron and Official Records of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 85D366, Box 1, Argentina — ^August 9 Testimony. Secret. Drafted by Vaky. In the top right-hand comer of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “Rec’d 2/16.” Below this the hand wrote “(cc: SC [Steven Cohen]).” Derian crossed out “SC” and wrote below it: “my file Arg.” UNCLASSIFIED •sfiefgr MEMORANDUM TO; FROM: SUBJECT; Pursuant to your tasking memorandum of January 27 I enclose the paper now approved by ARA, INR, HA and S/P. I have included on two or three points a dis- senting analyses and evaluation in the form of foot- notes. These were basic differences which could not be reconciled. S/S - Peter Tarnoff ARA - Viron P. Vaky Evaluation of Argentine Human Rights Situation Enclosure; Argentine paper. Drafted: ARA;VPVaky ; lif SECRET RDS-'? 5713/94 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 UNCLASSIFIED Enclosure Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, undated UNCLASSIFIED SeCRET/MOFOim/MO COHTRAeT - ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OP CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION Par ame tecs and problems . The following assessment covers the Argentine government ! s 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitaoly, efforts have Deen hampered somewhat by the US Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments. ■ ( Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments. tCt We do not believe, however, tnat timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below. _ The record or Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged. i-ei- Current situation . With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows: “tCt — Political prisoners : Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the aisposition of the national executive branch under state-of-sieq e powe rs provided for in the Argentine constitution (PEN pr i sober s7 T^ (CT V^ll^he current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention SB GRET/MOFOAH/Ne - CONTRACT ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 g^^’wk&^mivaaontmsM SaCRET/MOrOItN/MO .COWTRIICT " - 2 - There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposition of military authorities (DAM prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons. “tCt No sustained official effort is being made to sub- stantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges j (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (r ight-of-option) . The r ight-o£-option program initiated inlate 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile. ("Cf There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country. ttr) ~ Torture and prisoner, mistreatment ; Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have informa- tion about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include sucn things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military,' s conception of social order) groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety SECRBT/HOrOIUi}/NO. CONTRACT giiCRBg/NOPORN/N0.COWTRA e T -3- officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN pris oner, or his or her tlie PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in August that as many a s 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation. -fet” Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner fs alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, car with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 an ICRC official reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year. "tej- — Disappearances ; Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, roost must be presumed dead. of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (d) actions that contributed to an intellectual>-cultural environment conducive to the growth of ^subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term f security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers. ter (£k substantiate eports rec eived from released prisoners tend to I observations on the frequency of torture. 1 CBCRDT/NOFORM/MO. C e WTRAC r WNOttW su w (Bana» ME A SINCERE EFFORT HAS BEING MADE TO CLEAN HOUSE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF lAHRC. 13. I THANKED VIDELA FOR RECEIVING HE FAST AS SOON AS HE DID. HE REPLIED BY STATING HE WAS GLAD HE COULD ACCOMMODATE ME AS MIN ECON MARTINEZ DE HOZ TOLD HIM LAST WEEK USG WOULD VOTE "NO* ON RAILROAD LOAN. HE SAID HE LOOKED UPON ME AS A BEARER OF GOOD TIDINGS. CASTRO SECRE T" NNN S E CRE T //O A 0/0 A O O A O A I^A i^r\% ^ UNCLASSIFfED 100 . Memorandum of Conversation Washington, July 27, 1979 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, David Newsom Files, 1978-81, Lot 81D154, Box 14, Latin America. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Newsom. The meeting took place in the Embassy of Argentina. The time of the luncheon is not indicated in the memorandum. Copies were sent to ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, P, and the Embassy in Buenos Aires. UNCLASSIFIED LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DEPARTMENT OF STATE X Memorandum of ConvenoHon SUBJECTt U.S. -Argentina Relations DATE: July 27, 1979 Place: Argentina Embassy PARTICJFANTSj Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom Argentina Ambassador Aja Espil C|!pies to: ARA, HA, S/P, S, D, Buenos Aires, P . '■ 'fi.. During the "course of a luncheon conversation, Ambssador, Aja Espil stressed the need for a continuing^ dialogue with his country. He noted that it had been more than "a year since my visit to Buenos Aires and a considerable time since the important meet- ing between Vice President Mondale and President Videla iii Rome . Some new contact at a high-level was necessary in order to give support to the moderate elements in Argentina at a time when the military were reacting to a series of '•shocks." He mentioned the Nicaraguan situation and the Ar gen tine vote in favor of our resolution at the OAS. Also adverse from the military's standpoint were the recent visits of John Oakes of the New York Times -- who^wrptfi two articles critical of the regime on May 15-16 -- ana a delegation from the New York Bar Association. The problem with the military will be further aggravated by the results of the upcoming visit of the InterAmerican Human Rights Commission, The Ambassador emphasized that the vote on behalf of our resolution should be seen by us as a positive step to be acknowledged. He acknowledged that there were still human rights problems, but said there had been progress in the P : DDNews om : chg (Drtifmg «nd OfimJ D5,|254 j . 65 ' LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - 2 - release of prisoners and the reduced number of disappear- ances. He acknovledged that the Timmerman case and the inability of the government to account for the disappeared remained serious problems. He suggested that Ambassador Vaky might consider a visit to Buenos Aires after the inauguration of the Bolivian Presi- dent in La Paz bn August 6 (if this takes place*) . He sug- gested, also, that the Secretary receive the new Foreign Minister, pastor , who will be in New York from September 22 to 26. He said "even a half hour" would be very important. The Ambassador said it was important, particularly in view of the OAS vote to explain to the Argentine government our view on the Nicaraguan situation. The military reaction to this had been further aggravated by the appearance last week in Managua of a Montonero leader who proclaimed that "what has happened in Managua will happen next in Buenos Aires." I responded by agreeing to discuss the matters he had raised further with Ambassador Vaky, I said we wanted good rela- tions with Argentina, but that some of the matters he had raised clearly stood in the way. I asked whether, for ex- ample, it would be possible to make any progress on Timmer- man. He said, "perhaps at the end of the year." He said Timmerman, unfortunately, talks too much and says the wrong things as far as the military is concerned.' On Nicaragua, I suggested that Argentina had close relations with some of the Andean states, such as Venezuela and that his government might want to talk to these countries. I said we were trying to take a less central role and to leave such matters as much as possible to the Latin Amer- ican states directly interested. The Ambassador acknowledged, this, but insisted that his government still considered us "the key." LIMITED OFFICIAL USE UNCLASSIFIED 101 . Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Ecuador, Argentina, and Nicaragua Washington, August 14, 1979, 2220Z 212082 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790369-1 171. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to all American Republic diplomatic posts. Drafted by Adams; cleared in S/S-0 and in draft by R. Pastor and Bremer; and approved by Vaky. UNCLASSIFIED Ddcument View Page 1 of 5 CONFIIH-WTOO: EXDIS PAGE 01 STATE 212082 ORIGIN SS-25 INFO OCT-00 ADS-OO SSO-00 /02S R DRAFTED BY ARA/ECaiMMADAMS, OR. : MAS APPROVED BY ARA:VPVAKY NSCsRAPASTOR (DRAFT) S/S:JBREMER (DRAFT) S/S-OiRSTEVES - 034059 142321Z /75 0 R 142220Z AUG 79 FM SECSTATE W7VSHDC TO AME»ffiASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE AMEHBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE AMEHBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE INFO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS XMT AMS18ASSY BUENOS AIRES AMEHBASSY MANAGUA AMEHBASSY QUITO e e » F 1 U t. M I I A L STATE 212082 EXDIS E.O. 120SS.- GDS 8/10/8S (VARY, VIRON P,) TAGS: PGOV.PINT, PORS, PARM, XK. XM, AR SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR 1. OTJFTDEirrm; - entire text 2. SOTMARY: SECRETARY VANCE HAD EXTBNSJVE^BXCHANGE \ OF VIEWS WITH FONMIN PASTOR IN QUITO. PASTOR EXPRESSED \ CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN NICARAGUA AND THE ’DANGEROUS” ; CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION. HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA eOW F IP EWT Ig B PAGE 02 STATE 212082 HOPES TO PROCEED TOWARD DEJKXfRACY IN NEM FUTOHB BUT NOT UNTIL IT GETS ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. HE APPEALED FOR BETTER TIES WITH USG AND ASKED THAT ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IWT BE SOLE CRITERIA IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED APPRECIATICW FOR i^GENTI NA'S V OTE IN QAS ON NICARAGUA, AND N^/i'ED TIKAT U.S. VAflJinilUllLY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND CONSIDERS IT A FRISID --AN ALLY. HE CHARACTERIZED HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM A “FESTERING SORE" IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. W NICARAGUA, SECRETARY VANCE STRESSED NEED TO PUSH NEW GOVERNMENT INTO DIRECTION OF BEING INDEPENDENT, UNALIGNED COtJNTRY. WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL AMERICA, HE POINTED TO NEED FOR COLLECTIVE HEMISHPERIC EFFORT TO PERSUADE THESE COUNTRIES TO MOVE IN A RESKRISIBLK WAY. TURNING TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, THE SECRETARY PRESSED PASTOR HARD ON THE URGENCY OF ARGENTINA RATIFYING TREATY OF TLATELOLCO AS PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD ASSURED PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE THE CASE . PASTOR RESPONDED THAT TLATELOLCO WOULD BE RATIFIED AFTER GOA COMPLETES ARRANGEMENTS FOR PURCHASE OF HEAVY WATER PLANT AND "PEW OTHER STEPS." END SUMIARY. 3. DURING RECEPTION AT NATIONAL PALACE IN QUITO AUGUST 10, SECRETARY VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VARY AND MR. PASTOR OF NSC (WITH DCM FIMBRES AS NOTETAKER) HAD AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR. FULL TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OP CONVERSATION ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIRED by John Rtzpatrick, 4/24/2017 http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/17/2013 Document View Page 2 of 5 OP THAT MEETINO FOLLOWS: CENTRAL AMERICA THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE GOA SAW THE CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION AND WHAT STEPS THE FOREIGN MINISTER ■ CONPIDBIT S tt- PAGB 03 STATE 212082 BELIEVE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THIS AREA. IK RESPONSE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE AN HISTORIC SKETCH OP THE SPREAD OP COMMUNISM, BEGINNING WITH ITS BIRTH IN 1917 AND ITS EXTENSION TO CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. HE ASSERTED COMMUNISM HAD REACHED NICARAGUA AND NOW THREATENED SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE CENTRAL MIERICAN SITUATION AS VERY DANGEROUS. HE BELIEVED THE NEW NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT IS UNDER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FROK CUBA TO LAY ikjW AND TO SEEK AS MUCH HELP AS POSSIBLE PROM AN ARRAY OF SOURCES. AS NICARAGUA RECOVERS ON THE BASIS OP THIS ASSISTANCE IT HILL BECOME A SEVERE MENACE TO ITS NEIGHBORS. AGAIN, BROADENING HIS PERSPECTIVE, HE SAID THAT ARGENTINA IS AWARE THAT IN COLOMBIA, FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM IS BOILING UNDER A CALM SURFACE. THERE ARE ALSO SICTS OF GREAT INSTABILITY IN BOLIVIA, AS WELL AS IN PERU. IN SYNTHESIS, A RED STAIN IS SPREADING OVER A LARGE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES, AND A GREATER NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ARE "INTENSE PINK", HE COMTINl^ THAT ARGENTINA KNOWS THE PROBLEM BETTER THAN OTHERS BECAUSE OF ITS INTERNAL STRUGGLE. THE GOA KNOWS THE TECHNIQUES THAT C<»IMUNISTS USE IN SUBVERTING GOVERNMENTS. TO COUNTER COMMUNISM ARGENTINA IS TAKING STEPS IN AREAS SUCH AS THE UNIVERSITIES AND IS REVAMPING ITS ECCHOMY. THE GOA HOPES IN THE HEAR FUTURE TO PROCEED ALC»«3 THE DEMOCRATIC PATH BUT NOT UNTIL IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE PROBLEMS THAT BEFELL PERON WILL NOT REVISIT THE COUNTRY. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS THAT THE SOUTHERN CONE COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE THE U.S. AS THE LEADER OP THE WEST. ARGENTINA, ESPECIALLY, HAS A SIMILAR CONSTITUTION TO THAT OF THE U.S. AND WANTS TO BE TREATED AS AN ALLY. THE GOA DOES NOT WANT THE (WLY THING TO MATTER IN BILATERAL RELATIONS TO BE THE ISSUE OF HUMAN CON F IDEOTIKC- PAGE 04 STATE 212082 RIGHTS. IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DONE, EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER: FOR EXAMPLE, IT HAS INVITED A VISIT BY THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSICai. IF THIS COMMISSICW APPLIES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, IT HILL SEE HARKED PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRY AND THAT THE TREND IS ONE OF IMPROVEMENT. THIS MATTER OF HUMAN HIGHTS SHOULD BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPOSED AS A BARRIER BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ARGENTINA RECENTLY SUPPORTED THE U.S, IN THE OAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ALTHOUGH THE VIEWS OP ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND URUGUAY DO HOT CCMPLETELY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE H.S., THESE COUNTRIES ARE THE U.S.' TRUE ALLIES IN THE HEMISPHERE. AFTER THE O.S., ■raE FOUR MOST IMPORTANT COtMTRIlS ARE MEXICO, BRAZIL, VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA. IF THIS GROUP CAN ESTABLISH BETTER COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S., INDEED THEY HAVE A HEALTHY DESIRE FOR COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S., THEY CAN SERVE TO GUIDE THE SMALLER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES . THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. APPRECIATED ARGENTINA'S RECENT VOTE IN THE OAS. ARGENTINA IS http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS__... 7/17/2013 Document View Page 3 of 5 CONSIDERED A FRIEND --AN ADDY. THE D.S. VADUED HIGHLY ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH ARGENTINA AND EXPECTED THIS TO CX^TINOS INTO THE FUTURE. HE FRANKLY CHARACTERIZED THE HUMAN SIGHTS OBJECTIVES AS A FESTERING SORE. THIS AND OTHER ISSUES SHCRJLD BE DEALT WITH AS FHISTOS AND ALLIES. THE O.S. SHARED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW REGARDING ARGENTINA'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE INTERNATICHUAL COMMUNITY. BUT, THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED, THE U.S. CANNOT IGNORE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IS A FESTERING SORE IN OUR RELATIONS. eOWPIDEHTIAL PAGE 05 STATE 212082 TURNING TO NICARAGUA, THE SECRETARY SAID NO DOUBT THERE ARE SOME MARXIST/LENINISTS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT CUBA SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THERE ARE ALSO MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE GNRj CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNTRY CAN GO EITHER HAY. NICARAGim HAS TO BE PUSHED IN THE DIRECTION THAT WE WANT, TO BECOME AN INDEPENDENT AND UNALIGNED COUNTRY. THE NICARAGUAN SITUATION ALSO AFFECTS ITS NEIGHBORS WHO ARE ALSO UNDER POLITICAL TENSION. THE U.S. FEELS THAT COLLECTIVELY THE HEMISPHERE HAS TO HELP THESE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES FACE THEIR PROBLEMS. IF THESE TENSIONS ARB NOT EASED AND THERE CONTINUES TO BE SUPPRESSION OF RIGHTS, THERE HILL LIKELY BE AN EXPLOSION OFFERING CUBA NEW OPPORTUNITIES. THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SHOULD SEE WHAT THEY CAN DO ABOUT THIS AND TRY TO MOVE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY SINCE WE ALL HAVE A COMMOU RESPCRJSIBILITY FOR THE GOOD OF THE HEMISPHERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HIS ANDEAN GROUP COLLEAGUES HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT NICARAGUA WILL HEED A LONG PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL ABSORB ALL THE ENERGIES OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP HILL HAVE NO TIME TO THINK OF EXTENDING ITS MARXIST VIEWS. BUT, THE MINISTER WONDERED WHAT THE RESULT WOULD BE IP IT IS THE SANDINISTAS WHO DISTRIBUTE HUMANITARIAN AID AND CHANNEL RECUPERATION ASSISTANCE. WHO WILL GET ALL THE CREDIT FOR THIS EFFORT, HE ASKED, BUT THE SANDINISTAS. THE RESULT CAN ONLY BE THAT THE LEFTISTS WILL END UP ENLISTING THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR BEHALF SO THAT IN TWO OR THREE YEARS, SHOULD THE 6NR ACCEDE TO ELECTIONS, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD BE THE LOGICAL WINNERS AND COMMUNISM WOULD TAKE OVER. ee WFIPBW T IAC PAGE 0£ STATE 212082 THE SECRETARY ASKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER IP HE HAD AN ANSWER TO THIS DILEMMA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPLIED THAT HE DID HOT HAVE AN ANSWER. HE WENT CW TO COMMENT THAT NICAHAGia'S NEIGHBORS LACKED FAITH IN THE U.S. HE ASSERTED THESE NEIGHBORS WANT AND NEED THE U.S. TO as FORTHCX» QUICKLY ITS GOVERNMENT MAS IN PERIL. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/Doc View.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/17/2013 Document View Page 4 of 5 AT NEWS THAT THE U.S. IS SBRIODSLY STUDYING PROVIDING MILITARY AID TO THE GNR. HE THOUGHT THE EFFECT WOUU> BE INDIRECTLY TO ARM CUBA. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE GENERAL QUESTION HAD BEEN RAISED, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS AND THAT IS WHERE THE MATTER NOW STANDS. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH PROM A MORAL NECESSITY AND FROM THE PRACTICAL INFLUENCE IT COUUJ GIVE THE U.S. IN THE FUTURE THROUGH EXTENDING A HELPING HAND. THE U.S. ALSO HOPES TO CHANNEL ANY RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE THROUGH THOSE MINISTRIES RUN BY MODERATES. FRANKLY, HE OBSERVED, SHORT-TERM AID COWPlDSNTI W l PAGE 07 STATE 212082 AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE CAN BE EXTENDED BOTH TO MEET IMMEDIATE HUMAN NEEDS AND TO SERVE OIK LOI«3BR -RANGE OBJECTIVES . THE TERRITORIAL SEA THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT A WIRE SERVICE ACCOUNT REGARDING A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION ON WATERS BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL THREE MILES. REPORTEDLY, THE U.S. WOULD DELIBERATELY EXERCISE TRANSIT RIGHTS BEYOND THE THREE MILES AND WITHIN THE 200 MILES TO AFFIRM ITS VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT SEEN THE NEWS ACCOUNT AND WAS NOT AWARE WHAT IT MIGHT HEFER TO. HE COMMENTED THAT IT MIGHT BE A GARBLED STORY COMING OUT OP THE LOS NEGOTIATIONS . - - TREATY OF TLATELOLCO THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER' S RREDECBSSOR "njAT ARGENTINA WOUI43 MOVE ON TLATELOLCO, *AND HE ASKED AlsOOl CdS STATUS us IT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID HE WANTED TO BE FRANK. ARGENTINA HAD VARIOUS SOURCES OF ENEiaiY, AIWMK3 THEM NUCLEAR PLANTS SOLELY INTENDED FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE jCOUNTRY, AND TO COMPLEMENT THE COUNTRY'S HYDROELECTRIC CAPACITY. ARGENTINA HAD NOW REACHED THE STAGE OP BEING ABLE FULLY TO IMPLEMENT ITS ENERGY PLAN. AN OBSTACLE TO THIS IS THE STRONG PRESSURE BEING APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS. HE BELIEVED THE GOA'S POINT OF VIEW IS A JUST ONE. IF ARGENTINA CAN COMPLETE ITS KJBRGY OBJECTIVES IT HAS NO OBJECTION TO FULL AND COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS. ARGENTINA IS FUIiLY DETER- COMflUEMTlAL ' PAGE 08 STATE 212082 MINED TO SIGN TLATELOLCO BUT WANTS TO BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE A FEW STEPS TO FULFILL ITS ENERGY PLAN. IT HOPES TO FINISH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A HEAVY WATER PLANT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. ONCE THESE MEASURES ARE ACHIEVED, ARGENTINA PLANS ADHERENCE TO THE BAH ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AND TO ■raE TREATY OP TLATELOLCO. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE CONDITIONS IN THE PREVIOUS JOINT COMMUNIQUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT AT THE TIME THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE REFERRED TO HAD NOT EXISTED. THE SECRETARY AGAIN ASKED WREN ARGENTINA COULD SIGN. http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/17/2013 Document View Page 5 of 5 THE FOREIGN MINISTER REPEATED THIS OJDLD BE IN A COUPLE OF MONTHS AFTER ARGENTINA HAS ARRANGED PURCHASE OF THE HEAVY WATER PLANT. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD THAT ARGENTINA HAS PRESSED ON THE MATTER SUCH IHAT IT COULD NOT ABIDE BY THE COMMUNIQUE. HE ASSUMED ARGENTINA’S STATED INTENTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT AS INDICATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE WAS THE FIRST INDICATICBI OP A DIFFERENT VIEW PREVAILING IN ARGENTINA. PRESIDENT VIDELA HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT ARGENTINA WOULD RATIFY TLATELOLCO AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE OTMMUNIQUE. ' THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED THE "CENTRAL CONCEPT" HAD NOT CHANGED; WHAT WAS DIFFERENT WERE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARGENTINA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE SIGNING. coNriP B W T iAr;- PAGE 09 STATE 212082 VANCl CO N FIPEH T IHL « END OF DOCUMENT » c ew w pew T B i ti: EXDIS http://smartarchive.state.sgov,gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key==odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/17/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 102 . Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State New York, September 29 , 1979, 0405Z 4059 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977-80, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS memcons 1979. Confidential; Exdis. UNCLASSIFIED k M ?■ ■>* m 1>A6l f] ttSUN N tmi $i 12 1101152 MTI« 55-25 EiXDlS INCOMIN§$ IN CUBA. THE SECRETARY SAtO THAT IMMEOIATEIY UPON CONFIRMATION THAT THE BRIGADE WAS THERE THE FACT WAS MAOE PURL I C AND THE US ENTERED IRTO DISCUSSIONS WITH tHE SOVIET UMION. THE US WAS SEEKING RECTIFICATIW OF THE SITUATION AMI HAD TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE STATUS OUO IS UNACCEPTARLE. « ARE SEEKING A SOLUTION BASED ON CHANGES IN THE STATUS GUO WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY TO VS. t. nCETIHG OF AMERICAN ARMIES. PASTOR ASKED WHAT >OSITIOH THE US WOULD TARE REGARDING NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE AT THE MEETING OF A«RICAN ARMIES TO TRKE PLACE IN, CKWaiA. THE SECRETARY SAIO WE WOULD FAV») NICARAGUA'S PRESENCE. DIST: S, D, P, s/p, NSC* S/S, ARA, HA, vS/S=I BXDIS Files sjTW "AS * k ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIRED by John Rtzpatrick, 4/24/2017 MORlZATiON OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETMT E X D I S i Ttt m tliiili lAL INUUWINU Department of State TELEGRAM PAGE 01 USUN N 04059 02 OF 02 0101162 7098 ACTION SS-2S INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W 120331 010126Z /70 R 29040SZ SEP 79 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASHOC 2581 Tr ~ ir ~' W" '' F - 1 — o— t, -' fy - t— 1 -' « L SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 04059 EXDIS X D I S E. X D' h m •£’ E t lb 1 S 9. lAHRC VISIT. THE SECRETARY ASKED HOW THE VISIT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, WHICH hc TEH’h/TBu'A POSITIVE STEP. HAD GONE. PASTOR SAID THE VISIT HAD BEEN "VERY SATISFACTORY IN GENERAL TERMS" BECAUSE THE GOA HAD GIVEN FULL FACILITIES TO THE COMMISSION WHICH WAS ABLE TO CONDUCT ITS BUSINESS FREELY. HE BELIEVED THE REPORT WOULD BE OBJECTIVE. NORMAL AND REASONABLE. HE SAID. "WE DO NOT EXPECT APPLAUSE OR CONGRATULATIONS. BUT UNDER- STANDING. " HE FELT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION TO UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION TODAY AND THAT OBTAINING IN THE 1973-75 PERIOD IN ARGENTINA AND TO NOTE THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE. 10. HUMAN RIGHTS IN US/ARGENTINE RELATIONS. PASTOR SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN WHAT IS TEMPORARY OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND WHAT IS PERMANENT. HE SAID THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION HAD BEEN A REAL WAR AND ARGENTINA HAD SUFFERED AN INFLUX OF SUBVERSIVES FROM URUGUAY AND CHILE. "EVERY WAR," He POINTED OUT, "HAS ITS DEAD, ITS MISSING IN ACTION. AND ITS PRISONERS. " ARGENTINA, HOWEVER, WAS TRADITIONALLY A COUNTRY WHICH RESPECTS HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY; IT WOULD HAVE TO OVERCOME "THIS SAD PERIOD." IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT PERMANENT. NATIONAL SECURITY HAD TO TAKE PRIORITY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS; NOW THAT THE FORMER IS GUARANTEED. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES WOULD END RAPIDLY, THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED THE CONVICTION WITH WHICH MINISTER PASTOR HAD SPOKEN. THE US V.'AS CONCERNED, HOWEVER. ABOUT RE CENT D T SA PPF AR ANCF S AND HOPED THEY _WOUL D BE CLEARED UP, PASTOR SAID THE SECRETARY "COULD t)t ASSURED OF THAT. " HE ALSO EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BECOME AN ISSUE IN THE US ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. "WE DO NOT WANT TO BE ALL ARY RESPONDED THAT THE US a¥ fneSE ISSUES "AS a friend, PUTTING THE CARDS ON THE TABLE. “ WE HAD A MUTUAL CONCERN ON THESE ISSUES AND DIO NOT WISH THESE ISSUES TO DIVIDE US. X 0 I s 11. RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMEMBASSIES BUENOS AIRES AND MANAGUA. ABOVE TEXT HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH ARA DAS EATON. MCHENRY X 0 I s - tffiFlOENTIAL ns . MOT TO BE BEPRODUCEB WITMOUT THE AUIHOPIlftTIOM OF. THE EXECUTIVE SECRET UNCLASSIFIED 103. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tamoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) Washington, January 16, 1980 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Argentina, 1/79-1/80. Confidential. UNCLASSIFIED January 16, MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THE WHITE HOUSE / |e> S/S 8001008 cofmr i AT (Entire Text 1980 i \ t $ ! 4 ! I j I Subject: Consultations with Argentina on Human Rights On January 8, you advised us of President Cartsr!Ls j request for a proposed course of action on tfte suggestion j (BUENOS AIRES 0163) that the Argentine Government might : negotiate specific human rights improvements for a O.S. ! commitment not to condemn them in the meeting of the , i United Nations Commission on Human Rights next month. I Such a plan was drawn up, approved by the NSC, and transmitted to our Charge d'Affaires in Buenos Aires on January 11 (STATE 8592j.' However, earlier the same - | day, when delivering the message from President Carter } to President Videla urging Argentine cooperation with us on restricting grain and soybean sales to the ussw (STATE 8135) , our Charge, as instructed, raised this question. He told the Acting Foreign Minister that we had observed significant improvements in the Argentine human rights situation over the past year and had been i considering appropriate ways of recognizing these improvements (BUENOS AIRES 385). He then suggested that the Geneva session of the Human Rights Commission might be an occasion on which we could consult, should President videla so wish. The Acting Foreign Minister replied with great satisfaction, saying he would forward this news to President Videla. He asserted that recognition of Argentina's efforts in human rights was what the Government had wanted, and implied that genuine recognition would bring "understanding and support for Argentina." He said President videla would make a prompt reply to President Carter's message, and the meeting ended with his expression of optimism about the future of US-Argentine relations. Our Charge had planned to follow up this initial approach with a more substantive exchange with Colonel Cerda of the Office of the President as proposed in his original message. However, in the interim, the Ambassador has returned to Buenos Aires and now has been instructed to personally approach President videla to urge Argentine GDS 1/16/86 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Rtzpi^rick, 4/24/2017 e B NF I DENIIAL c - 2 - cooperation on grain sales and to propose that a special emissary b e sent to Argentina to discuss with tfte Gok k number of Issues, among them U.S. positions in multilateral fora dealing with human rights in Argentina (STATE 12183). If the GOA expresses interest in consultations with us as a result of our Charge's approach to the Acting Foreign Minister, as a result of any subsequent approach to Colonel Cerda, or after meeting with our special emissary, we would propose to follow the plan furnished to the Embassy earlier (STATE 8592). Specifically, we would seek from the GOA a commitment to release a certain number of prisoners by a set date (if possible, a schedule of releases); a commitment to additional releases under the right-of-option program; and a reaffirmation of previous Argentine statements, not fully honored to date, that disappearances definitively will cease. With regard to information about the disappeared, we plan to convey our continuing concern that the GOA find a way to inform families of their fate. For our part, we would plan to assure the Argentines that the United States does not and will not seek public censure or condemnation of the GOA in the coming meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Instead, we would look toward either s — a Commission request to the Secretary General to establish direct contact with the GOA; or — the Commission's appointment of a rapporteur to study the Argentine situation. We do not believe that the human rights situation in Argentina has improved sufficiently to warrant merely keeping the situation under review, nor do we believe that the other members of the Commission would wish to appoint a special investigatory committee, since this already has been done throuoh the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. We consider it unlikely that the Commission would seek to censure Argentina publicly, despite GOA fears, as this is the first time the Argentine case will come before the Commission. However, given Argentine fears, and the fact that both direct contacts by the Secretary General and the appointment of a rapporteur are confidential procedures, we believe it likely that our planned position will be acceptable. eONFIDCNTIAL COtflDEHTHL - 3 - We also shall seek from the Argentines a commitment not to lobby against or offer resistance to the proposed resolution in the UNCHR that the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities be given authority to establish a special group of experts to "make contacts with governments and families concerned to assist in locating missing and disappeared persons." In return for this, we would assure the Argentines that we would not introduce or support resolutions dealing solely with Argentina, Peter Tarnoff Executive Secretary 7 UNCWSSIFIED 104. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting Washington, January 22, 1980, 9-9:45 a.m. 1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Historical Material, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Box 31, Meetings — SCC 257: 1/22/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the top right-hand comer of the summary. In preparation for the meeting. Sick sent Brzezinski a January 22 memorandum outlining issues for discussion. (Ibid.) UNCLASSIFIED S ECRET SPECIAL COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING Januaxry 22, 1980 (7 Time and Place: 9:00 - 9:45 a.m. , White House Situation Room Subject: Iran, Olympics, Pakistan, Argentina, Yugoslavia, Intelligence, Military Deployments and Bartholontew/Murray Mission Participants : State Deputy Secretary Christopher David Newsom Harold Saunders l^cietis e Secretary Harold Brown Graham Claytor Vice President* s Office Denis Clift White House David Aaron Hedley Donovan Hamilton Jordan (briefly) Lloyd Cutler CIA Admiral Turner Frank Carlucci JCS General David Jones Lt. General John Pustay ^jpmitted here is material unrelated to Argentii^ NSC William Odom Gary Sick Thomas Thornton ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 - 2 - SE CRET Q mittod here fs-flfatciM imraiMea to ArgSalnar 7. Argentina . General Goodpaster has agreed to go to Argentina tonight. He will have a heavy series of briefings at State and the White House today. Mr. Clay tor said that a finding that Argentina had made substantial progress on human rights (in connection with the Kennedy Amendment) would be extremely helpful. Others noted that the Kennedy Amendment merely established a deadline (October 1, 1978) for Argentinian performance on human rights but indicated no relief for subsequent improvement. Mr. Newsom noted that this amendment would be much harder to lift than the Symington Amendment on Pakistan. The Argentinian record is still very bad, and the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report which is coming out soon will be extremely derogatory. Mr. Aaron said that General Goodpaster must have something to encourage the Argentines to be helpful. The instructions for his trip are being drafted and will be reviewed this afternoon, state wiii. take a new look at the legislation. We are prepared to be helpful to Argentina with respect to the UN Human Rights Commission. (S) SECRE T [Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina] UNCLASSIFIED 105. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs (Bushnell) to Secretary of State Vance Washington, January 22, 1980 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800028-2024. Confidential. Drafted by Whitman and Flood on January 21; sent through Christopher. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Vance saw it. UNCLASSIFIED ORIGINAL TO; FADRC 2 L DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION MEMORArpUM 1405 0 7 jr‘: ngg The Secretary COPIES TO; S D CXagFFPENT fMr (Entire text) P ARA TO; The Secretary H HA THRO; D - Mr. Christopher S/P S/S-S PROM: ARA - John A. B«shn< TMA RF(JAB) FROM: ARA - John A. Bushnell ISSDE FOR DECISION Whether to approve the ARA version or the HA version (or parts of each) of the O.S. Human Rights Report for Argentina. ESSENTIAL FACTORS The President has asked that you review the Human Rights report for Argentina. ARA and HA have reached substantial agreement on the major part of the Report's contents. However, significant differences remain in the introduction and in Section l.a. (torture), rnie attachnKsnt hiqhliohts the differences between the reports, ARA Position ARA believes that the version of the Introduction to the Bia&an Rights Report on Argentina that is being proposed by HA is unnecessarily provocative. In terms of our maintaining any powers of suasion with the Government of Argentina in the area of human rights, it could even be counter-productive; — The is well aware that the attention of the Congress, of the media, and of the public focuses most readily on the introduction to these reports. ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 2 - — The version proposed by HA is far more lengthy and substantially more detailed than those on other countries with human rights records no less serious than that of Argentina. — The detail contained in HA*s introduction is repeated in the body of the report. — There has been substantial improvement in human rights, Basket I, in 1979 for which the GOA should be given credit. — The length and weight of the historical detail of abuses tends to submerge the evidence of very real improvements, and makes it unduly severe and harsh in tone. It will be seen by the Argentines in this light. Argentines will compare this report with the ones on other countries and will be strengthened in their conviction that they are being singled out, that the United States has no intention of recognizing the progress they have made. Our actions in the public domain, and those by our representatives to the United Rations Commission on Human Bights and the private U.S. citizen member of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have already come under ^severe fire from the Argentines as being discriminatory. Any further exacerbation of their injured feelings might serve only to cut off our dialogue. As regards the description of torture, ARA's version refers to the severe psychological and physical abuse that took place, but avoids specifics which we believe are inappropriate in a Government report. Such minute detail will certainly be perceived as unduly inflammatory and provocative by Argentina. We have thus far retained considerable influence with the GOA, and have used it effectively in pressing for improvements in human rights. The HA version of the report would needlessly inflame relations and emotions. It would push Argentina toward greater isolation from us and the remainder of the Western world, and toward the Soviet Onion, which has quietly supported Argentina in multilateral fora on human rights. HA Position CWIgFI P gK Tffttr - 3 - The revision of the report proposed by HA is the result of extensive discussions with ARA's Office of East Coast Affairs (ARA/ECA) during the period before Christinas, which culminated in agreement on December 23, The alternative version resulted from . a post- holiday review of this text by the ARA Front Office. •’’he principal differences between the two reports lie in the introduction and with the section on torture: — Introduction: HA believes that ARA's revisipn tends to give the unintended impression that the Argentine Junta's repressive activities at least to some extent are justified, that the tone is unduly upbeat and optimistic, and that it omits essential information about the nature and extent of human rights violations in the country. Although most of the latter are covered in the body of the report, it is important to treat them in the introduction because: — the introduction sets the tone of the report? — as ARA points out, many readers focus almost exclusively on the introduction; and — as this is the first report on Argentina prepared during the Carter Administration, a more extensive treatment of historical antecedents is justified. Moreover, the length of the proposed introduction is not out of line with those in many of the other reports we have prepared this year. The introductions vary in length from a paragraph to four pages, in accordance with conditions in the country concerned. They tend to be longer for countries being covered for the first time, especially with serious human rights problems. — •'V>rture; ARA's version omits mention of torture methods. However, the guidelines approved last August by the Deputy Secretary for the preparation of all reports specifically requests the inclusion of this information. ARA's editorial revisions also soften the tone of this section; the same holds true for the opening irords of the following section (on Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishmenty. These sections would be substantially different from other reports. OONPIPE t TflAL GONFIDCN ' P Jftfc -4- ARA argues that adoption of the HA version vould complicate our relations with the Argentine Government. However, Congress established the requirements to submit human rights reports for the purpose of obtaining objective, accurate, and comprehensive information on human rights conditions, in all countries. The purpose of the report is not to praise or condemn individual governments. The Deputy Secretary's guidelines call for both objectivity and specificity, and we have followed these norms in preparing all 155 reports. Ho report has been deliberately softened, toughened, or otherwise modified because of the state of our relations with the country concerned. We should not. make an exception of Argentina# or appear to be willing to negotiate human rights principles for other objectives. Recommendations That you approve the ARA proposal. Approve Disapprove Approve Disapprove Alternatively, that you approve some combination of the two. you approve the HA pro^Kssal. , Approve Disapprove Attachment ; As stated. / Dr a f ted : ARA/ECA : GJWh i tman : BA : PFlood : mas 1/21/80 X29166 / / UNCLASSIFIED 106. Telegram From the Consulate General in Argentina to the Department of State Rio de Janeiro, January 26, 1980, 0527Z 313 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800002-0385. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 4 s e en er n/a, NOOXS eoifPIPBOTlWr" , PAGE 01 RIO OE 00313' 01 OF 02 2606562 ACTION NODS-00 INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /OOl W - 030646 260701Z /ll O 260527Z JAN 80 FM AMCraiSUIi RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC HIACT IMMEOIATE 8670 e 0 N T T U E N" T"! g~ ' g SECTION 1 OP 2 RIO OS JiUJlIRO 0313 NODIS FOR THE SBOiBTARY AND DR. BRZEZINSKI FR(»< GENERAL GOOOPASTER E.O, 1206S: GDS 1/25/85 (ROSER, CLAUS W.) OR-M TAGS: PGOV, PINR SUBJECT: GSIERAL GOOOPASTER 'S MISSION TO ARGENTINA: GENERAL REPORT -^e-ENTIRE TEXT) 1 . I BELIEVE DISCUSSIONS OP THE LAST THREE DAYS HAVE OPENED OPPORTUNITIES FOR US-ARGENTINE RELATICSIS WHICH SEEM PROMISING FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO FOLLOW OP. DURING THE TALKS I SOUGHT TO IMPRESS ON THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS BOTH THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WICH WE WOULD VIEW TWR EROSIION OF THE US GRAINS EMBARGO AND THE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA AS A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE COUNTRY OP THE WEST. 2. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS, I FEEL, APP!«aCHBD THE TALKS IN A POSITIVE, BUSINESS-LIKE MANNER. PRESIDENT VTOELA, RECALLING HIS MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE, EM- PHASIZED HIS DESIRE FOR SETTER RBLATICaiS. BUT ALL THE SENIOR ARGraiTINE OFFICIALS ALSO STRESSED THE ARGENTINE VIEW THAT MUCK OF ARGENTINA’S SUPPORT OF US INITIATIVES HAD GONE UNACKNOWLEDGED AND THAT US POLICIES HAD REQUENTLY CUNFlUEN'i'XAE' e e N P ian ffPi AL PM3B 02 RIO DS 00313 01 OF 02 2606562 FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOIBIT lUlGENTINA'S SEVHiE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO RECOGNIZE IMPROVEMENTS WHEN THEY OCCURRED. 3. THE ARGENTINE LEADERS RESPONDED WELL TO MY PRSSBNTATAIOH ON AFGHANISTAN. THEY APPEARED FULLY TO SHARE OUR VIEW ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MOVE, OUR CONCERNS FOR ITS BROADER STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR WESTERN UNITY. WHILE THEY REPEATEDLY QUESTIONED THE APPROPRIATENESS AND PROBABLE EFFECTIVB^SS OF THE •BOYCOTT" (UNDOUBTEDLY IN GOOD PART FOR TACTICAL REASONS) , THEY SEEMED GENUINELY IMPRESSED WITH THE RANGE, WEIGHT AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE MEASURES THE U.S. HAS TAKEN OR INITIATED. CmS FURTHER REPORT: IN THEIR RESPONSE, THEY ALSO NOTED ARGENTINA'S OWN RECENT STRUGGLE WITH LEFT- WING TERROR AND INSURGENCY WHICH HAD BROUGHT THEM, IN THEIR TERMS, ONLY "ISOLATION AND DISGRACE." 4. GRAINS EXPORTS. WHILE STANDING THEIR GROUND CW THE PUBLIC POSITION THEY HAD TAKEN, IN ESSENCE THE ARGENTINE LEADERS GAVE A POLITICAL AND MORAL CffllMITMENr THAT THEY MOULD SEEK TO PREVENT DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN NORMAL LEVELS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY MADE CLEAR THAT, GIVEN THIS PUBLIC POSTURE (AND THE ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 http://smartaichive.state.sgov,gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.S AS_... 7/1 9/201 3 Document View Page 2 of 4 POLITICAL REPRECUSSSIOHS IN ARGBUTIHft IF THEY HERB PER- CEIVED JIS GIVING IN TO U.S. PRESSURE} THEY HOOLD BE WILLING TO DO THIS ONLY THEOW3H INFORMAL AMJ PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS; AND THEY DECLINED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSSHIPMl^S BEYOND THEIR BORDERS, WHICH THEY ALLEGED HERE ONCONmtLLABLE BY THE GOA. TO THE EXTENT THEY MAKE GOOD ON THEIR WORD, THE DANGER OP MASSIVE DIRECT SOVIET PURCHASES WOULD HAVE BEEN AVERTED, EOT THIS LEAVES US RPT US WITH THE ^ALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF. INDIRECT PURCHASES. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT ee WFlBEBTI Ai; ' CUNFiUKNTiAL PAGE 03 RIO DE 00313 01 OF 02 2606S6Z OBJECT TO OUR PURSUING THIS PROBLEM WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND TRADING C(NtPANIES, AND THEY GAVE SOME INDICATIONS OF COOPERATION ON ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY RELUCTANT AND THIS HILL REQUIRE FOLLOW-UP (ADDITIONAL DETAIL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OP SEPTBL.), 5. mmm rights, the forthcmiing oas report^ CLEARLY IS OF INTENSE CONCERN TO THEM, AS IS THE US GOVERNMENT'S OWN REPORT. THEY HAD AraUTTED THE lAKRC BECAUSE THEY EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE REFORMS AND IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP, ALONG WITH THE DISMAL RECORD OF THEIR "DIRTY WAR." (IN PRIVATE, THEY STATED BITTERLY THAT THE CCNmiSSION STAFF HAS BEEN (WHBLPFUL AND PARTIAL, CITING THE PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF SOME OF ITS KEY MEMB^S.) THEY ASKED WHETHER HE COULD BE OF HELP IN THE NEXT PHASE OP THE CCMHISSIONS DILIBBRATIONS . WE, OF COURSE, STRESSED THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CC»miSSION AND OUR INTUBILITY TO INFLUENCE THE COMMISSION IN ITS REVIEW OF THE GOA'S COMMENTS (M THE DRAFT REPORT (DUE IN THE CCSWISSIQN NEXT MONTH.) 6. W1 EMPHASIZED THAT THE US INTEREST WAS MOT IN ARGQITINA'S INTEI^ATIONAL CENSURE BUT IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. (THE TENSION WHICH HAS PREVIOUSLY IN EVIDENCE WAS REDUCED CONSIDERABLY BY THIS STATEMENT.) THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION OF THE FORTHCOMING UNHHC CONFTDBWnm NNN eoMPiBa iT iAii ' PAGE 01 RIO DE 00313 02 OP 02 2e0704Z ACTION NODS -00 INFO OCT- 01 ADS-00 /OOl W 030660 260710Z /12 O 260S27Z JAN 80 FM AMO^SUL RIO DE JANEIRO TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8671 CONFIDBH T 1 A" t SECTION 2 OF 2 RIO DE JANEIRO 0313 TODIS MEETING; WE INDICATED THAT THE US, WHILE CCW- CERNBD TO MAITAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE COMMISSIWS WORK, WOULD SUPPORT MODERATE APPROACHES ON AGENDA ITEMS AFFECTING ARGENTINA. THE ARGENTINES SAID THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE PROPOSAL IN THE UNHRC FOR A GENERAL PROCEDURE FOR DEALING THE QUESTION OP HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS http://smartarchive.state.sgov,gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=(Kibc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/19/2013 Document View Page 3 of 4 DETAIHS3 OR IMJPRISOKSD . TREY EXPRESSED SOME CONCBRH THAT AM ATTEMPT MIGHT BE MRDE (POSSIBLY BY CAMADA) TO INTRODUCE A RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY CENSURING ARGENTINA; HE REPEATED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENT TO CENSURE ARGENTINA. 7. WITH RESPECT TO THE COMPLAINTS AG^thST ARGENTIlOl UNDER IHE OaiFIDENTIAL 1503 PROCEDURE, THE ARGKMXiWC OFFICTSE REQUESTED US SUPPORT FOR A DECISICRI BY THE COMMISSION TO KEEP THE ARGENTINE SITUATION UNDER REVISE, IN VIEW OF CONTINUING AND PROSPECTIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN ARGEINTINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS SITTOTION. WE STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CimRBNT US POSITimr and that we would have to refer their REQUEST TO WASHINGTCSl. 8. NUCLEAR ISSUES.* THE ARGHITINE LEADERS, AS WOULD BE EXPECTED, DISPLAYED A STRONG INTEREST AND SENSITIVITIES OVER US POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THIS AREA. FOREIGN MINISTER PASTOR STATED THAT THEIR PROGRAM WAS FOR PEACEFUL USES ONLY; ARGENTINA HAD NO DESIRE TO EXERCISE eoNPiBa r riAL e owFiBBrriAL PAGE 02 RIO DB 00313 02 OF 02 260704Z A NUCLEAR OPTION AND WOULD DO SO ONLY IF REQUIRED BY WORLD-WIDE OR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS (HE MENTIONED BRAZIL AND CHILE) . HE SAID THAT THE RATIFICATION OF THE TLATILOLCO TREATY MUST AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF AN APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS J^RE]0(SNT WITH THE IAEA, NEGOTIATIONS FOR WHICH ARE NOW UNDER WAY. (I UNDER- STAND THERE MAY BE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THE ARGENTINES WANTED.) 9. THE ARGENTINE OFFICIALS RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SWISS AND THE FRG. WE STRESSED THAT THE US OBJECTIVE HAD NOT BEEN TO STOP THE SALES OR TO DENY TECHNOLOGY BUT LEGITIMATE COFTCERN OVER SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS AS ARGENTINA IS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. PURSUANT TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS WE STATED THAT THE US WOULD SHORTLY SUBMIT A REPLY ON THE ASSURKANCES WE REQUIRE IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE PENDING SHIPMENTS OF NUCLEAR FUEL FOR AIKSENTINA'S RE- SEARCH REACTORS. 10. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. MB DETECTED CONSIDlSABI£ INTEREST IN THE RESUMPTION OP A RELATIONSHIP AMONG OUR ARMED FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUESTION, WE STATED THAT HE COULD SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF LIFTING OP THE HUMPHREY-KENNEDY AMENDMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE RESTORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MILITARY RELATIONS WAS AN INTEREST BOTH COUNTIRIS SHARED. AS FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THIS GOAL WE SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OP VISITS AND JOINT EXERCISES, PERSONNEL EXCHANGES AND CONSULTATIONS OHI SECURITY MATTERS. THEY EVIDENCED INTEREST IN ALL OF THESE. 11. GENERAL CONSULTATIONS. IN THE DISCUSSIONS THERE ee«FID 8WTI «C TONFTDENTTJa: PAGE 03 RIO DE 00313 02 OF 02 260704Z SEEMED TO BE AGREEMENT THAT INCREASED C<»7SUDTATIONS WERE required AS A MEANS OF DEEPBMIl® AND IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS . 12. THE ARGENTINES RAISED NUMEROUS OTHER POINTS WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPTELS AND MBMCONb. 13. AN ATMOSPHERE OP CORDIALITY WAS MAINTAINED THROUGHOUT EVEN WHEN CONTENTIOUS POINTS WERE DISCUSSED. MY OVER- http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/19/2013 Document View Page 4 of 4 sij;, ASsassMiHT rs that ths talks had a positive effect. DEWITT CONFI ' OEHTiaX T f NHN — SECRET” n/a, NOOIS http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 7/19/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 107. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, March 26, 1980, 2134Z 2604 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800005-0023. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 3 secRg T n/a, NODIS SICHKI PRGS 01 Bvmos 02604 01 OF 02 262224Z ACTION NODS -00 INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /OOl W 095600 262229Z /62 O 262134Z HAR 80 FH AHBMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATB WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4797 "S ' "E C «~"8 T SBCTICW 1 OP 2 BUENOS AIRES 2604 NODIS . FOR THE SECRETARY PROM AMBASSADOR SMITH E.O. 12065: XDS-1 (3/26/10) (SMITH, GERARD) TAGS: ENRG SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF MY VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES 1. TST ENTIRE TEXT 2. CONDITIONS FOR OUR VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES HERE HOT AUSPICIOUS. WHILE WE HELD TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY CASTRO MADSku, HIS DEPUTY WAS IN MOSCOW AT THE SOVIET'S INVITATICRI. A HIGH-LEVEL GERMAN DELEGATION, HEADED BY VAN WELL, HAS ALSO HERE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ATUCHA II REACTOR. DURING OUR TALKS WITH VIDELA, PASTOR, MARTINEZ DE HOZ; GALTIERI AND VIOLA WE STRESSED THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH HE VIEW THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, THAT THERE WILL BE NO 1 LURCH TOWARDS DETENTE, " AND OUR AIM TO STRENGTHEN RELATKRIS WITH ARGENTINA. 3. THERE CLEARLY REMAIN DEEP DIFFERENCES ON MAJOR ISSUES FROM NWI-PROLIFERATIOK TO CENTRAL AMERICAN STRATEGY. SOME OF THE EXPECTATIONS QE.-OOODVEMEMT C»i MILITARY RELATIONS AND OUR ATTITUDE IN THE OAS C»I THE lAHRC'S HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT IMPORTANT TESTS OF WHETHER WE SHARE THEIR DESIRE FOR COOPERATI(»I. MY PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS ARB: A) WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REBUILD THE RELA- TI(»1SHIP. ARGENTINA'S HUNAN RIGHTS SITUATION HAS IM- PROVED OVER THE PAST YEAR — MORE SO THAN THEY ARB INTERNATIIONALLY BEING GIVEN CREDIT FOR, ARGENTINA IS AN IMPORTANT NATION, WITH CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON MAJOR US INTERESTS, AND ONE WITH WHICH HE SHOULD HAVE DECENT WORKING RBLATIC»S. B) HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR POLICIES SHOUI^ BE BASED e»7 CURRENT PERFORMANCE, HOT THE GRIM RECORD OF THE PAST. WE SHOULD BE CSNCIRNID WITH CURRENT SECURITY PRACTICES, THE CURRENT QUALITY OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURES, AND THE ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 4/29/2013 Document View Page 2 of ^ OPENNESS OP ’THE BHERGING POIiITZCAI. OZALOGOB. BUT I QUESTION WHETHER AH ACCOUNTING OF THE PATS OP THE THOOSANOS OP DISAPPEARANCES IS A REAIiISTIC CBJECTIVB AT THIS TIMS; MS SHOOIZJ, CONTIOTE TO UIK3E MOVES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, BUT WITBOUT MAKING OUR RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA HOSTAGE TO THIS ISSUE. (MO MAJOR ARGENTINE POLITICIAN SEEKS SUCH AH ACCOUNTING.) C) POLITICAL EVOLUTION. MOST OF ARGENTINA'S MILITARY LEADERSHIP WISHES TO RETURN ARGENTINA TO ITS DEMOCRATIC TRADITIONS -- IN A MANNER THAT MOULD AVOID PAST PATTERNS hTEdCBTr^ . SECRE T PiUSE 03 BUENOS 02S04 OX OP 02 262224Z OF CHRCallC INSTABILITY. BUT WHILE PROGRESSIVE IMPROVE- MENT IN THE SECURITY OP THE PERSON CAN BE EXPECTED, THE INSTALLATICRT OP AH EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WILL BE A MATTER OF YEARS. TOO MUCH OF THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE HAS BEEN DESTROYED BY PBROHISM AND ITS AFTERMATH. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT PRESSURE AND SANCTIONS WILL ACCELERATE THIS PROCESS. D) NON-PROLIFERATION. THERE HAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT DURING MY TALKS THAT ARGENTINA MILL RATIFY TLATELOLCO ANY TIME SOON; ON FULL- SCOPE SAFEGUARDS WE AGREED TO DISAGREE. ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS HELL ADVANCED AND WILL MOVE AHEAD UNDER ABLE LEADERSHIP. OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVE, MUST BE TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE HEMISPHERE. THE ARGENTINE LEADERSHIP HAY BE ON THE THRESHOLD OF CONCERN OVER GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROLIFERATICRI AND HAY BE INTER- ESTED IN A DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL SOLUTION. THEIR NEW COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH BRAZIL OFFER HOPE OF FOSTERING MUTUAL RESTRAINT AND CmPIOENCE BETWEEN THESE TWO COUNTRIES AND MERIT OUR SUPPORT. SECRET NNN " 5EC K ET PAGE 01 BUENOS 02604 02 OF 02 2e2229Z ACTION HODS -00 INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /OOl W 09S614 262230Z /62 O 2e2134Z MAR 80 AM0IBASSY BUENOS AIRES TO SECSTATE WASKDC SIMTt IMMEDIATE 4798 SEC R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BUENOS AIRES 2604 HODIS E) BILATERAL NUCLEAR COOPERATION. FOR THE PRESENT? THE ARGENTINES DO NOT APPEAR INTERESTED IN COOPERATION BEYOMO THE SUPLY OF FUEL FOR THEIR RESEARCH REACTORS, TO WHICH HE ARB COMMITTED. MB SHOULD, HOWEVER, MAIN- TAIN REMAINING LINKS TO THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM BY RE- SOLVING THE RELATED SAFEGUARDS ISSUE TN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF US LAW. I THINK WE CAN SOLVE THE ISSUE ON THAT BASIS, F) OLYMPICS AND GRAINS BIBAE^O. THERE IS A REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARGENTINES ULTIMATELY WILL WITH- DRAW FROM THE MOSCCMI GAMES, AND THEY COULD HELP SWING http://smartaichive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/Doc View.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 4/29/2013 Document View Page 3 of 3 THl OTHER lATIS AMSHICftN COHKTRIIS. ( WE SHOULD KEEP THEM CORRENTLX ISEORMBD ABOUT Otffi CXSUNT OF THE HWffiER OP PROSPECTIVE WM-PARTICI PASTS. (W GRAIHS, I SIB !JO JUSTIFICATION FOR ACCUSING THEM OF HAVING UNDERCUT THE GOODPASTBR UNDERSTANDING. THEY HAVE A CASS THAT MB HAVE UNDERSOLD THEM IN THEIR TRADITIONAL MARKETS. THE GRAIN THEY NOW HAVE AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT HAS BEEN SEVERELY REDUCED BY DROUGHT AND THUS THEY MO LCWGER HAVE FUTURE ABILITY TO AFFECT A MAJOR PART OF OUR msm^. B) CENTRAL AMERICA. THE AGREHTINE LEADERSHIP IS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT REGION. SECRET" sioorf PAGE 02 BUENOS 02£O4 02 OF 02 2S222SZ THEY HAVE DECIDED TO FOCUS THEIR SUPPORT ON GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS, AND ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS IN NICARAGUA AND EL SALVATOR. H) RELATICRIS HIT THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS O^INUB TO PROBE FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND COOPERATION. THEY HAVE BEC(»4B ONE OF AGRENTINA'S LARGER TRADING PARTNERS IN RECENT YEARS, COOPERATE WITH ARGENTINA IN THE UN. AND NOW PR(»B ARGENTINE INTEREST IN MILITARY SALES AMD NUCLEAR COOPERATION. THIS SHOULD BE A NATTER OF REAL CONCl!® TO US. 4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE HI SHOULD CCRTTIHOE CLOSE CONSOLATIONS OH SUCH MATTERS AS CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE FORTH-COMING lAHRC REPORT. I ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE PROCEED WITH AN INVITATION TO THE ARMY CHIEF-OF- STAFF, GENERAL VJ^USRO, SOMETIME THIS SUMMER, IP DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO ARGENTINA CONTD*m» FAVORABL'B. there is MERIT IN ECONWIC TALKS. MHICH I UNDERSTAND ARE SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS YEAR, AND IN PERMITTING THE PURCHASE OF SUCH TECHNICAL SERVICES UNDER AID'S REIMBURSABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS THEY MIGHT FIND OF INTEREST, OR THE PROGRAM OF TBOOIICAL COOPBRATIC»I WORKED OUT BETWEEN USDA AND THE ARGENTINE SECRETARIAT OF AHGICOLTURE. ON THE OTHER BAND, WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT HE SEE NO POSSIBILITY OF CHAINING OUR VOTE IN THE IFI'S OR LIPTIIB3 THE PROHIBITION ON MILITARY SALES AND TRAINITO UNTIL THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND IMAGE FURTHER IMPROVES. DIALOGUE SHOULD BE CONTINUEO ON POLITICAL APPROACHES TO GUmL AND RBGI(»IAL PROLIFERATICRI PROBLBSM. CASTRO -5BC1BT ' " s e cmr r n/a, NODZS http://smartarchive.state.sgov.gov/ui/view/DocView.aspx?key=odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_... 4/29/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 108. Memorandum of Conversation Washington, May 6, 1980, 2:30-2:50pm 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 5/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Owen, Deal, and Pastor. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office. UNCLASSIFIED THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON GOHPIDEMTB gr- MEMOBAEDOM OF COHVERSAnOH PAHICIPAIITS; DATE AND TIME: PLACE: Argentiaa Jose HarCinez de Ebz« Minister of the Economy Ambassador Jorge A. Aja EspU Dnlted States Zbigniew Brzezlnski* Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Thomas Thornton, Staff Member, National Security Council Tuesday, May 6, 1980 2:30-2:50 p.m. Dr. Brzazlnstci's Office SUBJECT: US-Argentine lelations; Grain Sales; Soviet Politics tC) Dr. Brzezinski opened by welcoming the warming trend in US-Argentine relations but stated his great concern about Argentine grain exports to the Soviet Union. Be stressed the need to take tangible actions to show the depth of Western con- cern and resolve. This involves sacrifices, which we are making. Dr. Brzezinski went on to discuss in some detail the strategic BManing to the West of the Soviet move into Afghanistan ~ affecting not only the immediate region but all of the non-communist world. The increase In Argentine grain sales diminishes the Impact of Western pressure on the USSR and it i s strange to see a country of Argentina's tradition playing such a role Brzezinski closed by saying that he found frictlnns in US-Argentine relations be unnatural and thus wanted to address the grain problesa frankly. tU)* Martinez de Hoz reassured Dr. Brzezinski of Argentina’s commitment to the West and went on to restate Argentina's rationale on its trade with the Soviet Union. In speaking of the Argentine-Soviet grain sales agreement, Martinez said that the figures Involved would be less than 1980, which is recognized as a peak year. He urged that the focus of pressure on the Soviets not be limited to grain but be extended to such things as European sales of capital goods. He urged a global comprehensive policy against Communist expansion. -^6^ coNPiDENT iar: Declassify on May 6, 2010 Extended by Zbigniew Brzezinski Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(a) ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 2851 » . « COlO'IDENTB ttr 2 Dr. Srzezlnaki observed that seeking a total solution often leads to no solution and noted that we are fiorking with the Europeans to limit techMlogy sales and tighten COCOH. He again returned to the question of Argentine grain sales noting that the growth had accelerated greatly this year and this made it harder for us to keep the other major suppliers on board. Be urged Martinez to think about this problem not just in bilateral terms but in light of Argentina's role as a member of the West. It would be a pity if Argentina were seen by history to have plaved the saxse kind of role that France played when Hitler occupied the Rheinland. Martinez de Hoz said that Argentina wants to take a stand but frankly doubts that grain embargos will be effective. Brzezinskl promised to supply information to Argentina to demonstrate that the embargo is being effective. Dr, Brzezii^ki agreed that there are problems for Argentina in implen^ting sanc- tions but said that more can always be done if there is determination. Argentina is, after all, one of the world's major countries and has a critical role to play. -(cy cc: Henry Owen Tim Deal Robert Pastor CONFIPES T IAT UNCLASSIFIED 109. Paper Prepared in the Department of State Washington, May 12, 1980 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Subject Files, Box 102, PRC: Argentina, 5/14/80: 5/80. Secret. Drafted by Eaton, Ruser, and Whitman; cleared in draft by Dworkin, Flood, and Buchanan and in P, S/P, S/MS, EUR, E, EB, S/AS, INR/RAR, INR/RSE, OES, PM/ISP, PM/SAS, 10, ARA/PPC, and ARA/RPP. Dodson sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Bergland, Duncan, Earle, Jones, and Turner under a May 12 covering memorandum. UNCLASSIFIED ISSUES PAPER - ARGENTINA I. TEE SSTTII^ The United States has three major interests in Argentina? East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. It also has significant interests in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade and investment relations. The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits have introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship while making a promising start at reducing the differences. The current status of our interests is as follows: East-West Relations . As part of its probings to expand political and economic influence in South America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded to a limited degree because of: — a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities; — a strong desire for Soviet support in international fora on human rights matters; — an interest in keeping open the possibility of nuclear supplies; and — some desire for greater balance in its foreign relations between East and West. However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect for at least the next four to seven years have no desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural inclination for economic and political reasons toward warmer bilateral relations. Our Improved dialogue with Argentina since January has produced: — repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic commitment to the West; GDS 5/10/86 ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Rtzpatrick, 4/24/201 7 - 2 - — a degree of cooperation on grains exports despite our late start on consultationsi and — greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America. The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's decision to join the Olympics boycott. Huclear Nonproliferation . It is clear that Argentina will insist '"on "the "continued developnent of its nuclear technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that it will not respond to pressure on these matters. Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own long-term self-interests will lead it more toward safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, sy^olized by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled for Hay 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina is still considering whether to proceed now with the ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine interpretation that the Treaty permits the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful, and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements to maintain limited nuclear cooperation. \ Human Rights . The status of human rights remains a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement on the facts of the situation, views differ on the scope and significance of the improvements that have, occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, a central human rights concern, have declined, as have the number of political prisoners. We are aware of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There reportedly were 44 disappearances last yeari 55 a month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, however, that suspected active terrorists would continue to be dealt with summarily. There is no present prospect that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands of ^ople who have disappeared in recent years. GOA officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA officials say ‘that, although there is insufficient evidence to try the others, the security forces regard 3 - them 8S dangerous and do not plan to release them. The latter group includes some persons who bene fitted from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state of siege and lack of due process continue. The military government has committed itself to eventual return to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future form of Argentina’s political party system, especially the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue with political leaders is now beginning, although political party activity remains prohibited. In the economic area, the government continues to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector while strengthening the functions of provincial and local governments, progressively bring inflation, under control, and encourage foreign investment as part of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate of investment. In the short term, these policies have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower- middle income groups, lowever, full employment has been maintained as part of a deliberate government policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In the longer term, these policies could produce sustained dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized economic system more compatible with a pluralistic political order than the statist centralism of the Per on period. Argentine officials and human rights activists have praised our human rights report this year as balanced and objective. There were difficulties between the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February- March. These reflected honest differences over substantive issues such as the new disappearance procedure and the draft torture convention. The Argentines will be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations of their human rights performance later this year and early next year; they want to see an end to the Huraphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales, and positive U.S. votes in the international financial institutions. OHO nu t " -4 The discussion paper previously distributed sitive trends in the h\im«m rights area but should not try to repeal the Himphrey-Kennedy Amendment SECR ET- 2972 Add-on SECRET at this time since that would be impossible with the present Congress emd politically unwise. This Option B needs fine tuning from the Interdepartmental Group; what we should do in the coming months is to warm up our relationship with Argentina. Perhaps in 1981 we will be able to have an initiative on the milit2Lry side, including training at least. Hodges said he was encouraged by Christopher's summation. for the trends in human rights are importeuit. The Commerce Depart- ment also supports Option B. Aaron said that we needed a specific program to improve our re- lations. The options as stated in the paper axe too static. Oiir goals should be first, to maintain a nuclear relationship that will result in Argentine accession to the Tlatelolco Treaty; secondly, a commercial policy that makes clear that we want the hydroelectric contract and will pursue it; third, there is no possibility of changing the military legislation now; fourth, there is a major OAS vote coming up and how we react will be a signal to them. We should relate that to the policy issues. Overall, we should have a tone that rests somewhere between Options B and C, leaving out for the time being any ch 2 mge in our military supply policy. The Inter- departmental Group should set up an 18 -month program with benchmarks for our progress and for Argentine performance. At the same time Aaron noted that there is no reason to improve relations dramatically with Argentina now directly after they have stuck their finger in our eye on the grain issue. We should make clear our irritation with them at this time and then pick up the pieces with a new administration when it comes into office. We will not be able to get very far with Videla. We should take the opportunity .of the new adminis- tration, however, for turning a new page. If we move to im- prove our relations with them now we will simply not have the respect of the Argentinicuis . Cl ay tor said that he saw Option C as the desirable goal, less the repeal of the Humphrey-Kezmedy Amendment which would be impossible. We should do all that we can with the Argentine militcury to restore relations between our two armed services. At the moment we are driving them to the Soviets. The Soviets are our greatest global problem and we are simply letting small things interfere with our dealing with this problem. SECRET 2972 Add-on SEORBg - 6 Pustay supported Clayt»r's statement and noted that we now have a number of opportunities to increase contacts with the Argentine militeury and JCS wsuld like to pursue them. He noted for instance the Galtieri (sic/) invitation which is being held up in State Depaxtment, Pustay said that Galtieri is prepared to come. Bushnell said we had received mixed signals. Galtieri, for his own political puxrposes, wauld like to receive the invitation but not actually accept it until after the Pr eside ntial decision is made in September in Argentina. Whatever we do we are T:ikely to become involved in Argentine politics. He also asked whether, following so close on their poor performance on grain, we want to give this signal of reward to them. Owen cautioned that we should be careful about assuming that the Argentinians will do the worst possible things on grain. It is conceivable that even if they have signed an agreement with the Soviets they may have some marginal flexibility. We should not take reprisals against them until they publicly azinounce the content of their agreement with the Soviets. Bushnell said that the announcement will not tell us very much in all likelihood. In any event the reality will depend on the Argentine harvest levels and we will not know that for some' six months. Aaron pointed out that we had pushed the Argentines very hard on the grain issue and wondered whether we are now going to let them undermine us, Owen pointed out that nobody else is likely to cooperate with us either next year. Pustay , returning to the question of General Galtieri 's visit, said tdiat it should be borne in mind that Galtieri had been instrumental in the positive decision that Argentina made on the Olympics. Keeny observed that we should maintain a nuclear relationship but we should not push it to the brink of what the law permits if this would undercut our non-proliferation efforts elsewhere. Christopher summarized the meeting by pointing out that there seemed to be no stark alternatives that need to be put to the President. It was generally agreed that: SECRET 2972 Add-on CECKB^ 7 1. There is enough human rights progress to justify movement towards improvement in our relationship. 2. Over the next six months events will be conditioned by the electoral situation in Argentina. 3. We will also have see whether we need to react to the Argentinian decision on grain. These axe short-term items which the Interdepartmental Group can review as it goes along. On the longer term: 4. If there is continued improvement in the humaui rights situ- ation in Argentina we should seek improvement in our relations with the new regime. The Interdepartmental Group will work out in detail what this improvement might involve. SECRET ' UNCLASSIFIED 111 . Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter Washington, June 14, 1980 1 Source; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country Files, Box 1, Argentina, 6-11/80. Secret. No drafting information appears in this memorandum. Concurred in H, EB, OES, PM, EUR/SOV, EUR/RMP, 10, S/AS, USOAS, AID/RDP, OPIC, SIR, DOD/ISA, JCS, CIA, Commerce, Treasury, USDA, DOE, EXIM, ACDA, ICA, and L/PM and by Derian, Lake and Thornton. In the right-hand margin. Carter wrote, “Ed- good ideas. Same process should be followed with other difficult countries. J.” UNCLASSIFIED 8012956 J7/7 3717 MEMORANDUM FOR; From; Subject; DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON rT" Steps To Improve U. S, -Argentine Relations June 14, 1980 THE PRESIDENT Warren Christopher, Acting UJ-d-. /, Pursuant to your instructions, the Inter-Agency Group for the American Republics has prepared a plan of action for 1980, which 1 am submitting for your approval. I. OBJECTIVES Our principal objectives in moving to improve our relationship with Argentina are to: — foster Argentina's identification with the West and thus to contain Soviet political and economic influence? — encourage further specific improvements in human rights practices? — seek assistance on appropriate East-West issues (e.g. grains); and — obtain progress on nonproliferation objectives, particularly full-scope safeguards and ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and foster increased sensitivity among Argentine leaders to global nonproliferation concerns. We also wish to encourage continued Argentine cooperation with the Papal mediation of Argentina's dispute with Chile over territorial limits in the Beagle Channel, a dispute that very nearly led to war between the two countries in late 1978. Finally, we wish to encourage Argentina to play a constructive role with respect to developments in Central America and other Hemispheric issues, . ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 2 II. ACTIONS FOR 1980 1. The Consultative Process We will continue the process of political and economic consultations begun with General Goo^aster's visit to Buenos Aires in January, we contempiaces — a visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affafri^ tO " ^6nos -S±rg 5 , pOSsibiy AbOUr i iti gTOt 1, during which he will review our policy concerns and the state of our relations and will be prepared to discuss steps we would plan to take to strengthen cooperation in selected areas, depending on the nature of the Argentine response. — a meeting of the D.S. -Argentine Mixed Economic Commission in October, the O.S. delegation possibly to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The meeting would include discussion of ongoing efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and to expand commercial relations. — periodic policy talks on global and hemispheric issues , with the' Hrst round to be held during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. 2. Military Relations We will begin to rebuild relations through increased contact and consultations, while stressing that further progress on human rights will be essential to the more fundamental improvement in these relations (including consideration of modification of the Humphrey/Kennedy Amendment, as reported in the conclusions of ^he PRC meetingj. We plan to: — begin periodic security consultations with Argentina ? the first round, to be held this year in Buenos Aires, would focus on Soviet activities in the South Atlantic; — invite an Argentine Armed Forces team to make a return visit to Washington later in the year to discuss global defense issues; — invite Argentina to send a guest instructor to the D.S. Army School of the Americas after consulting Q cr D 37/1 - 3 - with members of Congress to ensure that this initiative would not be regarded as conflicUng with the spirit of the Humph rey-Kennedy Amendment. f Other issues are: — High-Level Military Visit . We will keep under review the desirability of proceeding with an invitation to a senior Argentine military leader (such as the Commander-in-Chlef of the Argentine Army or the Army Chief-of-Staf f ) to visit Washington this year. A final decision on cnis (including the question of timing) should take into account the implications of such a move on the selection of the next Argentine president now under way within the Argentine Armed Forces, as well as continued improvements in the observance of human rights and developments in U. S. -Argentine relations. — Sale of P-3 Aircraft . In DOD's view, there is a strategic need for the sale of ocean surveillance aircraft to the GOA. We see no possibility, however, of seeking special legislation which would modify the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment to permit the sale of these aircraft to Argentina this year. 3. Human Rights We will continue the dialogue on human rights with Argentine leaders, principally but not exclusively through Ambassador Castro and during the visit by the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Ambassador Bowdler. In these consultations we will attempt to obtain assurances that: — the GOA will accept an OASGA resolution which recognizes the role of the OAS Commission on Human Rights and which encompasses a call for further improvements by Argentina; — there will be no new disappearances, including no disappearances of persons alleged to be terrorists; — all persons suspected of terrorism or subversive activities, including unacknowledged detainees, will Q cr. P CT QC.Ui"u - 4 £«» I J‘7f7 be processed through normal judicial channels and ensured due process? — guarantees will be instituted to prevent the torture of detainees; and — there be substantial progress, in advance of the OASGA, in reducing the number of political prisoners held without charges through release, trial, or exile (during his recent visit. Ambassador Smith was assured that half of these prisoners — 1,300 at the time — would be released or sentenced by the end of the year). The Inter-Agency Group noted that an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons was being addressed in ON fora and concluded that, while this should not be a central requirement for the improvement of our bilateral relations, it should remain an_impartant O.S. objective. We should urge Argentina, in bilateral discussions, to cooperate with these multilateral efforts, particularly with the ON Human Rights Commission's new expert working group on disappeared persons and with other groups such as the Catholic Church. In addition to human rights discussions initiated by the Ambassador and by Assistant Secretary Bowdler, the U.S. side of the Mixed Economic Commission will be prepared to raise or respond to human rights concerns in discussions with their Argentine counterparts, and will be fully briefed for this purpose. 4. Nuclear Relations We want to move Argentina over time to accept IAEA safeguards on future as well as current facilities (including the reprocessing facility) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To do this, we need to keep open the door for continued cooperation with Argentina's nuclear program to the extent commensurate with your policy. We should: — try to resolve promptly, in accordance with D.S. law and our nonproliferation objectives, the remaining safeguards issues to permit delivery of highly and moderately enriched fuel for Argentina's research program, as well as components for its power program; 37/7 — once this is done, undertake a review of the conditions under which we could facilitate expanded participation by O.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program, (A major case currently at issue is an export license application for the sale of a pressure vessel for the Atucha II power reactor. ) 5. Other Cooperative Steps In addition, we would: — Sign the pending O.S. -Argentine Agricultural Cooperation Agreement during the visit of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs? — Seek to conclude the negotiations for the bilateral income tax treaty? — Seek to negotiate a consular convention . 6. Consultations with Other Allies The Inter-Agency Group also considered whether and in what form the Administration should consult our NATO allies and Japan about issues of common concern such as human rights and recent Soviet Initiatives toward Argentina and other countries in the Hemisphere. These subjects and our policies thereon could be discussed within NATO fora such as the Political Advisors Committee, the Permanent council, and the NATO experts group on Latin America. Depending on the results of these consultations, we could consider further actions in Buenos Aires. A majority of the Interagency Group recommended against new high-level bilateral approaches to our Allies on these issues. We would continue the practice of consulting on human rights in the appropriate ON fora, such as the UN Human Rights Commission. 7. Implications for O.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Chile The Group also considered the implications for neighboring countries, especially as regards security consultations. With respect to Brazil, the Group noted that many of these steps will restore a better balance -SESREf - 6 - in U.S. relations with the two countries, since the U.S. already has a comprehensive consultative process with Brazil (including, most recently, security consultations) Chile is concerned about our improving relationship with Argentina, which it sees as threatening in the context of the Beagle Channel dispute. We have attempted to persuade the Chileans that what we are doing with Argentina has nothing to do with Chile or with our position on the Beagle Channel, which is to encourage acceptance of the outcome of Papal mediation and avoidance of war. This issue will be more fully addressed in the review of our relations with Chile later this year. Concurrences H - Mr. J. Brian Atwood EB - Mr Deane Hinton HA - Ms. Patt Derian OES - Mr. Louis Nosenzo PM - Mr. Daniel O' Donohue EDR/SOV - Mr. Robert Peri to EtJR/RMP - Mr. Stephen Ledogar S/P - Mr. Anthony Lake 10 - Mr. Michael Newlin S/AS - Mr. Allen Locke DSOAS - Mr. Herbert Thompson AID/RDP - Mr. David Raymond NSC - Mr. Thomas Thornton OPIC - Ms. Caryl Bernstein STR - Mr. Robert Hormatz DOD/ISA - Col. Patrick Briggs JCS - Admiral J.A. r.vons E.O. 13526 3.5(c) Commerce - Mr. A. Katz Treasury - Mr. Fred Bergsten DSDA - Mr. Dale Hathaway DOE - Mr. Les Goldman EXIMBANK - Mr. Grafton ACDA - Mr. Charles Van Doren ICA - Mr. Victor Olason L/PM - Mr. T. Borek UNCLASSIFIED 112 . Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter Washington, July 3, 1980 1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office Fil Country Chron File, Box 3, Argentina, 1979-1980. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Zbig” in the top right-hand comer. UNCLASSIFIED •^7 ^ copy CABTERlIBfiAfl? ' N - MEMbRANDUM f THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON July 3, 1980 '• . SECRB? ACTION MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM; SUBJECT ; THE PRESIDENT ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKi Report on7 US -Argentine Relations advance our dialogue with the Argentines on the Issues of grain sales to the Soviets, nuclear non-pro- liferation and human rights progress. Given the need to cftiject publicly and privately to the Argentines* positions on Bolivia, the trip would at best serve no constructive purpose as far as these other Issues are concerned. And, cancelling the trip is probably a more powerful statement than any Bill could have delivered in person. involvement^ at least BUI Bowdler^ visit Omitted here is material unrelated to Argentina. ADP Declassification Review DECLASSIFIED by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 — / • / / - UNCLASSIFIED 114. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State Buenos Aires, August 15, 1980, 1936Z 6584 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800392-0933. Secret; Exdis; Nofom. UNCLASSIFIED SECRET - 2 of 3 SEGRST- PAGE 01 BUENOS 06584 172144Z ACTION SS-30 INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W 122830 172207Z /23 R 151936Z AUG 80 FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES ■K3 SECSTATE WASHDC 6406 3 B C R E - T BUmiOS AIRES 6584 EXDIS NOFORN E.O. 12065; RDS-4 8/14/00 (RUSER, CLAUS W. ) OR-M TAGS: EAID MASS PCT^ AR GT SUBJECT: tSt GROWJ^G ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN GUATEMALA REF: STATE 203396, 1.-S-/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. WE KNOW FROM BOTH ARGENTINE AND GUATEMALAN CREDIBLE SOURCES THAT THE GOA PERCEIVES OF CENTRAL AMERICA AS A VACUUM RAPIDLY FILLING WITH RADICAL LEFTWING EXILE GROUPS --SOME TERRORIST, TO INCLUDE MONTONERO GROUPS WITH CLOSE TIES TO HAVANA. GHSERAL CARLOS MARTINEZ, OilEF OF THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) HAS STATED THAT HIS SERVICE HAS INCONTROVERTIBLE PROOF THAT THE MONTONEROS AND OTHER SOTHERN CONE TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TRANSPLANTED THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN EXILE FROM EUROPE TO HAVANA, WITH AN INCREASINGLY GREATER PRESENCE AND MILITANT INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERIA, AT TOIS TIME PRIMARILY NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR. ( WE CANNOT CONFIRM THEIR VIEWS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH "HEADQUARTERS" IN HAVANA.) THIS IS, OF COURSE, CREDITED IN GREAT PART TO USG ABDICA- TION OF STRONG LEADERSHIP IN THAT REGION, AS RANKING - SECRET ADP Declassificalion Review SE C RE T DECLASSIFIED PAGE 02 BUENOS 06584 172144Z by John Fitzpatrick, 4/24/2017 ARGENTINE OFFICIALS VIEW U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. THUS, SENIOR ARGENTINE OFFICIALS SEE CENTRAL AMERICA AS A NEW SAFEHAVEN AND FOCUS FOR CUBAN- LINKED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION LED BY THE SAME MILITANTS OF 3ECRE= P 2 of 3 3 of 3 S E CR ET THE RADICAL LEFT EXPELLED FROM ARGENTINA, CHILE AND OTHER NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. MARTINE25 EXPRESSED SERIOUS CON- CERN THAT THESE ACTIVISTS OF THE RADICAL LEFT, IF PERMITTED TO TRIUMPH IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WOULD USE THAT REGION AS A BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR RENEWING SUBVERSIVE AND GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AGAINS ARGENTINA. THAT IS, PRESUMABLY, THE RATIONALE FOR ARGENTINA'S INTEREST IN ASSISTING GUATEMALA EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, ESPECIALLY, IN RESISTING THE RADICAL LEFT IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. 3. WE ALSO KNOW THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA REGARDS ARGENTINA AS THE ULTIMATE "SUCCESS STORY" IN . DISARTICULAT- ING THE LEFT, AND IS EAGER TO EMMULATE "THE ARGENTINE fTODEL" IN REPEATING THAT EXPERIENCE IN ITS OWN COUNTRY. TO THAT END WE ARE AWARE OP TRAINING IN THE AREAS OF COUNTER- INTELLlGmCE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY ALREADY GIVEN OR BEING GIVEN TO MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM GUATEMALA, SALVADOR AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WE SUSPECT THAT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT TO ARGENTINA OF GUATEMALAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAFAEL CASTILLO VALDEZ, MAY HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CONTEMPLATING FURTHER TUIGENTINE ASSISTANCE AND POSSIBLY MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR GUATEMALA. AT THIS TIME WE ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY AWARE OF POSSIBLE ARGENTINE AGREEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO SELL THEM MILITARY EQUIP- MENT, TRAIN POLICE PERSONNEL, OR TO FACILITATE ARGENTINE EXPORTS TO GUATEMALA. RUSER ■ SE C RE T NNN SECR E T 3 of 3 UNCLASSIFIED 115. Telepmm From Secretary of State Muskie’s Delegation to the Department of State and the Embassy in Argentina New York, October 1, 1980, 1756Z Secto 8046 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800470-0449. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Asuncion, Brasilia, the U.S. Mission to Geneva, La Paz, Montevideo, and Santiago. Muskie was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly. UNCLASSIFIED Document View Page 1 of 5 CONFIPCWTlAt r EXDIS OOHPIDBlf T Bar PAGB 01 SECTO 0804S 01 OP 03 011900Z ACTION SS-30 INFO OCT-01 ADS-OO SSO-00 CCO-00 /031 » 055626 Q11907Z /43 O 011756Z OCT 80 ZPF-6 PK OSDEI, SSCRSTARY IN NEW YORK TO SECSTATE WASfflJC IMMEDIATE AMSMBASSY BUENOS AIRES INFO AHEMBASSY ASUNCION AMEKBASSY BRASILIA USMISSION GENEVA AMSMBASSY LA PAZ AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO A}fra4BASSY SANTIAGO C U K P 1 D a N f i k T SECTICai 01 OP 03 SECTO 08046 EXDIS E.O. 12065: GDS 10/01/86 (BOMDLER, WILLIAM G.), OR-S TAGS; AR, PEPR, OAS, SHUN SUBJECT!